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Joshua Isaac Fox

Biographic Data

ID6558996
NAMEJoshua Isaac Fox
GIVEN NAMESJoshua Isaac
FAMILY NAMEFox
SIGNATUREFOX J I
AFFILIATIONSUniversity of Chicago
ORCID0000-0002-5188-9132
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS6
TOTAL CITATIONS1
AUTHOR COUNT6
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2020
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2026
H-INDEX1
  • All Desire is Aversion: Schopenhauer’s Case for Viewing Want as Harm

    Open Access•Joshua Isaac Fox•ARTICLE•Archiv für Geschichte der…•2026

    Schopenhauer’s case for pessimism turns on a claim about desire. All desire, Schopenhauer suggests, consists in aversion rather than attraction: we are pushed away from states experienced as bad rather than pulled toward states experienced as good. Despite this claim’s importance, most commentators view it as an unsupported assertion. I argue that this consensus is mistaken: Schopenhauer does not leave his theory of desire without defense. This d…

  • Does Schopenhauer accept any positive pleasures

    Open Access•Joshua Isaac Fox•ARTICLE•European Journal of Philosophy•2023

    Schopenhauer repeatedly claims that all pleasure is negative, and this view seems to play key roles throughout his work. Nonetheless, many scholars have argued that Schopenhauer actually acknowledges certain positive pleasures. Two major arguments have been offered for this reading, one focused on the link between Schopenhauer's view of pleasure and Plato's, and one focused on Schopenhauer's distinction between two components of aesthetic pleasur…

  • Schopenhauer on boredom

    Joshua Isaac Fox•ARTICLE•British Journal for the History…•2022

    On the dominant interpretation, Schopenhauer possesses a will to will view of boredom: boredom consists in the dissatisfaction of a second-order desire to pursue objects of first-order desire. I challenge this account, arguing that it misconstrues one of boredom’s effects for its essence. Instead, I suggest that Schopenhauer identifies boredom with distress at the inactivity of our faculties. The major contributor to this distress is the inactivi…

  • The Freedom-based Critique of Well-Being’s Exclusive Moral Claim

    Joshua Isaac Fox•ARTICLE•Journal of Human Development•2021•References: 2

    Amartya Sen has suggested that the moral significance of freedom undermines the view that well-being alone possesses fundamental moral worth. Sen’s efforts to establish this claim, however, seem to fall short: he attempts to establish freedom’s independent moral significance by pointing to the value of autonomy, but explains the value of autonomy in terms of its role as an element of well-being. Nonetheless, I take it that Sen is very much on the…

  • Two Pessimisms in Mill

    Open Access•Joshua Isaac Fox•ARTICLE•Utilitas•2021•Cited by: 1•References: 3

    Mill defines utilitarianism as the combination of a “theory of life” and a moral claim: only pleasure and freedom from pain are desirable as ends, and the promotion of happiness is the sole goal of moral action. So defined, utilitarianism is open to ad hominem pessimistic objection: a “theory of life” which entails the impossibility of happiness fits poorly with a morality centered on its promotion. The first two challenges Mill confronts in Util…

  • Gratitude to Beautiful Objects: On Nietzsche's Claim That the Beautiful “Promises Happiness”

    Joshua Isaac Fox•ARTICLE•The Journal of Nietzsche Studies•2020

    Nietzsche suggests that part of what it is to experience something as beautiful is to experience it as beneficial in the highest degree. He defends this claim by suggesting that it alone captures the experience of beauty typical of artists. I argue that this is best understood as pointing to an explanatory argument: Nietzsche takes his view to make sense of an effect beautiful objects have on artists. This effect is, I suggest, gratitude. Beautif…

  • Two Pessimisms in Mill

    Open Access•Joshua Isaac Fox•ARTICLE•Utilitas•2021•Cited by: 1•References: 3

    Mill defines utilitarianism as the combination of a “theory of life” and a moral claim: only pleasure and freedom from pain are desirable as ends, and the promotion of happiness is the sole goal of moral action. So defined, utilitarianism is open to ad hominem pessimistic objection: a “theory of life” which entails the impossibility of happiness fits poorly with a morality centered on its promotion. The first two challenges Mill confronts in Util…

  • Gratitude to Beautiful Objects: On Nietzsche's Claim That the Beautiful “Promises Happiness”

    Joshua Isaac Fox•ARTICLE•The Journal of Nietzsche Studies•2020

    Nietzsche suggests that part of what it is to experience something as beautiful is to experience it as beneficial in the highest degree. He defends this claim by suggesting that it alone captures the experience of beauty typical of artists. I argue that this is best understood as pointing to an explanatory argument: Nietzsche takes his view to make sense of an effect beautiful objects have on artists. This effect is, I suggest, gratitude. Beautif…

  • The Freedom-based Critique of Well-Being’s Exclusive Moral Claim

    Joshua Isaac Fox•ARTICLE•Journal of Human Development•2021•References: 2

    Amartya Sen has suggested that the moral significance of freedom undermines the view that well-being alone possesses fundamental moral worth. Sen’s efforts to establish this claim, however, seem to fall short: he attempts to establish freedom’s independent moral significance by pointing to the value of autonomy, but explains the value of autonomy in terms of its role as an element of well-being. Nonetheless, I take it that Sen is very much on the…

  • Two Pessimisms in Mill

    Open Access•Joshua Isaac Fox•ARTICLE•Utilitas•2021•Cited by: 1•References: 3

    Mill defines utilitarianism as the combination of a “theory of life” and a moral claim: only pleasure and freedom from pain are desirable as ends, and the promotion of happiness is the sole goal of moral action. So defined, utilitarianism is open to ad hominem pessimistic objection: a “theory of life” which entails the impossibility of happiness fits poorly with a morality centered on its promotion. The first two challenges Mill confronts in Util…

  • Schopenhauer on boredom

    Joshua Isaac Fox•ARTICLE•British Journal for the History…•2022

    On the dominant interpretation, Schopenhauer possesses a will to will view of boredom: boredom consists in the dissatisfaction of a second-order desire to pursue objects of first-order desire. I challenge this account, arguing that it misconstrues one of boredom’s effects for its essence. Instead, I suggest that Schopenhauer identifies boredom with distress at the inactivity of our faculties. The major contributor to this distress is the inactivi…

  • Does Schopenhauer accept any positive pleasures

    Open Access•Joshua Isaac Fox•ARTICLE•European Journal of Philosophy•2023

    Schopenhauer repeatedly claims that all pleasure is negative, and this view seems to play key roles throughout his work. Nonetheless, many scholars have argued that Schopenhauer actually acknowledges certain positive pleasures. Two major arguments have been offered for this reading, one focused on the link between Schopenhauer's view of pleasure and Plato's, and one focused on Schopenhauer's distinction between two components of aesthetic pleasur…

  • All Desire is Aversion: Schopenhauer’s Case for Viewing Want as Harm

    Open Access•Joshua Isaac Fox•ARTICLE•Archiv für Geschichte der…•2026

    Schopenhauer’s case for pessimism turns on a claim about desire. All desire, Schopenhauer suggests, consists in aversion rather than attraction: we are pushed away from states experienced as bad rather than pulled toward states experienced as good. Despite this claim’s importance, most commentators view it as an unsupported assertion. I argue that this consensus is mistaken: Schopenhauer does not leave his theory of desire without defense. This d…

Epistemology (5 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Aesthetics (3 works) · Nietzsche, Schopenhauer, and Hegel (3 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Social Psychology (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Economics (2 works)

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