Roger G López
Biographic Data
| ID | 6213550 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Roger G López |
| GIVEN NAMES | Roger G |
| FAMILY NAME | López |
| SIGNATURE | LÓPEZ R G |
| AFFILIATIONS | Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas "Francisco García Salinas" |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-2683-1756 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 8 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Destigmatizing Stigma
This article deals with the moral evaluation of stigma. I respond to Euan Allison's recent critique of stigma, calling into question his major arguments for its wrongness. Allison's foundational premise is that stigma is wrong because it fails to treat the stigmatized as individuals. He accepts that stigma denies the autonomy of those it attaches to but concludes that its distinctive wrongness lies in the harm it does to their agency by limiting …
Regrettable experiences and the affirmation of life
My theme in this essay is the relation of misfortune – and other occasions for regret – to the affirmation of life. R. Jay Wallace believes there is an antagonistic relation that produces a schism between our affirmative attitudes and our reasons and considered judgments. On his view, our attachments to the persons and projects that give meaning to our lives lead us to affirm states of affairs it would be more appropriate to regret. I argue that …
Is Blame a Moral Attitude
The present article challenges a widespread view of blame as an inherently moral attitude. I begin by pointing out some features of blame that are not readily explained by, and not obviously compatible with, a moral orientation. To account for those features, I elucidate Nietzsche’s insights that blame responds to frustration and can serve as a bulwark against unwelcome self-perception, drawing as well on modern psychoanalysis’s inheritance of th…
Forgiveness out of control
This article challenges the widespread assumption that forgiveness transpires under voluntary control. I explain that that assumption underlies the lively debate of the question of whether forgiveness is or ought to be free or conditional. I then critically examine two accounts of forgiveness, those of Avishai Margalit and Pamela Hieronymi, to which the assumption of control is pivotal, and argue that they are compromised by that assumption. The …
The Ethical Import of Grief
Emerson's Philosophical Hour of Friendship
This paper responds to David Robinson's reading of Emerson's Friendship. On Robinson's reading, that essay initially offers a pessimistic picture of friendship grounded in determinism, then reverses itself and in doing so, repudiates philosophy altogether. My aim here is to establish that Emerson's arguments in that essay are not only consistent but tenable and do not call for recantation. I will argue that Robinsons misreads several key passages…
The heteronomous moral value of shame
Recent work in moral theory has argued against according shame any moral value in virtue of its supposed heteronomy. Authors who have defended shame's moral value have generally argued that shame is, in fact, autonomous. In the present article, I draw on the work of Jean-Paul Sartre, Stanley Cavell and Adam Smith to develop an argument for shame's moral worth based on its heteronomy. I then contrast my defence with work that holds shame's moral v…
William James and the Religious Character of the Sick Soul
No prominent works on this page.
William James and the Religious Character of the Sick Soul
Emerson's Philosophical Hour of Friendship
This paper responds to David Robinson's reading of Emerson's Friendship. On Robinson's reading, that essay initially offers a pessimistic picture of friendship grounded in determinism, then reverses itself and in doing so, repudiates philosophy altogether. My aim here is to establish that Emerson's arguments in that essay are not only consistent but tenable and do not call for recantation. I will argue that Robinsons misreads several key passages…
The heteronomous moral value of shame
Recent work in moral theory has argued against according shame any moral value in virtue of its supposed heteronomy. Authors who have defended shame's moral value have generally argued that shame is, in fact, autonomous. In the present article, I draw on the work of Jean-Paul Sartre, Stanley Cavell and Adam Smith to develop an argument for shame's moral worth based on its heteronomy. I then contrast my defence with work that holds shame's moral v…
Forgiveness out of control
This article challenges the widespread assumption that forgiveness transpires under voluntary control. I explain that that assumption underlies the lively debate of the question of whether forgiveness is or ought to be free or conditional. I then critically examine two accounts of forgiveness, those of Avishai Margalit and Pamela Hieronymi, to which the assumption of control is pivotal, and argue that they are compromised by that assumption. The …
The Ethical Import of Grief
Is Blame a Moral Attitude
The present article challenges a widespread view of blame as an inherently moral attitude. I begin by pointing out some features of blame that are not readily explained by, and not obviously compatible with, a moral orientation. To account for those features, I elucidate Nietzsche’s insights that blame responds to frustration and can serve as a bulwark against unwelcome self-perception, drawing as well on modern psychoanalysis’s inheritance of th…
Regrettable experiences and the affirmation of life
My theme in this essay is the relation of misfortune – and other occasions for regret – to the affirmation of life. R. Jay Wallace believes there is an antagonistic relation that produces a schism between our affirmative attitudes and our reasons and considered judgments. On his view, our attachments to the persons and projects that give meaning to our lives lead us to affirm states of affairs it would be more appropriate to regret. I argue that …
Destigmatizing Stigma
This article deals with the moral evaluation of stigma. I respond to Euan Allison's recent critique of stigma, calling into question his major arguments for its wrongness. Allison's foundational premise is that stigma is wrong because it fails to treat the stigmatized as individuals. He accepts that stigma denies the autonomy of those it attaches to but concludes that its distinctive wrongness lies in the harm it does to their agency by limiting …
Philosophy (6 works) · Epistemology (5 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Sociology (5 works) · Social Psychology (4 works) · American Constitutional Law and Politics (2 works) · Autonomy (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Emotions and Moral Behavior (2 works) · Free Will and Agency (2 works)