Gil Baram
Biographic Data
| ID | 6189785 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Gil Baram |
| GIVEN NAMES | Gil |
| FAMILY NAME | Baram |
| SIGNATURE | BARAM G |
| AFFILIATIONS | Bar-Ilan University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0384-612X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 12 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 8 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 12 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
When Intelligence Agencies Publicly Attribute Offensive Cyber Operations
In January 2021, U.S. intelligence agencies—the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the National Security Agency—and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency publicly attributed the SolarWinds cyber intrusion to an unnamed “Russian actor.” Four months later, in April 2021, the Biden Administration explicitly named the perpetrator as the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service. This ra…
Re-ordering accountability
What lurks beneath the tip of the iceberg? Exploring the “missingness” problem in cyber events data
Redefining vigilance
Israel was caught off guard by Hamas attack on October 7, underscoring vulnerabilities in its national security apparatus. Scholars and practitioners primarily attribute this failure to intelligence oversights and misinterpretations of Hamas’ intentions and capabilities. However, we argue that the October 7 attack represents more than an intelligence failure; it highlights a breakdown in multiple elements of Israel’s security doctrine, focusing o…
Navigating uncertainty in cyber conflict
This paper examines false flag operations in cyberspace and their implications for attribution. While these operations are key to understanding cyber conflict, they are mostly understudied outside technical research. We place deception and attribution challenges within the broader context of offensive cyber operations and international security, illustrating how manipulating identity and intent complicates forensic analysis and political decision…
Introduction
Cyber Diplomacy through Official Public Attribution
International discussions on establishing and implementing norms for behavior in cyberspace have spanned over two decades. However, differences in what constitutes ‘acceptable conduct’ have hindered progress in forming these norms. In recent years, Western countries have adopted a strategy to signal what is considered unacceptable behavior by publicly attributing cyberattacks and intrusions. I argue that this act of official public attribution se…
Public Secrets
Historically, offensive cyber operations (OCOs) have been considered a practice that states could carry out covertly, away from the public eye, with both perpetrators and defenders having incentives to remain silent. Over the past few years, however, perpetrators and defenders have publicly acknowledged their involvement in OCOs. How common is this strategic choice among states? What are its characteristics? In this research note I show that this…
Deter, Disrupt, or Deceive
Journal Article Deter, Disrupt, or Deceive: Assessing Cyber Conflict as an Intelligence Contest Get access Robert Chesney Max Smeets Editors. Deter, Disrupt, or Deceive: Assessing Cyber Conflict as an Intelligence Contest. Georgetown University Press, 2023. 318pp. $36.95 (ISBN: 978-1647123260) Gil Baram Gil Baram University of California, USA https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0384-612X Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Sc…
Saving face in the cyberspace
How do states "save face" following a cyber intrusion directed at them? Recent scholarship demonstrates that the covert nature of cyber intrusions allows states to respond with restraint, avoiding escalation. But what happens when cyber intrusions become public and are highly visible? This article examines the rhetorical strategies employed by authoritarian Gulf states to mitigate the image-related costs associated with a public cyber intrusion. …
The Academic Reserve
Why is Israel world-renowned as the ‘start-up nation’ and a leading source of technological innovation? While existing scholarship focuses on the importance of skill development during Israel Defense Forces (IDF) service, we argue that the key role of the Academic Reserve has been overlooked. Established in the 1950s as part of David Ben-Gurion’s vision for a scientifically and technologically advanced defense force, the Academic Reserve is a spe…
Why can't we be friends? Challenges to international cyberwarfare cooperation efforts and the way ahead
In the past few years, there has been growing recognition of the importance of international cooperation concerning cyberwarfare norms. To this end, a number of international forums have been established, but as of now, they have had limited success. We recognize three major challenges to the success these forums: (1) the problem of trust, (2) varying threat perceptions, and (3) different definitions of state sovereignty. We analyze the existing …
Deter, Disrupt, or Deceive
Journal Article Deter, Disrupt, or Deceive: Assessing Cyber Conflict as an Intelligence Contest Get access Robert Chesney Max Smeets Editors. Deter, Disrupt, or Deceive: Assessing Cyber Conflict as an Intelligence Contest. Georgetown University Press, 2023. 318pp. $36.95 (ISBN: 978-1647123260) Gil Baram Gil Baram University of California, USA https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0384-612X Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Sc…
Saving face in the cyberspace
How do states "save face" following a cyber intrusion directed at them? Recent scholarship demonstrates that the covert nature of cyber intrusions allows states to respond with restraint, avoiding escalation. But what happens when cyber intrusions become public and are highly visible? This article examines the rhetorical strategies employed by authoritarian Gulf states to mitigate the image-related costs associated with a public cyber intrusion. …
The Academic Reserve
Why is Israel world-renowned as the ‘start-up nation’ and a leading source of technological innovation? While existing scholarship focuses on the importance of skill development during Israel Defense Forces (IDF) service, we argue that the key role of the Academic Reserve has been overlooked. Established in the 1950s as part of David Ben-Gurion’s vision for a scientifically and technologically advanced defense force, the Academic Reserve is a spe…
Public Secrets
Historically, offensive cyber operations (OCOs) have been considered a practice that states could carry out covertly, away from the public eye, with both perpetrators and defenders having incentives to remain silent. Over the past few years, however, perpetrators and defenders have publicly acknowledged their involvement in OCOs. How common is this strategic choice among states? What are its characteristics? In this research note I show that this…
Why can't we be friends? Challenges to international cyberwarfare cooperation efforts and the way ahead
In the past few years, there has been growing recognition of the importance of international cooperation concerning cyberwarfare norms. To this end, a number of international forums have been established, but as of now, they have had limited success. We recognize three major challenges to the success these forums: (1) the problem of trust, (2) varying threat perceptions, and (3) different definitions of state sovereignty. We analyze the existing …
The Academic Reserve
Why is Israel world-renowned as the ‘start-up nation’ and a leading source of technological innovation? While existing scholarship focuses on the importance of skill development during Israel Defense Forces (IDF) service, we argue that the key role of the Academic Reserve has been overlooked. Established in the 1950s as part of David Ben-Gurion’s vision for a scientifically and technologically advanced defense force, the Academic Reserve is a spe…
Why can't we be friends? Challenges to international cyberwarfare cooperation efforts and the way ahead
In the past few years, there has been growing recognition of the importance of international cooperation concerning cyberwarfare norms. To this end, a number of international forums have been established, but as of now, they have had limited success. We recognize three major challenges to the success these forums: (1) the problem of trust, (2) varying threat perceptions, and (3) different definitions of state sovereignty. We analyze the existing …
Public Secrets
Historically, offensive cyber operations (OCOs) have been considered a practice that states could carry out covertly, away from the public eye, with both perpetrators and defenders having incentives to remain silent. Over the past few years, however, perpetrators and defenders have publicly acknowledged their involvement in OCOs. How common is this strategic choice among states? What are its characteristics? In this research note I show that this…
Deter, Disrupt, or Deceive
Journal Article Deter, Disrupt, or Deceive: Assessing Cyber Conflict as an Intelligence Contest Get access Robert Chesney Max Smeets Editors. Deter, Disrupt, or Deceive: Assessing Cyber Conflict as an Intelligence Contest. Georgetown University Press, 2023. 318pp. $36.95 (ISBN: 978-1647123260) Gil Baram Gil Baram University of California, USA https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0384-612X Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Sc…
Saving face in the cyberspace
How do states "save face" following a cyber intrusion directed at them? Recent scholarship demonstrates that the covert nature of cyber intrusions allows states to respond with restraint, avoiding escalation. But what happens when cyber intrusions become public and are highly visible? This article examines the rhetorical strategies employed by authoritarian Gulf states to mitigate the image-related costs associated with a public cyber intrusion. …
Cyber Diplomacy through Official Public Attribution
International discussions on establishing and implementing norms for behavior in cyberspace have spanned over two decades. However, differences in what constitutes ‘acceptable conduct’ have hindered progress in forming these norms. In recent years, Western countries have adopted a strategy to signal what is considered unacceptable behavior by publicly attributing cyberattacks and intrusions. I argue that this act of official public attribution se…
Redefining vigilance
Israel was caught off guard by Hamas attack on October 7, underscoring vulnerabilities in its national security apparatus. Scholars and practitioners primarily attribute this failure to intelligence oversights and misinterpretations of Hamas’ intentions and capabilities. However, we argue that the October 7 attack represents more than an intelligence failure; it highlights a breakdown in multiple elements of Israel’s security doctrine, focusing o…
Navigating uncertainty in cyber conflict
This paper examines false flag operations in cyberspace and their implications for attribution. While these operations are key to understanding cyber conflict, they are mostly understudied outside technical research. We place deception and attribution challenges within the broader context of offensive cyber operations and international security, illustrating how manipulating identity and intent complicates forensic analysis and political decision…
Introduction
When Intelligence Agencies Publicly Attribute Offensive Cyber Operations
In January 2021, U.S. intelligence agencies—the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and the National Security Agency—and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency publicly attributed the SolarWinds cyber intrusion to an unnamed “Russian actor.” Four months later, in April 2021, the Biden Administration explicitly named the perpetrator as the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service. This ra…
Re-ordering accountability
What lurks beneath the tip of the iceberg? Exploring the “missingness” problem in cyber events data
Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare Studies (9 works) · Political science (8 works) · Law (6 works) · Attribution (5 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Information and Cyber Security (5 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Business (4 works) · Cyberspace (4 works) · European and Russian Geopolitical Military Strategies (4 works)