What is Structural Rationality
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4351745 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Wooram Lee (0000-0002-4154-1984, Seoul National University , South Korea, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 74 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 614-636 |
| Publication date | 2024-03-29 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/pq/pqad072 |
| OpenAlex | W4384834308 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 6 |
| References cited | 38 |
The normativity of so-called 'coherence' or 'structural' requirements of rationality has been hotly debated in recent years. However, relatively little has been said about the nature of structural rationality, or what makes a set of attitudes structurally irrational, if structural rationality is not ultimately a matter of responding correctly to reasons. This paper develops a novel account of incoherence (or structural irrationality), critically examining Alex Worsnip's recent account. It first argues that Worsnip's account both over-generates and under-generates incoherent patterns of attitudes, and then proposes an alternative that both avoids these problems and captures a crucial insight behind Worsnip's account. According to this account, a set of attitudes is incoherent just in case having all of the attitudes in that set is incompatible with reacting to a question in a way that one is, in virtue of having the attitudes, committed to
Coherence (philosophical gambling strategy) · Ecological rationality · Economics · Epistemology · Irrational number · Irrationality · Mathematical economics · Positive economics · Rationality · Set (abstract data type) · Virtue · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Mathematics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy
Belief's Own Ethics
Putting Logic in its Place
The Importance of Being Rational
Why Be Rational?
Intentional Systems
Belief is weak
The paradox of the preface
Rationality Through Reasoning
Structural Rationality and the Property of Coherence
The Real Myth of Coherence
Coherence as Joint Satisfiability
The independence of (in)coherence
Ideal rationality and logical omniscience
Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat
The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence
The Normativity of Rationality
Oxford Studies in Metaethics 12
Problems of Rationality
The Wrong Kind of Reason
Instrumental Rationality
Wide and narrow scope
Coherence and Knowability
The Scope of Rational Requirements
| Unique citing works | 6 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 3 |
| Citation span | 2024 - 2026 (3) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 6 |