The original analytic/synthetic distinction
Still no cause for concern
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 11420480 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Alnica Visser (0000-0002-2948-9490, University of the Witwatersrand, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2015 |
| Volume | 34 |
| Issue | 3 |
| Pages | 271-278 |
| Publication date | 2015-07-03 |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | South African Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0258-0136 • E-ISSN: 2073-4867 |
| Publisher | Informa UK Limited (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/02580136.2015.1047259 |
| OpenAlex | W2306201115 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 6 |
In her 2007 survey of the topic, Gillian Russell stipulates five criteria that any adequate account of the analytic/synthetic distinction must meet. These criteria include the charge that the distinction must provide an account of the objects of the distinction, render the distinction non-trivial, explain why analytic truths are necessary and a priori, explain away our intuitions regarding some apparently contingent analytic truths, and finally explain why some truths that are true in virtue of meaning alone fail to seem analytic. In this paper I argue that a species-genus hierarchy interpretation of Kant's version of the distinction can meet all five these criteria. I argue further that Kant's distinction provides an interesting escape from Quine's charge that the distinction relies implicitly on a vicious circularity. The aim of this paper is to showcase the continuing strength of Kant's presentation of the distinction, despite the widespread contemporary charges of obscurity
Analytic philosophy · Contemporary philosophy · Epistemology · Linguistics · Quine · Virtue · Philosophy · Philosophy and History of Science · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Philosophy, Science, and History
| Highly cited | No |
|---|