Does Schopenhauer accept any positive pleasures

Bibliographic Data

ID21603264
AuthorsJoshua Isaac Fox (0000-0002-5188-9132, Department of Philosophy The University of Chicago Chicago Illinois USA, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume31
Issue4
Pages902-913
Publication date2023-12-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueEuropean Journal of Philosophy (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0966-8373 • E-ISSN: 1468-0378
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/ejop.12830
OpenAlexW4304783379
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited14

Schopenhauer repeatedly claims that all pleasure is negative, and this view seems to play key roles throughout his work. Nonetheless, many scholars have argued that Schopenhauer actually acknowledges certain positive pleasures. Two major arguments have been offered for this reading, one focused on the link between Schopenhauer's view of pleasure and Plato's, and one focused on Schopenhauer's distinction between two components of aesthetic pleasure. I argue that neither way of motivating the positive pleasure reading succeeds. Both overlook a key aspect of Schopenhauer's account: namely, his suggestion that there are two distinct kinds of negative pleasure, pleasures of satisfaction and pleasures of distraction . When Schopenhauer claims that all pleasure is negative, he means it

Aesthetics · Cognitive psychology · Distraction · Epistemology · Linguistics · Pleasure · Psychotherapist · Computer Science · Ethics, Aesthetics, and Art · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Philosophy and Theoretical Science · Psychology

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