Coherence and Incoherence

Bibliographic Data

ID10696936
AuthorsDaniel Fogal (0000-0003-0811-5585, New York University), Olle Risberg (0000-0001-5820-1145, Uppsala University)
Year2025
Volume134
Issue4
Pages405-454
Publication date2025-10-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Review (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8108 • E-ISSN: 1558-1470
PublisherDuke University Press (PUBLISHER • US)
DOI10.1215/00318108-11964758
OpenAlexW4414855759
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited38

In the recent literature on coherence and structural rationality, it is widely assumed that sets of attitudes are coherent just in case they are not incoherent. In particular, the two most popular kinds of views of incoherence—those centered around wide-scope rational requirements and those centered around guaranteed failures of some normatively significant kind—rely on this assumption. This article argues that this assumption should be rejected because it fails to capture the difference between positively coherent attitudes and random unrelated ones. The article also formulates and defends an alternative support-centric view of coherence and incoherence that captures this difference and has several additional advantages

Coherence (philosophical gambling strategy) · Coherence length · Coherence theory · Significant difference · Spatial coherence · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

Tools

Open DOIOpen Access