Explaining normative reasons

Bibliographic Data

ID21364042
AuthorsDaniel Fogal (0000-0003-0811-5585, Center for Bioethics New York University NY USA), Olle Risberg (0000-0001-5820-1145, Department of Philosophy Uppsala University Uppsala Sweden, corresponding author)
Year2023
Volume57
Issue1
Pages51-80
Publication date2023-03-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenueNoûs (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0029-4624 • E-ISSN: 1468-0068
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/nous.12393
OpenAlexW3183538731
LanguageEN
Citations received10
References cited80

In this paper, we present and defend a natural yet novel analysis of normative reasons. According to what we call support‐explanationism , for a fact to be a normative reason to φ is for it to explain why there's normative support for φ ‐ing. We critically consider the two main rival forms of explanationism— ought‐explanationism , on which reasons explain facts about ought, and good‐explanationism , on which reasons explain facts about goodness—as well as the popular Reasons‐First view, which takes the notion of a normative reason to be normatively fundamental. Support‐explanationism, we argue, enjoys many of the virtues of these views while avoiding their drawbacks. We conclude by exploring several further important implications: among other things, we argue that the influential metaphor of ‘weighing’ reasons is inapt, and propose a better one; that, contrary to what Berker (2019) suggests, there's no reason for non‐naturalists about normativity to accept the Reasons‐First view; and that, contrary to what Wodak (2020b) suggests, explanationist views can successfully accommodate what he calls ‘redundant reasons’

Epistemology · Metaphor · Natural (archaeology) · Normative · Normative social influence · Sociology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · History · Philosophy · Psychology · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment

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