John Brunero
Biographic Data
| ID | 1012430 |
|---|---|
| NAME | John Brunero |
| GIVEN NAMES | John |
| FAMILY NAME | Brunero |
| SIGNATURE | BRUNERO J |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Nebraska–Lincoln |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5136-8049 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 25 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 36 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 25 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2004 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Normative Reasons: Between Reasoning and Explanation
Hypocrisy and Conditional Requirements
This paper considers the formulation of the moral requirement against hypocrisy, paying particular attention to the logical scope of ‘requires’ in that formulation. The paper argues (i) that we should prefer a wide-scope formulation to a narrow-scope formulation, and (ii) this result has some advantages for our normative theorizing about hypocrisy—in particular, it allows us to resist several of Daniela Dover’s (2019) recent arguments against the…
The Primacy of the Practical
According to Action-First theorists, like Jonathan Dancy, reasons for action explain reasons for intentions. According to Intention-First theorists, like Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way, reasons for intentions explain reasons for action. In this paper, I introduce and defend a version of the Action-First theory called “Instrumentalism.” According to Instrumentalism, just as we can derive, using principles of instrumental transmission, reasons to ψ …
Practical reasons, theoretical reasons, and permissive and prohibitive balancing
The Conclusion of Practical Reasoning
Intention Persistence
There are two well‐known formulations of the diachronic rational requirement of intention persistence, due to Michael Bratman and John Broome. I argue in this paper that both formulations face serious difficulties. Bratman’s formulation is unable to accommodate two different kinds of examples in which it is permissible to drop an intention even though one’s assessment of the adequacy of its reasons remains constant. Broome’s formulation is both t…
Reasons and Defeasible Reasoning
According to the Reasoning View, a normative reason to φ is a premise in a pattern of sound reasoning leading to the conclusion to φ. But how should the Reasoning View account for reasons that are outweighed? One very promising proposal is to appeal to defeasible reasoning. On this proposal, when a reason is outweighed, the associated pattern of sound reasoning is defeated. Both Jonathan Way and Sam Asarnow have recently developed this idea in di…
Conclusion
This concluding chapter sums up the main claims defended in the book, and explains how those claims relate to some of the sources of philosophical interest in means–ends coherence mentioned in the introduction. Although means–ends coherence can’t be traced to some social rule or convention, it can be explained in terms of the constitutive aims of the very attitudes the requirement governs. These constitutive aims—given how we’re understanding the…
Copyright Page
Normativity II
This chapter turns to the question of whether means–ends coherence is normative in the sense that we always ought, or more weakly, have reason to comply with it. The chapter considers the view, inspired by Prichard’s critique of “moral philosophy,” that rationality provides its own reasons, and so we need not search for “external” reasons to comply with rational requirements. It argues that the request for such reasons is a legitimate request, an…
Intention
This chapter develops a view according to which there is a constitutive aim of intention that parallels the constitutive aim of belief, and both of these constitutive aims can be used to explain some of the rational requirements governing intentions and beliefs. The chapter first considers in what sense there is an “aim of intention.” It begins by looking at many of the philosophical ideas associated with the “aim of belief,” noting that some of …
Dedication
Bootstrapping
Several philosophers object to the idea that intentions provide reasons on the grounds that this idea licenses an implausible “bootstrapping” of reasons into existence. However, there is no shared understanding of the bootstrapping objection in the literature, and, this chapter argues, available versions of the objection are too strong, since they would also disallow promises as sources of reasons. The chapter develops a new conception of the boo…
Scope
This chapter takes up the debate over the formulation of rational requirements, particularly over whether “requires” should have wide or narrow scope. The chapter shows how if there’s a real disagreement between the wide-scoper and narrow-scoper, it must concern the formulation of diachronic, not synchronic, requirements. It presents what it takes to be the strongest argument for the wide-scope formulations, and show how attempts by narrow-scoper…
Belief
Cognitivists about practical rationality argue that some requirements of practical rationality can be explained by the requirements of theoretical rationality, given the way in which intentions involve beliefs. This chapter considers several possible ways a cognitivist could explain means–ends coherence. It first considers accounts that use the Strong Belief Thesis, according to which intending to X involves believing one will X. It considers and…
Normativity I
According to Normative Disjunctivism, when an agent is means–ends incoherent, then she either ought not intend the end, ought not believe intending the means is necessary, or ought to intend the means. If this view is true, it might lend support to the idea that means–ends coherence is a myth. The thought is that we’ve made the mistake of confusing a disjunction of requirements of reason for a disjunctive rational requirement (means–ends coherenc…
The Normativity of Rationality
Suppose you believe you ought to complete your grading on time but don't intend to do so. Nearly everyone agrees this akratic combination of attitude-states involves irrationality. One plausible explanation of why you're irrational is that you violate a requirement of “structural” rationality that prohibits you from having this combination. In other words, the rational code requires, roughly, that you not both believe you ought to φ and fail to i…
Instrumental Rationality: The Normativity of Means-Ends Coherence
Rationality requires that we intend the means we believe are necessary for achieving our ends. This book explores several interrelated issues regarding the formulation and status of this requirement of means–ends coherence. I argue that means–ends coherence is a genuine requirement of rationality, and cannot be explained away as a myth, confused with a disjunction of requirements to have, or not have, specific attitudes. But nor, I argue, is mean…
Fittingness and Good Reasoning
Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way have defended a view of good reasoning according to which good reasoning is explained in terms of the preservation of fittingness. I argue that their Fittingness View is incorrect. Not all fittingness-preserving transitions in thought are instances of good reasoning
Reasons as explanations
Consequentialism and the Wrong Kind of Reasons: A Reply to Lang
In his article ‘The Right Kind of Solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem’, Gerald Lang formulates the buck-passing account of value so as to resolve the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem. I argue against his formulation of buck-passing. Specifically, I argue that his formulation of buck-passing is not compatible with consequentialism (whether direct or indirect), and so it should be rejected
The Scope of Rational Requirements
Niko Kolodny has argued that some (local) rational requirements are narrow‐scope requirements. Against this, I argue here that all (local) rational requirements are wide‐scope requirements. I present a new objection to the narrow‐scope interpretations of the four specific rational requirements which Kolodny considers. His argument for the narrow‐scope interpretations of these four requirements rests on a false assumption, that an attitude which p…
Against Cognitivism about Practical Rationality
Two Approaches to Instrumental Rationality and Belief Consistency
R. Jay Wallace argues that the normativity of instrumental rationality can be traced to the independent rational requirement to hold consistent beliefs. I present three objections to this view. John Broome argues that there is a structural similarity between the rational requirements of instrumental rationality and belief consistency. Since he does not reduce the former to the latter, his view can avoid the objections to Wallace’s view. However, …
Korsgaard on Motivational Skepticism
Instrumental Rationality: The Normativity of Means-Ends Coherence
Rationality requires that we intend the means we believe are necessary for achieving our ends. This book explores several interrelated issues regarding the formulation and status of this requirement of means–ends coherence. I argue that means–ends coherence is a genuine requirement of rationality, and cannot be explained away as a myth, confused with a disjunction of requirements to have, or not have, specific attitudes. But nor, I argue, is mean…
Reasons as explanations
The Scope of Rational Requirements
Niko Kolodny has argued that some (local) rational requirements are narrow‐scope requirements. Against this, I argue here that all (local) rational requirements are wide‐scope requirements. I present a new objection to the narrow‐scope interpretations of the four specific rational requirements which Kolodny considers. His argument for the narrow‐scope interpretations of these four requirements rests on a false assumption, that an attitude which p…
Practical reasons, theoretical reasons, and permissive and prohibitive balancing
Reasons and Defeasible Reasoning
According to the Reasoning View, a normative reason to φ is a premise in a pattern of sound reasoning leading to the conclusion to φ. But how should the Reasoning View account for reasons that are outweighed? One very promising proposal is to appeal to defeasible reasoning. On this proposal, when a reason is outweighed, the associated pattern of sound reasoning is defeated. Both Jonathan Way and Sam Asarnow have recently developed this idea in di…
Against Cognitivism about Practical Rationality
Korsgaard on Motivational Skepticism
Two Approaches to Instrumental Rationality and Belief Consistency
R. Jay Wallace argues that the normativity of instrumental rationality can be traced to the independent rational requirement to hold consistent beliefs. I present three objections to this view. John Broome argues that there is a structural similarity between the rational requirements of instrumental rationality and belief consistency. Since he does not reduce the former to the latter, his view can avoid the objections to Wallace’s view. However, …
Against Cognitivism about Practical Rationality
Consequentialism and the Wrong Kind of Reasons: A Reply to Lang
In his article ‘The Right Kind of Solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem’, Gerald Lang formulates the buck-passing account of value so as to resolve the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem. I argue against his formulation of buck-passing. Specifically, I argue that his formulation of buck-passing is not compatible with consequentialism (whether direct or indirect), and so it should be rejected
The Scope of Rational Requirements
Niko Kolodny has argued that some (local) rational requirements are narrow‐scope requirements. Against this, I argue here that all (local) rational requirements are wide‐scope requirements. I present a new objection to the narrow‐scope interpretations of the four specific rational requirements which Kolodny considers. His argument for the narrow‐scope interpretations of these four requirements rests on a false assumption, that an attitude which p…
Reasons as explanations
Fittingness and Good Reasoning
Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way have defended a view of good reasoning according to which good reasoning is explained in terms of the preservation of fittingness. I argue that their Fittingness View is incorrect. Not all fittingness-preserving transitions in thought are instances of good reasoning
Conclusion
This concluding chapter sums up the main claims defended in the book, and explains how those claims relate to some of the sources of philosophical interest in means–ends coherence mentioned in the introduction. Although means–ends coherence can’t be traced to some social rule or convention, it can be explained in terms of the constitutive aims of the very attitudes the requirement governs. These constitutive aims—given how we’re understanding the…
Copyright Page
Normativity II
This chapter turns to the question of whether means–ends coherence is normative in the sense that we always ought, or more weakly, have reason to comply with it. The chapter considers the view, inspired by Prichard’s critique of “moral philosophy,” that rationality provides its own reasons, and so we need not search for “external” reasons to comply with rational requirements. It argues that the request for such reasons is a legitimate request, an…
Intention
This chapter develops a view according to which there is a constitutive aim of intention that parallels the constitutive aim of belief, and both of these constitutive aims can be used to explain some of the rational requirements governing intentions and beliefs. The chapter first considers in what sense there is an “aim of intention.” It begins by looking at many of the philosophical ideas associated with the “aim of belief,” noting that some of …
Dedication
Bootstrapping
Several philosophers object to the idea that intentions provide reasons on the grounds that this idea licenses an implausible “bootstrapping” of reasons into existence. However, there is no shared understanding of the bootstrapping objection in the literature, and, this chapter argues, available versions of the objection are too strong, since they would also disallow promises as sources of reasons. The chapter develops a new conception of the boo…
Scope
This chapter takes up the debate over the formulation of rational requirements, particularly over whether “requires” should have wide or narrow scope. The chapter shows how if there’s a real disagreement between the wide-scoper and narrow-scoper, it must concern the formulation of diachronic, not synchronic, requirements. It presents what it takes to be the strongest argument for the wide-scope formulations, and show how attempts by narrow-scoper…
Belief
Cognitivists about practical rationality argue that some requirements of practical rationality can be explained by the requirements of theoretical rationality, given the way in which intentions involve beliefs. This chapter considers several possible ways a cognitivist could explain means–ends coherence. It first considers accounts that use the Strong Belief Thesis, according to which intending to X involves believing one will X. It considers and…
Normativity I
According to Normative Disjunctivism, when an agent is means–ends incoherent, then she either ought not intend the end, ought not believe intending the means is necessary, or ought to intend the means. If this view is true, it might lend support to the idea that means–ends coherence is a myth. The thought is that we’ve made the mistake of confusing a disjunction of requirements of reason for a disjunctive rational requirement (means–ends coherenc…
The Normativity of Rationality
Suppose you believe you ought to complete your grading on time but don't intend to do so. Nearly everyone agrees this akratic combination of attitude-states involves irrationality. One plausible explanation of why you're irrational is that you violate a requirement of “structural” rationality that prohibits you from having this combination. In other words, the rational code requires, roughly, that you not both believe you ought to φ and fail to i…
Instrumental Rationality: The Normativity of Means-Ends Coherence
Rationality requires that we intend the means we believe are necessary for achieving our ends. This book explores several interrelated issues regarding the formulation and status of this requirement of means–ends coherence. I argue that means–ends coherence is a genuine requirement of rationality, and cannot be explained away as a myth, confused with a disjunction of requirements to have, or not have, specific attitudes. But nor, I argue, is mean…
The Conclusion of Practical Reasoning
Intention Persistence
There are two well‐known formulations of the diachronic rational requirement of intention persistence, due to Michael Bratman and John Broome. I argue in this paper that both formulations face serious difficulties. Bratman’s formulation is unable to accommodate two different kinds of examples in which it is permissible to drop an intention even though one’s assessment of the adequacy of its reasons remains constant. Broome’s formulation is both t…
Reasons and Defeasible Reasoning
According to the Reasoning View, a normative reason to φ is a premise in a pattern of sound reasoning leading to the conclusion to φ. But how should the Reasoning View account for reasons that are outweighed? One very promising proposal is to appeal to defeasible reasoning. On this proposal, when a reason is outweighed, the associated pattern of sound reasoning is defeated. Both Jonathan Way and Sam Asarnow have recently developed this idea in di…
Practical reasons, theoretical reasons, and permissive and prohibitive balancing
The Primacy of the Practical
According to Action-First theorists, like Jonathan Dancy, reasons for action explain reasons for intentions. According to Intention-First theorists, like Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way, reasons for intentions explain reasons for action. In this paper, I introduce and defend a version of the Action-First theory called “Instrumentalism.” According to Instrumentalism, just as we can derive, using principles of instrumental transmission, reasons to ψ …
Normative Reasons: Between Reasoning and Explanation
Hypocrisy and Conditional Requirements
This paper considers the formulation of the moral requirement against hypocrisy, paying particular attention to the logical scope of ‘requires’ in that formulation. The paper argues (i) that we should prefer a wide-scope formulation to a narrow-scope formulation, and (ii) this result has some advantages for our normative theorizing about hypocrisy—in particular, it allows us to resist several of Daniela Dover’s (2019) recent arguments against the…
Epistemology (24 works) · Philosophy (20 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (17 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (12 works) · Computer Science (11 works) · Psychology (11 works) · Free Will and Agency (9 works) · Mathematics (8 works) · Normative (8 works) · Economics (7 works)