Actualism, Possibilism, and the Nature of Consequentialism

Bibliographic Data

ID23601139
AuthorsYishai Cohen (0000-0002-3888-2032, University of Southern Maine), Travis Timmerman (0000-0002-2693-5846, Seton Hall University)
Year2020
Pages139-161
Publication date2020-10-08
Open AccessNo
TypeCHAPTER
VenueOxford Handbook of Consequentialism (SOURCE_BOOK)
PublisherOxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB)
DOI10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190905323.013.5
OpenAlexW3092766407
ISBN9780190905323
LanguageEN
Citations received1
References cited16

The actualism/possibilism debate in ethics is about whether counterfactuals of freedom concerning what an agent would freely do if she were in certain circumstances even partly determine that agent’s obligations. This debate arose from an argument against the coherence of utilitarianism in the deontic logic literature. In this chapter, we first trace the historical origins of this debate and then examine actualism, possibilism, and securitism through the lens of consequentialism. After examining their respective benefits and drawbacks, we argue that, contrary to what has been assumed, actualism and securitism both succumb to the so-called nonratifiability problem. In making this argument, we develop this problem in detail and argue that it’s a much more serious problem than has been appreciated. We conclude by arguing that an alternative view, hybridism, is independently the most plausible position and best fits with the nature of consequentialism, partly in light of avoiding the nonratifiability problem.

Argument (complex analysis) · Consequentialism · Counterfactual conditional · Deontic logic · Epistemology · Internalism and externalism · Utilitarianism · Free Will and Agency · Philosophical Ethics and Theory · Philosophy · War, Ethics, and Justification

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