The Scope of Rational Requirements

Bibliographic Data

ID3176478
AuthorsJohn Brunero (0000-0001-5136-8049, University of Missouri–St. Louis, corresponding author)
Year2010
Volume60
Issue238
Pages28-49
Publication date2010-01-01
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessNo
TypeARTICLE
VenueThe Philosophical Quarterly (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 0031-8094 • E-ISSN: 1467-9213
PublisherOxford University Press (OUP) (PUBLISHER)
DOI10.1111/j.1467-9213.2008.596.x
OpenAlexW2061742724
LanguageEN
Citations received19

Niko Kolodny has argued that some (local) rational requirements are narrow‐scope requirements. Against this, I argue here that all (local) rational requirements are wide‐scope requirements. I present a new objection to the narrow‐scope interpretations of the four specific rational requirements which Kolodny considers. His argument for the narrow‐scope interpretations of these four requirements rests on a false assumption, that an attitude which puts in place a narrow‐scope rational requirement somewhere thereby puts in place a narrow‐scope rational requirement everywhere. My argument against Kolodny is analogous to arguments which use holism about reasons to defend moral particularism

Argument (complex analysis) · Epistemology · Holism · Law and economics · Scope (computer science) · Sociology · Computer Science · Free Will and Agency · Medicine · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · War, Ethics, and Justification

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