Jeong-Yoo Kim
Biographic Data
| ID | 6220091 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jeong-Yoo Kim |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jeong-Yoo |
| FAMILY NAME | Kim |
| SIGNATURE | KIM J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Kyung Hee University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 15 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 3 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 15 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2001 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Product Recommendation and Self-Preferencing
We consider a monopolistic platform's product recommendation as a nonbinding communication message when there is platform encroachment. We show that a partially truth-revealing equilibrium in which the platform sometimes cheats and the consumer sometimes exits from the platform exists even in a stage game, albeit no fully communicative one. We also characterize a partially revealing equilibrium in infinitely repeated games both in cases that the …
Credible plea bargaining with the Jury’s rational conviction decision
Seller liability versus platform liability
Strict liability versus negligence in the case of data breach
Evolutionary stability of preferences
Limited Liability, Liability Cap, and Pretrial Negotiation
We examine how the possibility of limited liability will affect the trial likelihood when the plaintiff is uninformed of whether the defendant is financially constrained or not. The financially constrained defendant has a smaller incentive to settle because he has less to lose in court, and thus makes a lower settlement offer. Therefore, there is a separating equilibrium in which only the poor defendant goes to court, while the rich defendant mak…
Guaranteed lowest prices
We examine the effect of guaranteed lowest price clauses (G.L.P.). First, we correct the proof of Logan and Lutter’s main result that it is the unique equilibrium outcome for firms adopting G.L.P. to charge collusive prices in a simultaneous pricing game, if one uses the trembling-hand perfect equilibrium as the solution concept. Second, we extend their argument to a sequential pricing game in which one firm chooses its price before the other, gi…
Quantity Restrictions with Imperfect Enforcement in an Overused Commons
This paper presents a model of quantity regulation as a policy variable when regulation enforcement is imperfect. The model provides a counterintuitive result: that equilibrium congestion can become worse as the quantity restriction becomes more severe. Intuitively, stricter regulation makes the detection probability lower due to the crowding effect, which makes agents more likely to violate the regulation. The effect of the regulation standard i…
A signalling explanation for preferential attachment in the evolution of social networks
Connectivity, stability and efficiency in a network as an information flow
Information Acquisition Activity and Damage Measures
We examine the effect of various damage measures on the buyer's information acquisition efforts when the buyer can learn a signal about the production cost after a contract. We find that contrary to standard results, liquidated damages induce neither efficient performance nor efficient reliance, if a buyer decides to learn the signal, and that they do not provide a buyer with the incentive to acquire information. Thus, if acquiring information is…
Hyperbolic discounting and the repeated self-control problem
Consumer referral in a small world network
Yes-Men and No-Men
We provide the rationale for the existence of yes-men and no-men in an organization or a group. On one hand, a person is inclined to conform to the instruction of another, because he cannot ignore the information contained in the instruction, even though his own evidence contradicts the instruction. On the other hand, if only the person himself knows the accuracy of his own information, he may tend to disobey the instruction, to make others belie…
An Economic Theory of Deviance
We develop a model of deviance by incorporating the labeling effect into rational choice theory. In our model, we provide an explanation of the process through which a deviant is stigmatized and explore theoretically the relationship between the experience of having deviated and the incentive for deviation. Surprisingly, our study finds that an ex-deviant is not necessarily more likely to deviate, contrary to widely held belief. This is because t…
An Economic Theory of Deviance
We develop a model of deviance by incorporating the labeling effect into rational choice theory. In our model, we provide an explanation of the process through which a deviant is stigmatized and explore theoretically the relationship between the experience of having deviated and the incentive for deviation. Surprisingly, our study finds that an ex-deviant is not necessarily more likely to deviate, contrary to widely held belief. This is because t…
Yes-Men and No-Men
We provide the rationale for the existence of yes-men and no-men in an organization or a group. On one hand, a person is inclined to conform to the instruction of another, because he cannot ignore the information contained in the instruction, even though his own evidence contradicts the instruction. On the other hand, if only the person himself knows the accuracy of his own information, he may tend to disobey the instruction, to make others belie…
Consumer referral in a small world network
Information Acquisition Activity and Damage Measures
We examine the effect of various damage measures on the buyer's information acquisition efforts when the buyer can learn a signal about the production cost after a contract. We find that contrary to standard results, liquidated damages induce neither efficient performance nor efficient reliance, if a buyer decides to learn the signal, and that they do not provide a buyer with the incentive to acquire information. Thus, if acquiring information is…
Hyperbolic discounting and the repeated self-control problem
Connectivity, stability and efficiency in a network as an information flow
A signalling explanation for preferential attachment in the evolution of social networks
Quantity Restrictions with Imperfect Enforcement in an Overused Commons
This paper presents a model of quantity regulation as a policy variable when regulation enforcement is imperfect. The model provides a counterintuitive result: that equilibrium congestion can become worse as the quantity restriction becomes more severe. Intuitively, stricter regulation makes the detection probability lower due to the crowding effect, which makes agents more likely to violate the regulation. The effect of the regulation standard i…
Guaranteed lowest prices
We examine the effect of guaranteed lowest price clauses (G.L.P.). First, we correct the proof of Logan and Lutter’s main result that it is the unique equilibrium outcome for firms adopting G.L.P. to charge collusive prices in a simultaneous pricing game, if one uses the trembling-hand perfect equilibrium as the solution concept. Second, we extend their argument to a sequential pricing game in which one firm chooses its price before the other, gi…
Limited Liability, Liability Cap, and Pretrial Negotiation
We examine how the possibility of limited liability will affect the trial likelihood when the plaintiff is uninformed of whether the defendant is financially constrained or not. The financially constrained defendant has a smaller incentive to settle because he has less to lose in court, and thus makes a lower settlement offer. Therefore, there is a separating equilibrium in which only the poor defendant goes to court, while the rich defendant mak…
Evolutionary stability of preferences
Seller liability versus platform liability
Strict liability versus negligence in the case of data breach
Product Recommendation and Self-Preferencing
We consider a monopolistic platform's product recommendation as a nonbinding communication message when there is platform encroachment. We show that a partially truth-revealing equilibrium in which the platform sometimes cheats and the consumer sometimes exits from the platform exists even in a stage game, albeit no fully communicative one. We also characterize a partially revealing equilibrium in infinitely repeated games both in cases that the …
Credible plea bargaining with the Jury’s rational conviction decision
Economics (9 works) · Computer Science (7 works) · Game Theory and Applications (6 works) · Business (5 works) · Law (5 works) · Microeconomics (5 works) · Political science (5 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (4 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (3 works)