Yishai Cohen
Biographic Data
| ID | 6686484 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Yishai Cohen |
| GIVEN NAMES | Yishai |
| FAMILY NAME | Cohen |
| SIGNATURE | COHEN Y |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Southern Maine |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3888-2032 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 6 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2014 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
The opposition of omnibenevolence towards evil
This article develops two logical arguments from evil that bypass Alvin Plantinga’s Free Will Defence through a critical examination of the relationship between freedom and value. The first argument assumes that morally innocent freedom is valuable, challenging the traditional emphasis on significant freedom. The second argument draws on an interpretation of J.L. Mackie’s underexplored ethical perspective, which highlights a form of evil that con…
Probabilism
The actualism/possibilism debate in ethics is traditionally formulated in terms of whether true counterfactuals of freedom about the future (true subjunctive conditionals concerning what someone would freely do in the future if they were in certain circumstances) even partly determine an agent's present moral obligations. But the very assumption that there are true counterfactuals of freedom about the future conflicts with the idea that freedom r…
Actualism, Possibilism, and the Nature of Consequentialism
The actualism/possibilism debate in ethics is about whether counterfactuals of freedom concerning what an agent would freely do if she were in certain circumstances even partly determine that agent’s obligations. This debate arose from an argument against the coherence of utilitarianism in the deontic logic literature. In this chapter, we first trace the historical origins of this debate and then examine actualism, possibilism, and securitism thr…
Actualism Has Control Issues
According to actualism, an agent ought to φ just in case what would happen if she were to φ is better than what would happen if she were to ~φ. We argue that actualism makes a morally irrelevant distinction between certain counterfactuals, given that an agent sometimes has the same kind of control over their truth-value. We then offer a substantive revision to actualism that avoids this morally irrelevant distinction by focusing on a certain kind…
Reasons-Responsiveness and Time Travel
I argue that the theory of moral responsibility defended by John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza is incompatible with the metaphysical possibility of time travel
Don’t Count on Taurek
No prominent works on this page.
Don’t Count on Taurek
Reasons-Responsiveness and Time Travel
I argue that the theory of moral responsibility defended by John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza is incompatible with the metaphysical possibility of time travel
Actualism Has Control Issues
According to actualism, an agent ought to φ just in case what would happen if she were to φ is better than what would happen if she were to ~φ. We argue that actualism makes a morally irrelevant distinction between certain counterfactuals, given that an agent sometimes has the same kind of control over their truth-value. We then offer a substantive revision to actualism that avoids this morally irrelevant distinction by focusing on a certain kind…
Actualism, Possibilism, and the Nature of Consequentialism
The actualism/possibilism debate in ethics is about whether counterfactuals of freedom concerning what an agent would freely do if she were in certain circumstances even partly determine that agent’s obligations. This debate arose from an argument against the coherence of utilitarianism in the deontic logic literature. In this chapter, we first trace the historical origins of this debate and then examine actualism, possibilism, and securitism thr…
Probabilism
The actualism/possibilism debate in ethics is traditionally formulated in terms of whether true counterfactuals of freedom about the future (true subjunctive conditionals concerning what someone would freely do in the future if they were in certain circumstances) even partly determine an agent's present moral obligations. But the very assumption that there are true counterfactuals of freedom about the future conflicts with the idea that freedom r…
The opposition of omnibenevolence towards evil
This article develops two logical arguments from evil that bypass Alvin Plantinga’s Free Will Defence through a critical examination of the relationship between freedom and value. The first argument assumes that morally innocent freedom is valuable, challenging the traditional emphasis on significant freedom. The second argument draws on an interpretation of J.L. Mackie’s underexplored ethical perspective, which highlights a form of evil that con…
Free Will and Agency (6 works) · Epistemology (4 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Counterfactual conditional (3 works) · Argument (complex analysis) (2 works) · Artificial Intelligence (2 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Counterfactual thinking (2 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works)