Walter Ferrarese
Biographic Data
| ID | 6220367 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Walter Ferrarese |
| GIVEN NAMES | Walter |
| FAMILY NAME | Ferrarese |
| SIGNATURE | FERRARESE W |
| AFFILIATIONS | Universitat de les Illes Balears |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4642-4522 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 2 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Exploiting homogeneity in games with non-homogeneous revenue functions
We exploit the properties of homogeneous functions to characterize the symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria of n -player symmetric games in which each player’s revenue function is not homogeneous but it can be decomposed into the sum of homogeneous functions with different degrees of homogeneity. Our results aim to provide a pathway for an easy computation of symmetric equilibria for this type of games. We discuss our results in a Cournot game…
Horizontal mergers with Bertrand competition and convex costs
We discuss horizontal mergers in a homogeneous good industry where firms compete à la Bertrand with increasing marginal production costs. We show that profitable mergers can occur even for lower post-merger prices with respect to the pre-merger scenario, thus implying an increase in consumer surplus. The driving force of the result is the ability of the merged entity cutting production costs by sharing the output among its plants. This output rat…
No prominent works on this page.
Exploiting homogeneity in games with non-homogeneous revenue functions
We exploit the properties of homogeneous functions to characterize the symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria of n -player symmetric games in which each player’s revenue function is not homogeneous but it can be decomposed into the sum of homogeneous functions with different degrees of homogeneity. Our results aim to provide a pathway for an easy computation of symmetric equilibria for this type of games. We discuss our results in a Cournot game…
Horizontal mergers with Bertrand competition and convex costs
We discuss horizontal mergers in a homogeneous good industry where firms compete à la Bertrand with increasing marginal production costs. We show that profitable mergers can occur even for lower post-merger prices with respect to the pre-merger scenario, thus implying an increase in consumer surplus. The driving force of the result is the ability of the merged entity cutting production costs by sharing the output among its plants. This output rat…
Cournot competition (2 works) · Mathematical economics (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Algorithm (1 work) · Bertrand competition (1 work) · Bertrand paradox (economics) (1 work) · Best response (1 work) · Combinatorics (1 work) · Competition (biology (1 work) · Computation (1 work)