Gunnar S Eskeland
Biographic Data
| ID | 6148799 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Gunnar S Eskeland |
| GIVEN NAMES | Gunnar S |
| FAMILY NAME | Eskeland |
| SIGNATURE | ESKELAND G S |
| AFFILIATIONS | World Bank |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 80 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 4 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1997 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2010 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Instrumentos de política para el control de la contaminación en los países en desarrollo
Cuáles son las estrategias apropiadas para proteger el ambiente en países en desarrollo que al mismo tiempo buscan promover el crecimiento y reducir la pobreza? Este artículo revisa la literatura acerca de la intervención costo-efectiva[1], comparando los instrumentos regulatorios y fiscales que pueden ser empleados con el propósito de reducir la contaminación. Los autores examinan lo que ocurre cuando las características propias de un país en de…
Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints
A multi-country study of the conditions under which decentralized countries might ensure fiscal discipline. In many parts of the world, lower levels of government are taking over responsibilities from national authorities. This often leads to difficulty in maintaining fiscal discipline. So-called soft budget constraints allow these subnational governments to expand expenditures without facing the full cost. Until now, however, there has been litt…
Moving to greener pastures? Multinationals and the pollution haven hypothesis
Corruption under Moral Hazard
Some corruption of employees will exist when managers are constrained in setting rewards and penalties. Attempts to reduce corruption need to address these constraints. Raising salaries without raising expected penalties will have higher costs than benefits
Is demand for polluting goods manageable? An econometric study of car ownership and use in Mexico
Is demand for polluting goods manageable? An econometric study of car ownership and use in Mexico
Corruption under Moral Hazard
Some corruption of employees will exist when managers are constrained in setting rewards and penalties. Attempts to reduce corruption need to address these constraints. Raising salaries without raising expected penalties will have higher costs than benefits
Fiscal Decentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraints
A multi-country study of the conditions under which decentralized countries might ensure fiscal discipline. In many parts of the world, lower levels of government are taking over responsibilities from national authorities. This often leads to difficulty in maintaining fiscal discipline. So-called soft budget constraints allow these subnational governments to expand expenditures without facing the full cost. Until now, however, there has been litt…
Moving to greener pastures? Multinationals and the pollution haven hypothesis
Instrumentos de política para el control de la contaminación en los países en desarrollo
Cuáles son las estrategias apropiadas para proteger el ambiente en países en desarrollo que al mismo tiempo buscan promover el crecimiento y reducir la pobreza? Este artículo revisa la literatura acerca de la intervención costo-efectiva[1], comparando los instrumentos regulatorios y fiscales que pueden ser empleados con el propósito de reducir la contaminación. Los autores examinan lo que ocurre cuando las características propias de un país en de…
Economics (4 works) · Macroeconomics (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Business (2 works) · Climate Change Policy and Economics (2 works) · Energy, Environment, and Transportation Policies (2 works) · Energy, Environment, Economic Growth (2 works) · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works) · Natural resource economics (2 works)