Daniel Fogal
Biographic Data
| ID | 1607683 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Daniel Fogal |
| GIVEN NAMES | Daniel |
| FAMILY NAME | Fogal |
| SIGNATURE | FOGAL D |
| AFFILIATIONS | New York University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0811-5585 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Ditching decision-making capacity
Decision-making capacity (DMC) plays an important role in clinical practice—determining, on the basis of a patient’s decisional abilities, whether they are entitled to make their own medical decisions or whether a surrogate must be secured to participate in decisions on their behalf. As a result, it is critical that we get things right—that our conceptual framework be well-suited to the task of helping practitioners systematically sort through th…
Coherence and Incoherence
In the recent literature on coherence and structural rationality, it is widely assumed that sets of attitudes are coherent just in case they are not incoherent. In particular, the two most popular kinds of views of incoherence—those centered around wide-scope rational requirements and those centered around guaranteed failures of some normatively significant kind—rely on this assumption. This article argues that this assumption should be rejected …
The weight of reasons
This paper addresses the question of how the ‘weight’ or ‘strength’ of normative reasons is best understood. We argue that, given our preferred analysis of reasons as sources of normative support, this question has a straightforward answer: the weight of a normative reason is simply a matter of how much support it provides. We also critically discuss several competing views of reasons and their weight. These include views which take reasons to be…
Explaining normative reasons
In this paper, we present and defend a natural yet novel analysis of normative reasons. According to what we call support‐explanationism , for a fact to be a normative reason to φ is for it to explain why there's normative support for φ ‐ing. We critically consider the two main rival forms of explanationism— ought‐explanationism , on which reasons explain facts about ought, and good‐explanationism , on which reasons explain facts about goodness—a…
Which Reason? Which Rationality
The slogan that rationality is about responding to reasons has a turbulent history: once taken for granted; then widely rejected; now enjoying a resurgence. The slogan is made harder to assess by an ever-increasing plethora of distinctions pertaining to reasons and rationality. Here we are occupied with two such distinctions: that between subjective and objective reasons, and that between structural rationality (a.k.a. coherence) and substantive …
The Metaphysics of Moral Explanations
This chapter defends the view that general moral principles play an ineliminable role in moral explanations. More specifically, it argues that this view best makes sense of some intuitive data points, including the supervenience of the moral upon the natural. The chapter considers two alternative accounts of the nature and structure of moral principles: (i) “the nomic view,” on which moral principles are laws of metaphysics of the same broad kind…
New Work on Speech Acts
The essays collected in this book represent recent advances in our understanding of speech acts-actions like asserting, asking, and commanding that speakers perform when producing an utterance. The study of speech acts spans disciplines, and embraces both the theoretical and scientific concerns proper to linguistics and philosophy as well as the normative questions that speech acts raise for our politics, our societies, and our ethical lives gene…
Dogwhistles, Political Manipulation, and Philosophy of Language
This essay explores the speech act of dogwhistling (sometimes referred to as ‘using coded language’). Dogwhistles may be overt or covert, and within each of these categories may be intentional or unintentional. Dogwhistles are a powerful form of political speech, allowing people to be manipulated in ways they would resist if the manipulation was carried outmore openly—often drawing on racist attitudes that are consciously rejected. If philosopher…
No prominent works on this page.
New Work on Speech Acts
The essays collected in this book represent recent advances in our understanding of speech acts-actions like asserting, asking, and commanding that speakers perform when producing an utterance. The study of speech acts spans disciplines, and embraces both the theoretical and scientific concerns proper to linguistics and philosophy as well as the normative questions that speech acts raise for our politics, our societies, and our ethical lives gene…
Dogwhistles, Political Manipulation, and Philosophy of Language
This essay explores the speech act of dogwhistling (sometimes referred to as ‘using coded language’). Dogwhistles may be overt or covert, and within each of these categories may be intentional or unintentional. Dogwhistles are a powerful form of political speech, allowing people to be manipulated in ways they would resist if the manipulation was carried outmore openly—often drawing on racist attitudes that are consciously rejected. If philosopher…
The Metaphysics of Moral Explanations
This chapter defends the view that general moral principles play an ineliminable role in moral explanations. More specifically, it argues that this view best makes sense of some intuitive data points, including the supervenience of the moral upon the natural. The chapter considers two alternative accounts of the nature and structure of moral principles: (i) “the nomic view,” on which moral principles are laws of metaphysics of the same broad kind…
Which Reason? Which Rationality
The slogan that rationality is about responding to reasons has a turbulent history: once taken for granted; then widely rejected; now enjoying a resurgence. The slogan is made harder to assess by an ever-increasing plethora of distinctions pertaining to reasons and rationality. Here we are occupied with two such distinctions: that between subjective and objective reasons, and that between structural rationality (a.k.a. coherence) and substantive …
The weight of reasons
This paper addresses the question of how the ‘weight’ or ‘strength’ of normative reasons is best understood. We argue that, given our preferred analysis of reasons as sources of normative support, this question has a straightforward answer: the weight of a normative reason is simply a matter of how much support it provides. We also critically discuss several competing views of reasons and their weight. These include views which take reasons to be…
Explaining normative reasons
In this paper, we present and defend a natural yet novel analysis of normative reasons. According to what we call support‐explanationism , for a fact to be a normative reason to φ is for it to explain why there's normative support for φ ‐ing. We critically consider the two main rival forms of explanationism— ought‐explanationism , on which reasons explain facts about ought, and good‐explanationism , on which reasons explain facts about goodness—a…
Ditching decision-making capacity
Decision-making capacity (DMC) plays an important role in clinical practice—determining, on the basis of a patient’s decisional abilities, whether they are entitled to make their own medical decisions or whether a surrogate must be secured to participate in decisions on their behalf. As a result, it is critical that we get things right—that our conceptual framework be well-suited to the task of helping practitioners systematically sort through th…
Coherence and Incoherence
In the recent literature on coherence and structural rationality, it is widely assumed that sets of attitudes are coherent just in case they are not incoherent. In particular, the two most popular kinds of views of incoherence—those centered around wide-scope rational requirements and those centered around guaranteed failures of some normatively significant kind—rely on this assumption. This article argues that this assumption should be rejected …
Epistemology (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Free Will and Agency (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (3 works) · Political science (3 works) · Sociology (3 works) · Economics (2 works)