Forgiveness out of control

Bibliographic Data

ID21371424
AuthorsRoger G López (0000-0002-2683-1756, corresponding author), Roger Lopez (0000-0002-1091-5955)
Year2021
Volume96
Issue4
Pages527-551
Publication date2021-10-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8191 • E-ISSN: 1469-817X
PublisherCambridge University Press (CUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1017/s0031819121000115
OpenAlexW3153829442
LanguageEN
References cited15

This article challenges the widespread assumption that forgiveness transpires under voluntary control. I explain that that assumption underlies the lively debate of the question of whether forgiveness is or ought to be free or conditional. I then critically examine two accounts of forgiveness, those of Avishai Margalit and Pamela Hieronymi, to which the assumption of control is pivotal, and argue that they are compromised by that assumption. The premise that forgiveness is voluntary leads Margalit to incorrectly dissociate it from forgetting, and Hieronymi to grant judgment a role it can't reliably fulfill on its own. Drawing on works of theory and literature, I suggest that elements outside our control, such as time, other persons, identification and circumstances can play significant parts in bringing forgiveness about. I thus try to pave the way for a more complete view of forgiveness

Cognitive psychology · Control (management) · Epistemology · Forgetting · Forgiveness · Identification (biology) · Premise · Computer Science · Forgiveness and Related Behaviors · Hannah Arendt's Political Philosophy · Philosophy · Philosophy and Literary Analysis · Psychology · Social Psychology

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