Tess Dewhurst
Biographic Data
| ID | 6298472 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Tess Dewhurst |
| GIVEN NAMES | Tess |
| FAMILY NAME | Dewhurst |
| SIGNATURE | DEWHURST T |
| AFFILIATIONS | Rhodes University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7535-5389 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 4 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2009 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
We Do Not Know Propositions
Contemporary epistemologists analysing knowledge take (true) propositions to be the object of knowledge. In this paper, I provide an argument for the claim that the object of knowledge is, in fact, the world. The propositions in propositional knowledge ascriptions merely describe the part of the world of which the subject is aware. Kent Bach's response to Fregean puzzles creates a distinction between propositions and the object of belief. He clai…
The non-existent objects of belief
When I know something, what is the object of my knowledge? For example, when I know that it is raining, what is the thing that I know? The contemporary response is to say that what I know is the proposition “that it is raining”. Propositions are also the objects of belief: when I believe that it is raining, it is the proposition “that it is raining” that I believe. I am a proponent of the more controversial view that the object of my knowledge is…
The value problem and the nature of knowledge
Jason Baehr has argued that the intuition that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief is neither sufficiently general nor sufficiently formal to motivate the value problem in epistemology. What he calls the “guiding intuition” is not completely general: our intuition does not reveal that knowledge is always more valuable than true belief; and not strictly formal: the intuition is not merely the abstract claim that knowledge is more valu…
The Epistemology of Testimony
In this paper I aim to defend the claim that we are a priori entitled to accept that a speaker is being sincere, unless there are positive reasons not to. I look initially at the trust approach to testimony, which claims affective trust plays an epistemic role in our coming to believe that a speaker is being sincere. My claim is that this view is mistaken, and yet has something important to say in recognising the essential difference between test…
No prominent works on this page.
The Epistemology of Testimony
In this paper I aim to defend the claim that we are a priori entitled to accept that a speaker is being sincere, unless there are positive reasons not to. I look initially at the trust approach to testimony, which claims affective trust plays an epistemic role in our coming to believe that a speaker is being sincere. My claim is that this view is mistaken, and yet has something important to say in recognising the essential difference between test…
The value problem and the nature of knowledge
Jason Baehr has argued that the intuition that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief is neither sufficiently general nor sufficiently formal to motivate the value problem in epistemology. What he calls the “guiding intuition” is not completely general: our intuition does not reveal that knowledge is always more valuable than true belief; and not strictly formal: the intuition is not merely the abstract claim that knowledge is more valu…
The non-existent objects of belief
When I know something, what is the object of my knowledge? For example, when I know that it is raining, what is the thing that I know? The contemporary response is to say that what I know is the proposition “that it is raining”. Propositions are also the objects of belief: when I believe that it is raining, it is the proposition “that it is raining” that I believe. I am a proponent of the more controversial view that the object of my knowledge is…
We Do Not Know Propositions
Contemporary epistemologists analysing knowledge take (true) propositions to be the object of knowledge. In this paper, I provide an argument for the claim that the object of knowledge is, in fact, the world. The propositions in propositional knowledge ascriptions merely describe the part of the world of which the subject is aware. Kent Bach's response to Fregean puzzles creates a distinction between propositions and the object of belief. He clai…
Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Epistemology (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 works) · Proposition (2 works) · Argument (complex analysis) (1 work) · Assertion (1 work) · Descriptive knowledge (1 work) · Ethics in medical practice (1 work)