Epistemic emotions and self-trust

Bibliographic Data

ID21750808
AuthorsAnna Bortolan (0000-0002-6544-998X, Swansea University, corresponding author)
Year2024
Publication date2024-09-02
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1568-7759 • E-ISSN: 1572-8676
PublisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLC (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1007/s11097-024-10010-1
OpenAlexW4402138712
LanguageEN
Citations received2
References cited46

Epistemic emotions – namely affective phenomena like curiosity, certainty, and doubt – have been claimed to play a key role in epistemic evaluation and motivation, and, relatedly, to be an integral aspect of the epistemic virtues. In this paper I argue that the experience of epistemic emotions is extensively shaped by self-trust. More specifically, I claim that the set of epistemic emotions that we can undergo, and how these unfold over time, is modulated by the level of trust in one’s abilities as a knower. I do so by drawing on research on epistemic injustice, as well as through the exploration of some features of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) and depression. I then argue that the connection between epistemic emotions and self-trust can be best accounted for by conceiving of self-trust, through the framework of philosophical phenomenology, as an affective background orientation which has a structuring role in our cognitive and affective experience

Epistemology · Metaphysics · Philosophy of mind · Emotions and Moral Behavior · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Feminist Epistemology and Gender Studies · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology

Tools

Open DOIOpen Access