Ivan Oelrich
Biographic Data
| ID | 6154329 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Ivan Oelrich |
| GIVEN NAMES | Ivan |
| FAMILY NAME | Oelrich |
| SIGNATURE | OELRICH I |
| AFFILIATIONS | Former Vice President, Federation of American Scientists, Washington, DC, USA |
| ORCID | 0009-0007-4748-4080 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 21 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 6 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1990 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Anti-satellite warfare, proliferated satellites, and the future of space-based military surveillance
Will proliferated satellites enable a transparent battlefield in a way that might transform continental warfare? Many now think so. We argue, however, that anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities will limit satellites' potential contribution, but only if land forces adapt by deploying ground-based jamming and dazzling technologies. In a sustained measure-countermeasure competition, these non-kinetic approaches enjoy advantages that can deny an opponen…
Cool your jets
Russia, China, and the United States are in a race to develop and deploy hypersonic glide weapons. Hypersonic vehicles are defined as moving at a speed greater than five times the speed of sound. The US Defense Department has claimed these weapons will provide revolutionary new capabilities and will present daunting new threats against which there is currently no effective defense. Such claims have been repeated with little skepticism in the publ…
Future Warfare in the Western Pacific
Many analysts worry that improvements in Chinese missile, sensor, guidance, and other technologies will enable China to deny the U.S. military access to parts of the Western Pacific that the United States has long controlled. Although these “antiaccess, area denial” (A2/AD) capabilities are real, they are a geographically limited long-term threat. As both the United States and China deploy A2/AD capabilities, a new era will emerge in which the U.…
Iran and nuclear ambiguity
A comparison between Iran's current nuclear efforts and those of the pro-Western regime of Shah Reza Pahlavi shows that Iranian ambitions for a full-fledged civilian nuclear programme have remained relatively constant for nearly half a century. Today, fuel cycle technology provides Iran with a latent nuclear weapon's potential. However, US concerns about an Iranian bomb, which began in the early 1970s and aggravated after the Iranian Revolution, …
Controlling anti‐personnel landmines
(1998). Controlling anti‐personnel landmines. Contemporary Security Policy: Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 27-71
The Changing Rules of Arms Control Verification
Future Warfare in the Western Pacific
Many analysts worry that improvements in Chinese missile, sensor, guidance, and other technologies will enable China to deny the U.S. military access to parts of the Western Pacific that the United States has long controlled. Although these “antiaccess, area denial” (A2/AD) capabilities are real, they are a geographically limited long-term threat. As both the United States and China deploy A2/AD capabilities, a new era will emerge in which the U.…
The Changing Rules of Arms Control Verification
Controlling anti‐personnel landmines
(1998). Controlling anti‐personnel landmines. Contemporary Security Policy: Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 27-71
Iran and nuclear ambiguity
A comparison between Iran's current nuclear efforts and those of the pro-Western regime of Shah Reza Pahlavi shows that Iranian ambitions for a full-fledged civilian nuclear programme have remained relatively constant for nearly half a century. Today, fuel cycle technology provides Iran with a latent nuclear weapon's potential. However, US concerns about an Iranian bomb, which began in the early 1970s and aggravated after the Iranian Revolution, …
Future Warfare in the Western Pacific
Many analysts worry that improvements in Chinese missile, sensor, guidance, and other technologies will enable China to deny the U.S. military access to parts of the Western Pacific that the United States has long controlled. Although these “antiaccess, area denial” (A2/AD) capabilities are real, they are a geographically limited long-term threat. As both the United States and China deploy A2/AD capabilities, a new era will emerge in which the U.…
Cool your jets
Russia, China, and the United States are in a race to develop and deploy hypersonic glide weapons. Hypersonic vehicles are defined as moving at a speed greater than five times the speed of sound. The US Defense Department has claimed these weapons will provide revolutionary new capabilities and will present daunting new threats against which there is currently no effective defense. Such claims have been repeated with little skepticism in the publ…
Anti-satellite warfare, proliferated satellites, and the future of space-based military surveillance
Will proliferated satellites enable a transparent battlefield in a way that might transform continental warfare? Many now think so. We argue, however, that anti-satellite (ASAT) capabilities will limit satellites' potential contribution, but only if land forces adapt by deploying ground-based jamming and dazzling technologies. In a sustained measure-countermeasure competition, these non-kinetic approaches enjoy advantages that can deny an opponen…
Political science (6 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Law (4 works) · Nuclear Issues and Defense (4 works) · Computer security (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Aeronautics (2 works) · Aerospace Engineering (2 works) · Aerospace Engineering (2 works) · Artificial Intelligence (2 works)