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Consistent social ranking solutions

Bibliographic Data

ID21470290
AuthorsTakahiro Suzuki (0000-0002-1487-867X, The University of Tokyo, corresponding author), Masahide Horita (0000-0002-6987-5898, The University of Tokyo)
Year2024
Volume62
Issue3
Pages549-569
Publication date2024-05-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueSocial Choice and Welfare (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0176-1714 • E-ISSN: 1432-217X
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s00355-023-01502-1
OpenAlexW4391134900
LanguageEN
Citations received5
References cited16

The performance of coalitions is an important measure for evaluating individuals. Sport players, researchers, and firm workers are often judged with their team performances. The social ranking solution (SRS) is a function that maps the ranking on the set of all feasible coalitions (the domain of coalitions) into the ranking of individuals. Importing the axiom of consistency from voting theory, we study consistent SRSs under the variable domains of coalitions. We suppose that there are several domains of coalitions (e.g., a set of research teams made up of only young researchers and a set of research teams including senior researchers), and the individuals are required to be evaluated consistently on each domain of coalition. Such a situation is typical because all the logically possible coalitions are often too huge to deal with. We obtain a new characterization of the lexicographic excellence solution (LES) and its dual (DLES): they are the only SRSs satisfying consistency, neutrality, weak coalitional anonymity, and complete dominance. This characterization is expected to provide a new ground for determining the impacts of individuals based on the lexicographic comparisons of their team performances

Econometrics · Economics · International political economy · Macroeconomics · Mathematical economics · Political science · Public finance · Social policy · Computer Science · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law · Sports Analytics and Performance · Artificial Intelligence

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Unique citing works5
Citations per year5
Citation span2025 - 2026 (2)
Citation velocitycurrent
Highly citedNo
Citation typesNeutral: 5

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