The Normativity of Rationality
The Normativity of Rationality
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 4079963 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Jonathan Way (0000-0003-0610-5279) |
| Year | 2010 |
| Volume | 5 |
| Issue | 12 |
| Pages | 1057-1068 |
| Publication date | 2010-12-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Philosophy Compass (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1747-9991 • E-ISSN: 1747-9991 |
| Publisher | Wiley (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00357.x |
| OpenAlex | W1584388421 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 13 |
| References cited | 29 |
This article is an introduction to the recent debate about whether rationality is normative – that is, very roughly, about whether we should have attitudes which fit together in a coherent way. I begin by explaining an initial problem – the ‘detaching problem’– that arises on the assumption that we should have coherent attitudes. I then explain the prominent ‘wide‐scope’ solution to this problem, and some of the central objections to it. I end by considering the options that arise if we reject the wide‐scope solution
Economics · Epistemology · Normative · Positive economics · Rationality · Scope (computer science · Computer Science · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Psychology · Philosophy
The Mental States First Theory of Promising
Consistency, Obligations, and Accuracy-Dominance Vindications
Positive illusion and the normativity of substantive and structural rationality
Structural Rationality and the Property of Coherence
Rationality and Possessing Normative Reasons
Two roles for reasons
Coherence as the Possibility of Joint Success
The Normativity of Rationality
The explanatory role of consistency requirements
The irrational failure to act
Rationality is Not Coherence
Vindicating the Normativity of Rationality
You ought to φ only if you may believe that you ought to φ
Willing, Wanting, Waiting
Having reasons
Why Be Rational?
Reasons
Ii.—does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake ?
Slaves of the Passions
The Scope of Instrumental Reason
The Hypothetical Imperative
Moral Relativism Defended
Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives
Vindicating the Normativity of Rationality
Normative Requirements
Ethical Consistency Principles
The Scope of Rational Requirements
| Unique citing works | 13 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 0,72 |
| Citation span | 2008 - 2026 (19) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 13 |