What is Good Reasoning
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10345258 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Conor Mchugh (0009-0009-6730-1442, University of Southampton), Jonathan Way (0000-0003-0610-5279, University of Southampton) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 96 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 153-174 |
| Publication date | 2016-05-11 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/phpr.12299 |
| OpenAlex | W2288413515 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 29 |
| References cited | 40 |
What makes the difference between good and bad reasoning? In this paper we defend a novel account of good reasoning—both theoretical and practical—according to which it preserves fittingness or correctness : good reasoning is reasoning which is such as to take you from fitting attitudes to further fitting attitudes, other things equal. This account, we argue, is preferable to two others that feature in the recent literature. The first, which has been made prominent by John Broome, holds that the standards of good reasoning derive from rational requirements. The second holds that these standards derive from reasons. We argue that these accounts face serious difficulties in correctly distinguishing good from bad reasoning, and in explaining what's worthwhile about good reasoning. We then propose our alternative account and argue that it performs better on these counts. In the final section, we develop certain elements of the account in response to some possible objections
Algorithm · Analytic reasoning · Case-based reasoning · Correctness · Deductive reasoning · Epistemology · Face (sociological concept · Feature (linguistics · Linguistics · Practical reason · Reasoning system · Artificial Intelligence · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy
The Ugly Truth About Ourselves and Our Robot Creations
Nudges, Nudging, and Self-Guidance Under the Influence
Is reasoning responding to reasons
The norm of reasoning
An Improved Argument for Superconditionalization
Explaining Deontic Status by Good Reasoning
Logic and Norms of Reasoning
Fittingness first
Reasons, basing, and the normative collapse of logical pluralism
A puzzle about enkratic reasoning
Reasoning beyond belief acquisition
Where reasons and reasoning come apart
Suspending judgment the correct way
Emotions and their reasons
Who is a reasoner
Action and Rationalization
Fittingness and Good Reasoning
Misleading Higher-Order Evidence and Rationality
Ought-contextualism and reasoning
The epistemic norm of inference and non-epistemic reasons for belief
Naturalizing the contributory
Knowledge and reasoning
Goodness, availability, and argument structure
Normality, safety and knowledge
Doing your part
The Reasoning View and Defeasible Practical Reasoning
Two Arguments for Evidentialism
Reasons and Defeasible Reasoning
Norms of Reasoning
Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 10
Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories
Justification and the Truth-Connection
The Norm of Belief
Knowledge and its Limits
Defeasible Reasoning
Why Be Rational?
Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning
What is inference?
Fittingness First
Naturalism and norms of inference
Aspects of Reason
The Domain of Reasons
Rationality Through Reasoning
Internal and External Reasons
Content and Justification
The toxin puzzle
Keep Things in Perspective
Slaves of the Passions
What We Owe to Each Other
The Scope of Instrumental Reason
How Are Basic Belief‐Forming Methods Justified
On the Relationship between Propositional and Doxastic Justification
When Other Things Aren't Equal
Subjective Reasons
Ethics Without Principles
Oxford Studies in Metaethics 12
Normative Requirements
What is a reason to act
| Unique citing works | 29 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 2,9 |
| Citation span | 2016 - 2026 (11) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 29 |