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Desirability and social ranking

Bibliographic Data

ID21470384
AuthorsMichele Aleandri (0000-0002-5177-8176, Libera Università Internazionale degli Studi Sociali Guido Carli, corresponding author), Felix Fritz (0009-0002-7448-8005, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique), Stefano Moretti (0000-0003-3627-3257, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)
Year2025
Volume65
Issue3
Pages721-763
Publication date2025-11-01
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueSocial Choice and Welfare (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0176-1714 • E-ISSN: 1432-217X
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s00355-025-01590-1
OpenAlexW4409173615
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited25

We present an axiomatic study of various solutions to the social ranking problem, where a solution links any ranking of coalitions of players to a binary relation between individual players. We focus on solutions that align with the desirability relation, asserting that player i is more desirable than player j if any coalition including i but not j ranks higher than the corresponding coalition formed by replacing i with j . Unlike previous characterizations, our study highlights the central role of the desirability property as a foundational axiom in the characterization of five solutions from the related literature: Ceteris Paribus majority, lexicographic excellence and its dual, $$L^{(1)}$$ L ( 1 ) solution and its dual. Our main results reveal additional similarities among these five solutions and emphasize the essential features that should be considered when selecting the most appropriate solution for a given scenario. A practical application involving a bicameral legislature is also presented

Economics · Information retrieval · International political economy · Macroeconomics · Market economy · Political science · Public finance · Social policy · Computer Science · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Game Theory and Applications · Game Theory and Voting Systems · Law

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Citations per year1
Citation span2026 - 2026 (1)
Highly citedNo

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