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Stefano Moretti

Biographic Data

ID8796119
NAMEStefano Moretti
GIVEN NAMESStefano
FAMILY NAMEMoretti
SIGNATUREMORETTI S
AFFILIATIONSCentre National de la Recherche Scientifique
ORCID0000-0003-3627-3257
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS6
TOTAL CITATIONS0
AUTHOR COUNT6
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2011
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2026
H-INDEX0
  • Ranking Alternatives from Opinions on Criteria

    Open Access•Takahiro Suzuki, Stefano Moretti et al.•ARTICLE•Group Decision and Negotiation•2026

    A primary challenge in collective decision-making is that achieving unanimous agreement is difficult, even at the level of criteria. The history of social choice theory illustrates this: numerous normative criteria on voting rules have been proposed; however, disagreements persist regarding which criteria should take precedence. This study addresses the problem of ranking alternatives based on the aggregation of opinions over criteria that the al…

  • Lexicographic social ranking

    Open Access•Roberto Lucchetti, Monica Milasi et al.•ARTICLE•Social Choice and Welfare•2026

  • Desirability and social ranking

    Open Access•Michele Aleandri, Felix Fritz et al.•ARTICLE•Social Choice and Welfare•2025

    We present an axiomatic study of various solutions to the social ranking problem, where a solution links any ranking of coalitions of players to a binary relation between individual players. We focus on solutions that align with the desirability relation, asserting that player i is more desirable than player j if any coalition including i but not j ranks higher than the corresponding coalition formed by replacing i with j . Unlike previous charac…

  • A note on weighted multi-glove games

    Open Access•Stefano Moretti, Henk Norde•ARTICLE•Social Choice and Welfare•2021

    In this note we consider the class of weighted multi-glove games. We will show that these games are totally balanced and we will characterize the weighted multi-glove games that are supermodular and pmas-admissible. Moreover, we will provide an explicit expression for the Shapley value of the supermodular and a large part of the pmas-admissible weighted multi-glove games

  • Lexicographic solutions for coalitional rankings

    Open Access•Encarnación Algaba, Stefano Moretti et al.•ARTICLE•Social Choice and Welfare•2021

  • A.R.T. Ancient Rome Tour 2.0 Upgraded How Nero Saved Rome

    Open Access•Stefano Moretti, Alessandro Furlan•ARTICLE•Virtual Archaeology Review•2011

    attraverso la proiezione di alcune animazioni tratte da "How Nero Saved Rome" film in HD per National Geographic Channel e Il Foro Romano e i Fori Imperiali per la trasmissione RAI Ulisse

No prominent works on this page.

  • A.R.T. Ancient Rome Tour 2.0 Upgraded How Nero Saved Rome

    Open Access•Stefano Moretti, Alessandro Furlan•ARTICLE•Virtual Archaeology Review•2011

    attraverso la proiezione di alcune animazioni tratte da "How Nero Saved Rome" film in HD per National Geographic Channel e Il Foro Romano e i Fori Imperiali per la trasmissione RAI Ulisse

  • A note on weighted multi-glove games

    Open Access•Stefano Moretti, Henk Norde•ARTICLE•Social Choice and Welfare•2021

    In this note we consider the class of weighted multi-glove games. We will show that these games are totally balanced and we will characterize the weighted multi-glove games that are supermodular and pmas-admissible. Moreover, we will provide an explicit expression for the Shapley value of the supermodular and a large part of the pmas-admissible weighted multi-glove games

  • Lexicographic solutions for coalitional rankings

    Open Access•Encarnación Algaba, Stefano Moretti et al.•ARTICLE•Social Choice and Welfare•2021

  • Desirability and social ranking

    Open Access•Michele Aleandri, Felix Fritz et al.•ARTICLE•Social Choice and Welfare•2025

    We present an axiomatic study of various solutions to the social ranking problem, where a solution links any ranking of coalitions of players to a binary relation between individual players. We focus on solutions that align with the desirability relation, asserting that player i is more desirable than player j if any coalition including i but not j ranks higher than the corresponding coalition formed by replacing i with j . Unlike previous charac…

  • Ranking Alternatives from Opinions on Criteria

    Open Access•Takahiro Suzuki, Stefano Moretti et al.•ARTICLE•Group Decision and Negotiation•2026

    A primary challenge in collective decision-making is that achieving unanimous agreement is difficult, even at the level of criteria. The history of social choice theory illustrates this: numerous normative criteria on voting rules have been proposed; however, disagreements persist regarding which criteria should take precedence. This study addresses the problem of ranking alternatives based on the aggregation of opinions over criteria that the al…

  • Lexicographic social ranking

    Open Access•Roberto Lucchetti, Monica Milasi et al.•ARTICLE•Social Choice and Welfare•2026

Game Theory and Voting Systems (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Multi-Criteria Decision Making (3 works) · Axiom (2 works) · Combinatorics (2 works) · Economics (2 works) · Game Theory and Applications (2 works) · International political economy (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Lexicographical order (2 works)

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