Quantity Restrictions with Imperfect Enforcement in an Overused Commons
Permissive Regulation to Reduce Overuse?
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 24049872 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Nathan Berg (0000-0002-1686-1281, Kyung Hee University, corresponding author), Jeong‐yoo Kim (Kyung Hee University), Jeong-Yoo Kim |
| Year | 2015 |
| Volume | 171 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 308-329 |
| Publication date | 2015-01-01 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics JITE (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0932-4569 • E-ISSN: 1614-0559 |
| Publisher | Mohr Siebeck (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1628/093245615x14273596659008 |
| OpenAlex | W2141879523 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 1 |
| References cited | 4 |
This paper presents a model of quantity regulation as a policy variable when regulation enforcement is imperfect. The model provides a counterintuitive result: that equilibrium congestion can become worse as the quantity restriction becomes more severe. Intuitively, stricter regulation makes the detection probability lower due to the crowding effect, which makes agents more likely to violate the regulation. The effect of the regulation standard is, however, not monotonic. This implies that the optimal standard should be neither too strict nor too permissive. We also discuss optimal enforcement.
Biology · Business · Commons · Economics · Enforcement · Imperfect · Permissive · Political science · Auction Theory and Applications · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Game Theory and Applications · Law
| Citations per year | 0.17 |
|---|---|
| Citation span | 2020 - 2020 (1) |
| Highly cited | No |