Doing your part
Joint obligation and individual‐level transmission
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 10345804 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Rosemary Mellor (0000-0002-3356-9661, Department of Philosophy Northwestern University Evanston Illinois USA, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2025 |
| Volume | 111 |
| Issue | 2 |
| Pages | 386-406 |
| Publication date | 2025-06-26 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0031-8205 • E-ISSN: 1933-1592 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/phpr.70031 |
| OpenAlex | W4411680612 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 60 |
This paper addresses how joint obligations bear on what individual group members should do. I argue that joint obligations do not transmit to the individual level. On the view I defend, “What should we do?” and “What should I do?” are separate questions to be answered independently. I distinguish two versions of the view that joint obligations transmit to the individual level: Ought Transmission, according to which if a group ought to do something, then each group member ought to do their part; and Defeasible Transmission, according to which if a group have a joint obligation to do something, then each group member has a defeasible reason to do their part. I argue that we should reject both of these. I then defend the opposing view, No Transmission, against two objections: one which claims that this view cannot account for the connection between obligation and deliberation, and a second which alleges that No Transmission counterintuitively implies that it is indeterminate what a given individual should do in cases of a certain structure
Joint (building · Obligation · Political science · Structural engineering · Telecommunications · Transmission (telecommunications · Computer Science · Engineering · Law · Legal principles and applications · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology
Utilitarianism and Co-operation
Collective Intentions And Team Agency
Thinking as a Team
Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning
How you can help, without making a difference
Can a Random Collection of Individuals be Morally Responsible?
Fittingness First
The Collective Moral Autonomy Thesis
Group Duties
Promises, Offers, Requests, Agreements
The Relation Between Moral Reasons and Moral Requirement
Where reasons and reasoning come apart
Cooperation
Team Reasoning and Collective Moral Obligation
Beyond Individual Choice
Group Agency
Distributing Collective Obligation
Reasons and Persons
Disagreement and alienation
Pattern-Based Reasons and Disaster
Collective Reasons and Agent-Relativity
What are we to do? Making sense of ‘joint ought’ talk
The Reasoning View and Defeasible Practical Reasoning
What is Good Reasoning
Collective Obligations
What is a reason to act
Opting for the Best
Joint Ought
Do I Make a Difference
What We Owe to Hypocrites
The deliberative constraint on reasons
What 'We
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |