Disagreement and alienation

Bibliographic Data

ID12749685
AuthorsBerislav Marušić (0000-0002-4165-4313, University of Edinburgh, corresponding author), Stephen J White (0000-0001-9489-5180)
Year2023
Volume37
Issue1
Pages210-227
Publication date2023-10-30
Peer ReviewedYes
Open AccessYes
TypeARTICLE
VenuePhilosophical Perspectives (JOURNAL)
Journal identifiersISSN: 1520-8583 • E-ISSN: 1758-2245
PublisherWiley (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1111/phpe.12197
OpenAlexW4388099824
LanguageEN
Citations received4
References cited22

This paper proposes to reorient the philosophical debate about peer disagreement. The problem of peer disagreement is normally seen as a problem about the extent to which disagreement provides one with evidence against one's own conclusions. It is thus regarded as a problem for individual inquiry. But things look different in more collaborative contexts. Ethical norms relevant to those contexts make a difference to the epistemology. In particular, we argue that a norm of mutual answerability applies to us when we engage in shared inquiry with others, and precludes us from treating one another's conflicting judgments as evidence relevant to the dispute. From this it follows that standard philosophical accounts of peer disagreement—e.g., the Equal Weight View and the Total Evidence View—presuppose that the disagreeing parties are in a sense alienated from one another. It's doubtful that such forms of alienated disagreement should be treated as the central case

Alienation · Epistemology · Norm (philosophy · Political science · Sociology · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Ethics in medical practice · Free Will and Agency · Law · Philosophy · Psychology · Social Psychology

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