Joanne M Walker
Biographic Data
| ID | 632819 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Joanne M Walker |
| GIVEN NAMES | Joanne M |
| FAMILY NAME | Walker |
| SIGNATURE | WALKER J M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Indiana University Bloomington |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-4625-4175 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 29 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 546 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 29 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1932 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 10 |
Fentanyl, Heroin, and Cocaine Overdose Fatalities are Shifting to the Black Community: An Analysis of the State of Connecticut
Changes in Covid-19-Associated Deaths During a Year Among Blacks and Hispanics Compared to Whites in the State of Connecticut
Excess Deaths Among Blacks and Latinx Compared to Whites During Covid-19
A Pandemic on a Pandemic: Racism and Covid-19 in Blacks
Racial Profiling Is a Public Health and Health Disparities Issue
The Bloomington Workshop: Multiple methods, interdisciplinary research, and collective action
Resource allocation contests: Experimental evidence
Reprint of: A common-pool resource experiment with postgraduate subjects from 41 countries
Foundations of the Ostrom workshop: Institutional analysis, polycentricity, and self-governance of the commons
Asymmetric payoffs in simultaneous and sequential prisoner’s dilemma games
Heterogeneous Preferences and Collective Action
Cooperation in PD Games: Fear, Greed, and History of Play
Collective Choice in the Commons: Experimental Results on Proposed Allocation Rules and Votes
We analyse and empirically examine a multi‐level common‐pool resource (CPR) game consisting of a collective‐choice level game and an operational‐level game. In the collective‐choice game, participants anonymously propose allocation rules to be used in the operational game and vote anonymously on the proposed rules. Majority and unanimity rules are investigated. Our major finding is that both types of voting rules substantially increase efficiency…
The voluntary provision of a pure public good with diminishing marginal returns
Reciprocity, Trust, and the Sense of Control: A Cross-Societal Study
Most cognitive approaches for explaining cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma games include the view that many people believe that mutual cooperation is generally a gainful strategy to all parties and will cooperate when they think their partner cooperates. Proceeding along these lines, we argue that many participants treat a Prisoner's Dilemma game as an assurance game, and respond in a reciprocal manner to the choice or expected choice of their pa…
Heterogenous demand for public goods: Behavior in the voluntary contributions mechanism
Group size and the voluntary provision of public goods
Heterogeneities, Information and Conflict Resolution: Experimental Evidence on Sharing Contracts
A growing body of field and experimental literature provides considerable evidence that individuals may adopt self-governing institutions that enable conflict resolution. This paper examines this issue by exploring the role of heterogeneity in individuals' production capabilities and past investments as an obstacle to conflict resolution. Results are presented from two ongoing research programs: (1) individual and group decision making in the con…
Probabilistic Destruction of Common-pool Resources: Experimental Evidence
Journal Article Probabilistic Destruction of Common-pool Resources: Experimental Evidence Get access James M. Walker, James M. Walker Indiana University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Roy Gardner Roy Gardner Indiana University and USDA-ERS Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 102, Issue 414, 1 September 1992, Pages 1149–1161, https://doi.org…
Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible
Contemporary political theory often assumes that individuals cannot make credible commitments where substantial temptations exist to break them unless such commitments are enforced by anexternalagent. One such situation may occur in relation tocommon pool resources, which are natural or man-made resources whose yield is subtractable and whose exclusion is nontrivial (but not necessarily impossible). Examples include fisheries, forests, grazing ra…
The Nature of Common-Pool Resource Problems
This article presents a conceptual framework for theoretical and empirical analysis of the multiplicity of behavioral problems encountered in common-pool resources (CPRs). This framework is used to specify more clearly the strategic content of CPR dilemmas and to show their interaction. The framework shows how general theoretical constructs (e.g., Prisoner's Dilemma and coordination games) apply to these behavioral dilemmas. Finally, results from…
The assurance problem in a laboratory market
Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism
This paper examines the relationship between variations in group size and “free-riding” behavior in the voluntary provision of public goods. We examine experimentally two pertinent concepts: the marginal return to an individual from contributions to the public good, and the actual number of members in the group. Our results strongly support a hypothesis that increasing group size leads to a reduction in allocative efficiency when accompanied by a…
Communication and Free‐riding Behavior: The Voluntary Contribution Mechanism
We examine experimentally the role of active communication as a mechanism for improving economic efficiency in a voluntary contribution public goods environment. With no communication this environment has been shown to induce significant subop‐timality, approaching zero contributions with iteration of the decision environment. Communication is shown to improve group optimality significantly. We examine the robustness of our results in increasingl…
Divergent evidence on free riding: An experimental examination of possible explanations
Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible
Contemporary political theory often assumes that individuals cannot make credible commitments where substantial temptations exist to break them unless such commitments are enforced by anexternalagent. One such situation may occur in relation tocommon pool resources, which are natural or man-made resources whose yield is subtractable and whose exclusion is nontrivial (but not necessarily impossible). Examples include fisheries, forests, grazing ra…
Divergent evidence on free riding: An experimental examination of possible explanations
Reciprocity, Trust, and the Sense of Control: A Cross-Societal Study
Most cognitive approaches for explaining cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma games include the view that many people believe that mutual cooperation is generally a gainful strategy to all parties and will cooperate when they think their partner cooperates. Proceeding along these lines, we argue that many participants treat a Prisoner's Dilemma game as an assurance game, and respond in a reciprocal manner to the choice or expected choice of their pa…
The Nature of Common-Pool Resource Problems
This article presents a conceptual framework for theoretical and empirical analysis of the multiplicity of behavioral problems encountered in common-pool resources (CPRs). This framework is used to specify more clearly the strategic content of CPR dilemmas and to show their interaction. The framework shows how general theoretical constructs (e.g., Prisoner's Dilemma and coordination games) apply to these behavioral dilemmas. Finally, results from…
Collective Choice in the Commons: Experimental Results on Proposed Allocation Rules and Votes
We analyse and empirically examine a multi‐level common‐pool resource (CPR) game consisting of a collective‐choice level game and an operational‐level game. In the collective‐choice game, participants anonymously propose allocation rules to be used in the operational game and vote anonymously on the proposed rules. Majority and unanimity rules are investigated. Our major finding is that both types of voting rules substantially increase efficiency…
Cooperation in PD Games: Fear, Greed, and History of Play
The assurance problem in a laboratory market
A Regional Test of the Heckscher-Ohlin Hypothesis
Racial Profiling Is a Public Health and Health Disparities Issue
Foundations of the Ostrom workshop: Institutional analysis, polycentricity, and self-governance of the commons
Heterogeneous Preferences and Collective Action
Probabilistic Destruction of Common-pool Resources: Experimental Evidence
Journal Article Probabilistic Destruction of Common-pool Resources: Experimental Evidence Get access James M. Walker, James M. Walker Indiana University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Roy Gardner Roy Gardner Indiana University and USDA-ERS Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 102, Issue 414, 1 September 1992, Pages 1149–1161, https://doi.org…
Heterogenous demand for public goods: Behavior in the voluntary contributions mechanism
Resource allocation contests: Experimental evidence
The voluntary provision of a pure public good with diminishing marginal returns
Asymmetric payoffs in simultaneous and sequential prisoner’s dilemma games
Voluntary Response to Energy Conservation Appeals
Journal Article Voluntary Response to Energy Conservation Appeals Get access James M. Walker James M. Walker Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic PubMed Google Scholar Journal of Consumer Research, Volume 7, Issue 1, June 1980, Pages 88–92, https://doi.org/10.1086/208796 Published: 01 June 1980 Article history Received: 01 July 1979 Revision received: 01 December 1979 Published: 01 June 1980
The Secret Service Under Charles II and James II
The reigns of the last two Stuart kings are coloured by the fact that Charles II did not inherit his throne but was restored to it. During the first seven years of the Restoration era a second attempt to overthrow the monarchy naturally seemed possible to Royalists, whose memories of the discomforts of exile were still green. Hence a special organization to watch the movements of malcontents and report on their activities, developed under the con…
A Regional Test of the Heckscher-Ohlin Hypothesis
Voluntary Response to Energy Conservation Appeals
Journal Article Voluntary Response to Energy Conservation Appeals Get access James M. Walker James M. Walker Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic PubMed Google Scholar Journal of Consumer Research, Volume 7, Issue 1, June 1980, Pages 88–92, https://doi.org/10.1086/208796 Published: 01 June 1980 Article history Received: 01 July 1979 Revision received: 01 December 1979 Published: 01 June 1980
Incentive Payments in Time-of-Day Electricity Pricing Experiments: The Arizona Experience
Daniel H. Hill, Deborah A. Ott, Lester D. Taylor, James M. Walker, Incentive Payments in Time-of-Day Electricity Pricing Experiments: The Arizona Experience, The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 65, No. 1 (Feb., 1983), pp. 59-65
Divergent evidence on free riding: An experimental examination of possible explanations
Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism
This paper examines the relationship between variations in group size and “free-riding” behavior in the voluntary provision of public goods. We examine experimentally two pertinent concepts: the marginal return to an individual from contributions to the public good, and the actual number of members in the group. Our results strongly support a hypothesis that increasing group size leads to a reduction in allocative efficiency when accompanied by a…
Communication and Free‐riding Behavior: The Voluntary Contribution Mechanism
We examine experimentally the role of active communication as a mechanism for improving economic efficiency in a voluntary contribution public goods environment. With no communication this environment has been shown to induce significant subop‐timality, approaching zero contributions with iteration of the decision environment. Communication is shown to improve group optimality significantly. We examine the robustness of our results in increasingl…
The assurance problem in a laboratory market
The Nature of Common-Pool Resource Problems
This article presents a conceptual framework for theoretical and empirical analysis of the multiplicity of behavioral problems encountered in common-pool resources (CPRs). This framework is used to specify more clearly the strategic content of CPR dilemmas and to show their interaction. The framework shows how general theoretical constructs (e.g., Prisoner's Dilemma and coordination games) apply to these behavioral dilemmas. Finally, results from…
Probabilistic Destruction of Common-pool Resources: Experimental Evidence
Journal Article Probabilistic Destruction of Common-pool Resources: Experimental Evidence Get access James M. Walker, James M. Walker Indiana University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Roy Gardner Roy Gardner Indiana University and USDA-ERS Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 102, Issue 414, 1 September 1992, Pages 1149–1161, https://doi.org…
Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible
Contemporary political theory often assumes that individuals cannot make credible commitments where substantial temptations exist to break them unless such commitments are enforced by anexternalagent. One such situation may occur in relation tocommon pool resources, which are natural or man-made resources whose yield is subtractable and whose exclusion is nontrivial (but not necessarily impossible). Examples include fisheries, forests, grazing ra…
Group size and the voluntary provision of public goods
Heterogeneities, Information and Conflict Resolution: Experimental Evidence on Sharing Contracts
A growing body of field and experimental literature provides considerable evidence that individuals may adopt self-governing institutions that enable conflict resolution. This paper examines this issue by exploring the role of heterogeneity in individuals' production capabilities and past investments as an obstacle to conflict resolution. Results are presented from two ongoing research programs: (1) individual and group decision making in the con…
Heterogenous demand for public goods: Behavior in the voluntary contributions mechanism
The voluntary provision of a pure public good with diminishing marginal returns
Reciprocity, Trust, and the Sense of Control: A Cross-Societal Study
Most cognitive approaches for explaining cooperation in Prisoner's Dilemma games include the view that many people believe that mutual cooperation is generally a gainful strategy to all parties and will cooperate when they think their partner cooperates. Proceeding along these lines, we argue that many participants treat a Prisoner's Dilemma game as an assurance game, and respond in a reciprocal manner to the choice or expected choice of their pa…
Collective Choice in the Commons: Experimental Results on Proposed Allocation Rules and Votes
We analyse and empirically examine a multi‐level common‐pool resource (CPR) game consisting of a collective‐choice level game and an operational‐level game. In the collective‐choice game, participants anonymously propose allocation rules to be used in the operational game and vote anonymously on the proposed rules. Majority and unanimity rules are investigated. Our major finding is that both types of voting rules substantially increase efficiency…
Cooperation in PD Games: Fear, Greed, and History of Play
Heterogeneous Preferences and Collective Action
Asymmetric payoffs in simultaneous and sequential prisoner’s dilemma games
Foundations of the Ostrom workshop: Institutional analysis, polycentricity, and self-governance of the commons
Reprint of: A common-pool resource experiment with postgraduate subjects from 41 countries
Resource allocation contests: Experimental evidence
The Bloomington Workshop: Multiple methods, interdisciplinary research, and collective action
A Pandemic on a Pandemic: Racism and Covid-19 in Blacks
Economics (20 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (17 works) · Political science (16 works) · Microeconomics (14 works) · Computer Science (11 works) · Law (10 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (8 works) · Law (8 works) · Psychology (8 works) · Public finance (8 works)