Vindicating the Normativity of Rationality
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 8078044 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Nicholas Southwood (0000-0002-5308-8814, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2008 |
| Volume | 119 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 9-30 |
| Publication date | 2008-10-01 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Ethics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0014-1704 • E-ISSN: 1539-297X |
| Publisher | University of Chicago Press (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1086/592586 |
| OpenAlex | W1966301197 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 27 |
| References cited | 7 |
I argue that the why be rational? challenge raised by John Broome and Niko Kolodny rests upon a mistake that is analogous to the mistake that H.A. Pritchard famously claimed beset the 'why be moral?' challenge. The failure to locate an independent justification for obeying rational requirements should do nothing whatsoever to undermine our belief in the normativity of rationality. I suggest that we should conceive of the demand for a satisfactory vindicating explanation of the normativity of rationality instead in terms of the demand for a philosophical characterisation of rationality that can do something to explain why rational requirements are the kinds of things that are, by their very nature, normative. I consider several accounts that have recently been offered the distinctive-object account, the proper functioning account, and the subjective reasons account and argue that none succeeds in meeting this challenge. I then sketch a new account, the first-personal authority account , which holds that rational requirements are what I call standpoint-relative demands concerning the attitudes we ought to have and form; and that complying with rational requirements is a matter of honouring our first-personal authority as agents. I suggest that the first-personal authority account does a better job of meeting the challenge
Epistemology · Humanities · Normative · Political science · Politics · Rationality · Realism · Sociology · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Political Philosophy and Ethics · Law · Philosophy
The Importance of Being Rational
“Actual” does not imply “feasible”
The Sources of Political Normativity
Demystifying Authoritative Normativity
Is ‘Remembering’ a Normative Concept
Is Rationality Normative for Reasoning
The Normative Autonomy of Logic
Knowledge and the Many Norms on Action
Respect and the reality of apparent reasons
Making space for the normativity of coherence
Rationality, Shmationality
Rationality, Appearances, and Apparent Facts
Two Accounts of the Normativity of Rationality
Coherence as the Possibility of Joint Success
The Tractatus Theologico-Politicus and the Received View of Spinoza on Democracy
Epistemic norms, all things considered
Epistemic instrumentalism
In defense of a strong persistence requirement on intention
Does the normative question about rationality rest on a mistake
Rationality is Not Coherence
Intention Persistence
Moral and Rational Commitment
Instrumental Rationality
Wide and narrow scope
Kant's Theory of Normativity
Is It Rational to Reject God
The Normativity of Rationality
| Unique citing works | 27 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,69 |
| Citation span | 2010 - 2026 (17) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 27 |