Alnica Visser
Biographic Data
| ID | 6298590 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Alnica Visser |
| GIVEN NAMES | Alnica |
| FAMILY NAME | Visser |
| SIGNATURE | VISSER A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of the Witwatersrand |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-2948-9490 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
The cognitive role of concept variability
I present and defend concept variability , the view that concepts can admit of indefinitely many variations and changes in their representational contents without thereby losing their identity. I argue that the variability of concepts is central to their role in enabling cognition, and thus that a concept's content variability is, despite philosophical orthodoxy to the contrary, a feature of our cognitive architecture and not a bug
Genericity generalized
The original analytic/synthetic distinction
In her 2007 survey of the topic, Gillian Russell stipulates five criteria that any adequate account of the analytic/synthetic distinction must meet. These criteria include the charge that the distinction must provide an account of the objects of the distinction, render the distinction non-trivial, explain why analytic truths are necessary and a priori, explain away our intuitions regarding some apparently contingent analytic truths, and finally e…
No prominent works on this page.
The original analytic/synthetic distinction
In her 2007 survey of the topic, Gillian Russell stipulates five criteria that any adequate account of the analytic/synthetic distinction must meet. These criteria include the charge that the distinction must provide an account of the objects of the distinction, render the distinction non-trivial, explain why analytic truths are necessary and a priori, explain away our intuitions regarding some apparently contingent analytic truths, and finally e…
Genericity generalized
The cognitive role of concept variability
I present and defend concept variability , the view that concepts can admit of indefinitely many variations and changes in their representational contents without thereby losing their identity. I argue that the variability of concepts is central to their role in enabling cognition, and thus that a concept's content variability is, despite philosophical orthodoxy to the contrary, a feature of our cognitive architecture and not a bug
Epistemology (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Linguistics (2 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (2 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 works) · Aesthetics (1 work) · Analytic philosophy (1 work) · Child and Animal Learning Development (1 work) · Cognition (1 work) · Cognitive architecture (1 work)