Ryan Kulesa
Biographic Data
| ID | 6298457 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Ryan Kulesa |
| GIVEN NAMES | Ryan |
| FAMILY NAME | Kulesa |
| SIGNATURE | KULESA R |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Missouri |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-1678-1166 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Conscientious refusal or conscientious provision
Some authors argue that it is permissible for clinicians to conscientiously provide abortion services because clinicians are already allowed to conscientiously refuse to provide certain services. Call this the symmetry thesis. We argue that on either of the two main understandings of the aim of the medical profession—what we will call “pathocentric” and “interest‐centric” views—conscientious refusal and conscientious provision are mutually exclus…
The doing/allowing distinction in the divine context
The theist needs a conception of the distinction between doing and allowing because much of the literature focused on the problem of evil attempts to justify (via theodicy) or defend (via defence) God's allowing evil to occur. I present a counterfactual account of the doing/allowing distinction in the divine context and argue that, even if there are compelling objections to counterfactual accounts of the distinction in the human context, they do …
Kantian Conscientious Objection
In her paper, “The cost of conscience: Kant on conscience and conscientious objection,” Jeanette Kennett argues that a Kantian view of conscientious objection in medicine would bar physicians from refusing to perform certain practices based on conscience. I offer a response in the following manner: First, I reconstruct her main argument; second, I present a more accurate picture of Kant’s view of conscience. I conclude that, given a Kantian frame…
The Counterfactual Argument Against Abortion
In this article, I present a novel argument against abortion. In short, what makes it wrong to kill someone is that they are a counterfactual person; counterfactual persons are individuals such that, were they not killed, they would have been persons. My view accommodates two intuitions which many views concerning the wrongness of killing fail to account for: embryo rescue cases and the impermissibility of infanticide. The view avoids embryo resc…
A defense of conscientious objection
Schuklenk, Smalling, and Savulescu put forth four conditions that delineate when conscientious objection is impermissible. Roughly, they argue for the following claim: if some practice is legal, standard, expected of a profession, and in the patient's interest, then medical professionals cannot refuse to perform the practice. In this essay, I argue that these conditions are not jointly sufficient to deny medical professionals the ability to refus…
Preemption and a counterfactual analysis of divine causation
The consequence of evil
Some philosophers of religion contend that the mere existence of natural evils gives strong reason to reject the existence of an omnibenevolent God. This brief essay takes the form of a reductio ad absurdum in order to demonstrate that the greatest good may only be achieved through the existence of a natural world, where a natural world may be defined as a possible world comprised of a maximally consistent set of propositions that affirm the exis…
No prominent works on this page.
The consequence of evil
Some philosophers of religion contend that the mere existence of natural evils gives strong reason to reject the existence of an omnibenevolent God. This brief essay takes the form of a reductio ad absurdum in order to demonstrate that the greatest good may only be achieved through the existence of a natural world, where a natural world may be defined as a possible world comprised of a maximally consistent set of propositions that affirm the exis…
Preemption and a counterfactual analysis of divine causation
A defense of conscientious objection
Schuklenk, Smalling, and Savulescu put forth four conditions that delineate when conscientious objection is impermissible. Roughly, they argue for the following claim: if some practice is legal, standard, expected of a profession, and in the patient's interest, then medical professionals cannot refuse to perform the practice. In this essay, I argue that these conditions are not jointly sufficient to deny medical professionals the ability to refus…
Kantian Conscientious Objection
In her paper, “The cost of conscience: Kant on conscience and conscientious objection,” Jeanette Kennett argues that a Kantian view of conscientious objection in medicine would bar physicians from refusing to perform certain practices based on conscience. I offer a response in the following manner: First, I reconstruct her main argument; second, I present a more accurate picture of Kant’s view of conscience. I conclude that, given a Kantian frame…
The Counterfactual Argument Against Abortion
In this article, I present a novel argument against abortion. In short, what makes it wrong to kill someone is that they are a counterfactual person; counterfactual persons are individuals such that, were they not killed, they would have been persons. My view accommodates two intuitions which many views concerning the wrongness of killing fail to account for: embryo rescue cases and the impermissibility of infanticide. The view avoids embryo resc…
Conscientious refusal or conscientious provision
Some authors argue that it is permissible for clinicians to conscientiously provide abortion services because clinicians are already allowed to conscientiously refuse to provide certain services. Call this the symmetry thesis. We argue that on either of the two main understandings of the aim of the medical profession—what we will call “pathocentric” and “interest‐centric” views—conscientious refusal and conscientious provision are mutually exclus…
The doing/allowing distinction in the divine context
The theist needs a conception of the distinction between doing and allowing because much of the literature focused on the problem of evil attempts to justify (via theodicy) or defend (via defence) God's allowing evil to occur. I present a counterfactual account of the doing/allowing distinction in the divine context and argue that, even if there are compelling objections to counterfactual accounts of the distinction in the human context, they do …
Philosophy (4 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Theology and Philosophy of Evil (4 works) · Conscientious objector (3 works) · Counterfactual thinking (3 works) · Epistemology (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Medicine (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · War, Ethics, and Justification (3 works)