Fittingness and Good Reasoning
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 19525083 |
|---|---|
| Authors | John Brunero (0000-0001-5136-8049, University of Nebraska–Lincoln, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2019 |
| Volume | 16 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 133-143 |
| Publication date | 2019-11-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1559-3061 • E-ISSN: 1559-3061 |
| Publisher | Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.26556/jesp.v16i2.782 |
| OpenAlex | W2983000346 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 2 |
| References cited | 7 |
Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way have defended a view of good reasoning according to which good reasoning is explained in terms of the preservation of fittingness. I argue that their Fittingness View is incorrect. Not all fittingness-preserving transitions in thought are instances of good reasoning
Analytic reasoning · Case-based reasoning · Cognition · Deductive reasoning · Defeasible reasoning · Epistemology · Practical reason · Scientific reasoning · Verbal reasoning · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · Psychology · Theology and Philosophy of Evil · Artificial Intelligence
| Unique citing works | 2 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,5 |
| Citation span | 2022 - 2024 (3) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 2 |