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Masahide Horita

Biographic Data

ID6219835
NAMEMasahide Horita
GIVEN NAMESMasahide
FAMILY NAMEHorita
SIGNATUREHORITA M
AFFILIATIONSThe University of Tokyo
ORCID0000-0002-6987-5898
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS9
TOTAL CITATIONS0
AUTHOR COUNT8
EDITOR COUNT1
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2020
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2026
H-INDEX0
  • Behavior Assessment in Tunnel Construction

    Open Access•Muhammad Tajammal Khan, Masahide Horita•ARTICLE•Group Decision and Negotiation•2026

  • A unified understanding of majority rule, CP majority rule, and their variants

    Open Access•Takahiro Suzuki, Yu Maemura et al.•ARTICLE•Social Choice and Welfare•2026

  • Revisiting J. S. Mill’s methods

    Open Access•Takahiro Suzuki, Masahide Horita•ARTICLE•Social Choice and Welfare•2026

    In his work “A System of Logic”, John Stuart Mill presented four methods of experimental inquiry, structured into five canons, aimed at determining the circumstances that relate to the considered phenomenon by an invariable law. This study delves into Mill’s methods through the lens of social choice theory and discovers the synchronicity between these theories. Our primary finding is that Approval Voting and the Leximax rule are characterized by …

  • Sabotage-proof social ranking solutions

    Open Access•Takahiro Suzuki, Masahide Horita•ARTICLE•Theory and Decision•2025

    Robustness against strategic manipulation is a crucial topic in social choice theory. Under some social ranking solutions (SRSs), namely mappings that yield candidates’ ranking from their coalitions’ ranking, candidates can sometimes improve their own social ranking by strategically degrading the coalitions to which they belong (e.g., sabotaging the coalitions to which the candidates and their competitors both belong could damage their competitor…

  • Consistent social ranking solutions

    Open Access•Takahiro Suzuki, Masahide Horita•ARTICLE•Social Choice and Welfare•2024

    The performance of coalitions is an important measure for evaluating individuals. Sport players, researchers, and firm workers are often judged with their team performances. The social ranking solution (SRS) is a function that maps the ranking on the set of all feasible coalitions (the domain of coalitions) into the ranking of individuals. Importing the axiom of consistency from voting theory, we study consistent SRSs under the variable domains o…

  • Which set of agents plays a key role? An impossibility in transforming binary relations

    Open Access•Takahiro Suzuki, Masahide Horita•ARTICLE•Mathematical Social Sciences•2024•References: 10

  • A Society Can Always Decide How to Decide

    Open Access•Takahiro Suzuki, Masahide Horita•ARTICLE•Group Decision and Negotiation•2023

    Infinite regress lies within every democratic procedural choice. If society members try to select an appropriate rule [social choice correspondence (SCC)] entirely endogenously, they will need an appropriate rule to choose such a rule. However, this should also be selected by an appropriate rule to choose a rule to choose a rule, and so on. This paper explores how to solve this infinite regress. A preference profile over the set of alternatives i…

  • What Forms the Trajectory of Social Reforms? The Roles of Decision Rules and Communication under Epistemic Uncertainty

    Open Access•Taiga Tsubota, Masahide Horita•ARTICLE•Group Decision and Negotiation•2022

  • Group Decision and Negotiation: A Multidisciplinary Perspective

    Open Access•Danielle Costa Morais, Liping Fang et al.•BOOK•Group Decision and Negotiation: A…•2020

No prominent works on this page.

  • Group Decision and Negotiation: A Multidisciplinary Perspective

    Open Access•Danielle Costa Morais, Liping Fang et al.•BOOK•Group Decision and Negotiation: A…•2020

  • What Forms the Trajectory of Social Reforms? The Roles of Decision Rules and Communication under Epistemic Uncertainty

    Open Access•Taiga Tsubota, Masahide Horita•ARTICLE•Group Decision and Negotiation•2022

  • A Society Can Always Decide How to Decide

    Open Access•Takahiro Suzuki, Masahide Horita•ARTICLE•Group Decision and Negotiation•2023

    Infinite regress lies within every democratic procedural choice. If society members try to select an appropriate rule [social choice correspondence (SCC)] entirely endogenously, they will need an appropriate rule to choose such a rule. However, this should also be selected by an appropriate rule to choose a rule to choose a rule, and so on. This paper explores how to solve this infinite regress. A preference profile over the set of alternatives i…

  • Consistent social ranking solutions

    Open Access•Takahiro Suzuki, Masahide Horita•ARTICLE•Social Choice and Welfare•2024

    The performance of coalitions is an important measure for evaluating individuals. Sport players, researchers, and firm workers are often judged with their team performances. The social ranking solution (SRS) is a function that maps the ranking on the set of all feasible coalitions (the domain of coalitions) into the ranking of individuals. Importing the axiom of consistency from voting theory, we study consistent SRSs under the variable domains o…

  • Which set of agents plays a key role? An impossibility in transforming binary relations

    Open Access•Takahiro Suzuki, Masahide Horita•ARTICLE•Mathematical Social Sciences•2024•References: 10

  • Sabotage-proof social ranking solutions

    Open Access•Takahiro Suzuki, Masahide Horita•ARTICLE•Theory and Decision•2025

    Robustness against strategic manipulation is a crucial topic in social choice theory. Under some social ranking solutions (SRSs), namely mappings that yield candidates’ ranking from their coalitions’ ranking, candidates can sometimes improve their own social ranking by strategically degrading the coalitions to which they belong (e.g., sabotaging the coalitions to which the candidates and their competitors both belong could damage their competitor…

  • Behavior Assessment in Tunnel Construction

    Open Access•Muhammad Tajammal Khan, Masahide Horita•ARTICLE•Group Decision and Negotiation•2026

  • A unified understanding of majority rule, CP majority rule, and their variants

    Open Access•Takahiro Suzuki, Yu Maemura et al.•ARTICLE•Social Choice and Welfare•2026

  • Revisiting J. S. Mill’s methods

    Open Access•Takahiro Suzuki, Masahide Horita•ARTICLE•Social Choice and Welfare•2026

    In his work “A System of Logic”, John Stuart Mill presented four methods of experimental inquiry, structured into five canons, aimed at determining the circumstances that relate to the considered phenomenon by an invariable law. This study delves into Mill’s methods through the lens of social choice theory and discovers the synchronicity between these theories. Our primary finding is that Approval Voting and the Leximax rule are characterized by …

Computer Science (6 works) · Mathematical economics (6 works) · Economics (5 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (5 works) · Artificial Intelligence (4 works) · Game Theory and Applications (3 works) · Mathematics (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Social choice theory (3 works) · Artificial Intelligence (2 works)

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