Corruption under Moral Hazard
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 19906487 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Gunnar S Eskeland (Norwegian School of Economics), Gunnar Eskeland, Henrik Thiele (Norwegian School of Economics) |
| Year | 1999 |
| Publication date | 1999-10-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | BOOK |
| Venue | World Bank policy research working paper (OTHER) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1813-9450 |
| Publisher | The World Bank (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1596/1813-9450-2204 |
| OpenAlex | W1592746814 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 2 |
Some corruption of employees will exist when managers are constrained in setting rewards and penalties. Attempts to reduce corruption need to address these constraints. Raising salaries without raising expected penalties will have higher costs than benefits
Economics · Hazard · Incentive · Language change · Microeconomics · Moral hazard · Political science · Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance · Chemistry · Corruption and Economic Development · Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems · Philosophy
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,08 |
| Citation span | 2000 - 2016 (17) |
| Citation velocity | historical |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 1 |