Sigurd Lindstad
Biographic Data
| ID | 6686464 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Sigurd Lindstad |
| GIVEN NAMES | Sigurd |
| FAMILY NAME | Lindstad |
| SIGNATURE | LINDSTAD S |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Oslo |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 4 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Self-Threatening Extortionists Constitute a Problem for Utilitarians, Not Contractualists
Johann Frick has claimed that morality requires that we (in many cases) should give in to the demands of rational agents who attempt to extort us by threatening to harm themselves (self-threatening extortionists). He has further argued that since contractualism implies that there is no such moral requirement, such cases represent a problem for this brand of moral theory. In this paper, we argue that things are quite the other way around: Morality…
Benefiting from Wrongdoing and Moral Protest
Some normative theorists believe that there is a principled moral reason not to retain benefits realized by injustice or wrongdoing. However, critics have argued that this idea is implausible. One purported problem is that the idea lacks an obvious rationale and that attempts to provide one have been unconvincing. This paper articulates and defends the idea that the principled reason in question has an expressive quality: it gets its reason-givin…
Beneficiary Pays and Respect for Autonomy
This paper proposes that the “beneficiary pays principle” may be grounded in a brand of respect for autonomy. I first argue that on one understanding, such respect implies that as far as we are not morally required to make some sacrifice in service of some purpose, we each have (pro-tanto) legitimate authority to ourselves decide the purposes for which we should make sacrifices. I then argue that the problem with retaining benefits realized by im…
What is the Wrong in Retaining Benefits from Wrongdoing? How Recent Attempts to Formulate a Plausible Rationale for the ‘Beneficiary Pays Principle’ Have Failed
What is the Wrong in Retaining Benefits from Wrongdoing? How Recent Attempts to Formulate a Plausible Rationale for the ‘Beneficiary Pays Principle’ Have Failed
Benefiting from Wrongdoing and Moral Protest
Some normative theorists believe that there is a principled moral reason not to retain benefits realized by injustice or wrongdoing. However, critics have argued that this idea is implausible. One purported problem is that the idea lacks an obvious rationale and that attempts to provide one have been unconvincing. This paper articulates and defends the idea that the principled reason in question has an expressive quality: it gets its reason-givin…
Beneficiary Pays and Respect for Autonomy
This paper proposes that the “beneficiary pays principle” may be grounded in a brand of respect for autonomy. I first argue that on one understanding, such respect implies that as far as we are not morally required to make some sacrifice in service of some purpose, we each have (pro-tanto) legitimate authority to ourselves decide the purposes for which we should make sacrifices. I then argue that the problem with retaining benefits realized by im…
Self-Threatening Extortionists Constitute a Problem for Utilitarians, Not Contractualists
Johann Frick has claimed that morality requires that we (in many cases) should give in to the demands of rational agents who attempt to extort us by threatening to harm themselves (self-threatening extortionists). He has further argued that since contractualism implies that there is no such moral requirement, such cases represent a problem for this brand of moral theory. In this paper, we argue that things are quite the other way around: Morality…
Free Will and Agency (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Epistemology (3 works) · Law and economics (3 works) · Political philosophy (3 works) · Politics (3 works) · Sociology (3 works) · Beneficiary (2 works)