Anna Bortolan
Biographic Data
| ID | 6533362 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Anna Bortolan |
| GIVEN NAMES | Anna |
| FAMILY NAME | Bortolan |
| SIGNATURE | BORTOLAN A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Swansea University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-6544-998X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 10 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 2 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 10 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Filling the Silence
This paper aims to explore from a philosophical perspective the experience of silence in social anxiety. Moving from the account of lived silences in mood disorders developed by Degerman (2024a), I argue that while “imposed”, “depressed”, “unknowing”, and “peaceful” silences can all be experienced by those who are socially anxious, this condition is also associated with two distinct ways of perceiving silence that are not captured by Degerman’s t…
Pretending to be myself
Drawing on the notion of “camouflaging” and its characterization within research on autism, this paper explores the role that attempts to conceal one’s experiences may have in the phenomenology of anxiety. I start by suggesting that actions associated with both the “masking” and “compensating” dimension of camouflaging may be present in different forms of anxiety. I then proceed to argue that these actions may foster the person’s ability to susta…
Epistemic emotions and self-trust
Epistemic emotions – namely affective phenomena like curiosity, certainty, and doubt – have been claimed to play a key role in epistemic evaluation and motivation, and, relatedly, to be an integral aspect of the epistemic virtues. In this paper I argue that the experience of epistemic emotions is extensively shaped by self-trust. More specifically, I claim that the set of epistemic emotions that we can undergo, and how these unfold over time, is …
Becoming oneself online
This paper explores how self-identity can be impacted upon by the use of digital and social media. In particular, drawing on a narrative account of selfhood, it argues that some forms of activity and interaction on the internet can support the capacity to be oneself, and foster transformative processes that are self-enhancing. I start by introducing different positions in the philosophical exploration of identity online, critically outlining the …
Online emotions
The paper develops a philosophical account of emotions experienced and communicated on the internet, and, in particular, in the context of social media use. A growing body of research across disciplines has investigated the distinctive features of emotions in the digital age, and a key question in this regard concerns whether online emotions are the same kind of phenomena as those undergone offline. In this paper, I contribute to addressing this …
Healing online? Social anxiety and emotion regulation in pandemic experience
During the pandemic of Covid-19, internet-based communication became for many the primary, or only, means of interaction with others, and it has been argued that this had a host of negative effects on emotional and mental health. However, some people with a lived experience of mental ill-health also perceived improvements to their wellbeing during the period in which social activities were moved online. In this paper, I explore the possibility th…
Selves hijacked
This paper investigates from a phenomenological perspective the origins of self-illness ambiguity. Drawing on phenomenological theories of affectivity and selfhood, I argue that, as a phenomenon which concerns primarily the ‘personal self’, self-illness ambiguity is dependent on distinct alterations of affective background orientations. I start by illustrating how personhood is anchored in the experience of a specific set of non-intentional affec…
Narrate It Until You Become It
Research in phenomenology and philosophy of psychiatry has suggested that psychopathological disturbances of experience often involve an alteration of one's ‘sense of possibility’, dependent upon the presence of specific ‘existential feelings’ (Ratcliffe 2012). In this paper I provide an extended account of how the engagement with certain narratives can lead to a transformation of one's sense of possibility by eliciting affective experiences that…
Affectivity and the distinction between minimal and narrative self
In the contemporary phenomenological literature it has been argued that it is possible to distinguish between two forms of selfhood: the “minimal” and “narrative” self. This paper discusses a claim which is central to this account, namely that the minimal and narrative self complement each other but are fundamentally distinct dimensions. In particular, I challenge the idea that while the presence of a minimal self is a condition of possibility fo…
Self‐Esteem and Ethics
This paper aims to provide an account of the relationship between self‐esteem and moral experience. In particular, drawing on feminist and phenomenological accounts of affectivity and ethics, I argue that self‐esteem has a primary role in moral epistemology and moral action. I start by providing a characterization of self‐esteem, suggesting in particular that it can be best understood through the phenomenological notion of “existential feeling.” …
Self‐Esteem and Ethics
This paper aims to provide an account of the relationship between self‐esteem and moral experience. In particular, drawing on feminist and phenomenological accounts of affectivity and ethics, I argue that self‐esteem has a primary role in moral epistemology and moral action. I start by providing a characterization of self‐esteem, suggesting in particular that it can be best understood through the phenomenological notion of “existential feeling.” …
Self‐Esteem and Ethics
This paper aims to provide an account of the relationship between self‐esteem and moral experience. In particular, drawing on feminist and phenomenological accounts of affectivity and ethics, I argue that self‐esteem has a primary role in moral epistemology and moral action. I start by providing a characterization of self‐esteem, suggesting in particular that it can be best understood through the phenomenological notion of “existential feeling.” …
Affectivity and the distinction between minimal and narrative self
In the contemporary phenomenological literature it has been argued that it is possible to distinguish between two forms of selfhood: the “minimal” and “narrative” self. This paper discusses a claim which is central to this account, namely that the minimal and narrative self complement each other but are fundamentally distinct dimensions. In particular, I challenge the idea that while the presence of a minimal self is a condition of possibility fo…
Narrate It Until You Become It
Research in phenomenology and philosophy of psychiatry has suggested that psychopathological disturbances of experience often involve an alteration of one's ‘sense of possibility’, dependent upon the presence of specific ‘existential feelings’ (Ratcliffe 2012). In this paper I provide an extended account of how the engagement with certain narratives can lead to a transformation of one's sense of possibility by eliciting affective experiences that…
Selves hijacked
This paper investigates from a phenomenological perspective the origins of self-illness ambiguity. Drawing on phenomenological theories of affectivity and selfhood, I argue that, as a phenomenon which concerns primarily the ‘personal self’, self-illness ambiguity is dependent on distinct alterations of affective background orientations. I start by illustrating how personhood is anchored in the experience of a specific set of non-intentional affec…
Healing online? Social anxiety and emotion regulation in pandemic experience
During the pandemic of Covid-19, internet-based communication became for many the primary, or only, means of interaction with others, and it has been argued that this had a host of negative effects on emotional and mental health. However, some people with a lived experience of mental ill-health also perceived improvements to their wellbeing during the period in which social activities were moved online. In this paper, I explore the possibility th…
Epistemic emotions and self-trust
Epistemic emotions – namely affective phenomena like curiosity, certainty, and doubt – have been claimed to play a key role in epistemic evaluation and motivation, and, relatedly, to be an integral aspect of the epistemic virtues. In this paper I argue that the experience of epistemic emotions is extensively shaped by self-trust. More specifically, I claim that the set of epistemic emotions that we can undergo, and how these unfold over time, is …
Becoming oneself online
This paper explores how self-identity can be impacted upon by the use of digital and social media. In particular, drawing on a narrative account of selfhood, it argues that some forms of activity and interaction on the internet can support the capacity to be oneself, and foster transformative processes that are self-enhancing. I start by introducing different positions in the philosophical exploration of identity online, critically outlining the …
Online emotions
The paper develops a philosophical account of emotions experienced and communicated on the internet, and, in particular, in the context of social media use. A growing body of research across disciplines has investigated the distinctive features of emotions in the digital age, and a key question in this regard concerns whether online emotions are the same kind of phenomena as those undergone offline. In this paper, I contribute to addressing this …
Filling the Silence
This paper aims to explore from a philosophical perspective the experience of silence in social anxiety. Moving from the account of lived silences in mood disorders developed by Degerman (2024a), I argue that while “imposed”, “depressed”, “unknowing”, and “peaceful” silences can all be experienced by those who are socially anxious, this condition is also associated with two distinct ways of perceiving silence that are not captured by Degerman’s t…
Pretending to be myself
Drawing on the notion of “camouflaging” and its characterization within research on autism, this paper explores the role that attempts to conceal one’s experiences may have in the phenomenology of anxiety. I start by suggesting that actions associated with both the “masking” and “compensating” dimension of camouflaging may be present in different forms of anxiety. I then proceed to argue that these actions may foster the person’s ability to susta…
Psychology (9 works) · Epistemology (8 works) · Philosophy (8 works) · Social Psychology (7 works) · Emotions and Moral Behavior (5 works) · Anxiety (4 works) · Linguistics (4 works) · Narrative (4 works) · Cognitive psychology (3 works) · Existentialism (3 works)