We Do Not Know Propositions
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 20143451 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Tess Dewhurst (0000-0002-7535-5389, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf Düsseldorf Germany, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2026 |
| Publication date | 2026-04-04 |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Theoria (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0040-5825 • E-ISSN: 1755-2567 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/theo.70084 |
| OpenAlex | W7149604515 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 14 |
Contemporary epistemologists analysing knowledge take (true) propositions to be the object of knowledge. In this paper, I provide an argument for the claim that the object of knowledge is, in fact, the world. The propositions in propositional knowledge ascriptions merely describe the part of the world of which the subject is aware. Kent Bach's response to Fregean puzzles creates a distinction between propositions and the object of belief. He claims propositions merely describe or characterise what is believed. I will use this move to claim that it is possible that propositions merely describe what we know, and do not constitute it. In this way, knowledge can be a relation between the subject and the world rather than the subject and a true proposition
Argument (complex analysis) · Descriptive knowledge · Object (grammar) · Proposition · Relation (database) · Subject (documents) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science
| Highly cited | No |
|---|