Bruce Yandle
Biographic Data
| ID | 698242 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Bruce Yandle |
| GIVEN NAMES | Bruce |
| FAMILY NAME | Yandle |
| SIGNATURE | YANDLE B |
| AFFILIATIONS | Clemson University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 33 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 52 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 33 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1974 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
George J. Stigler’s theory of economic regulation, bootleggers, baptists and the rebirth of the public interest imperative
Christianity and Classical Culture
The momentous encounter between Christian thought and Greek philosophy reached a high point in fourth-century Byzantium, and the principal actors were four Greek-speaking Christian thinkers whose collective influence on the Eastern Church was comparable to that of Augustine on Western Latin Christendom. In this erudite and informative book, a distinguished scholar provides the first coherent account of the lives and writings of these so-called Ca…
Bob Tollison, Adam Smith’s pin factory, and the flow of knowledge
Asserting presidential preferences in a regulatory review bureaucracy
Gordon Tullock
Bootleggers and Baptists in the Theory of Regulation
Theories of regulation offer thought facilitating devices that may help to explain the functioning of government in a political economy. Among formal theories put forward in the 20 th century are public interest, capture, special interest, and money for nothing. The Bootlegger and Baptist theory is based on the frequent observation of two distinct and different interest groups pursuing the same regulatory end. The name comes from experiences obse…
Regulation by litigation
We believe that careful application of the logic of economics and public choice shines important light on regulation through litigation and can explain at least partly why regulators choose the litigation route, when they choose it, and how the choice may or may not achieve broad goals of efficiency and fairness. We present three case studies: heavy‐duty diesel engines, silica and asbestos, and the tobacco industry's Master Settlement Agreement (…
A theory of entangled political economy, with application to Tarp and NRA
National TV broadcasting and the rise of the regulatory state
Common law environmentalism
Exploring the Production of Social Order
Regulatory takings and constitutional repair the 1990s' property-rights rebellion
Private and public choices in public education
Sir Edward Coke and the struggle for a new constitutional order
Constitutional choice for the control of water pollution
Regulation and the Reagan Era
Journal Article Regulation and the Reagan Era: Politics, Bureaucracy and the Public Interest. Ed. by Roger E. Meiners and Bruce Yandle. (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1989. xvi + 304 pp. Cloth, $49.50. Paper, $19.95.) Get access William H. Becker William H. Becker George Washington University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Journal of American History, Volume 79, Issue 2, September 1992, Pages 747–748, https:/…
Sewage Treatment as an Industry Subsidy
Federal water pollution control legislation in the 1970s set standards that affected the discharge of industrial effluent and expanded subsidies for the construction of municipal treatment
Environment and efficiency lovers
Organic constitutions and common law
The Politics of Regulatory Change
Environmental feudalism
Antitrust actions and the budgeting process
Regulators, legislators and budget manipulation
Regulating the function, not the industry
Rentless rent-seeking and abnormal returns
The Politics of Regulatory Change
A theory of entangled political economy, with application to Tarp and NRA
Exploring the Production of Social Order
Organic constitutions and common law
George J. Stigler’s theory of economic regulation, bootleggers, baptists and the rebirth of the public interest imperative
Regulatory takings and constitutional repair the 1990s' property-rights rebellion
Constitutional choice for the control of water pollution
Common law environmentalism
Private and public choices in public education
Antitrust actions and the budgeting process
Regulating the function, not the industry
Regulation by litigation
We believe that careful application of the logic of economics and public choice shines important light on regulation through litigation and can explain at least partly why regulators choose the litigation route, when they choose it, and how the choice may or may not achieve broad goals of efficiency and fairness. We present three case studies: heavy‐duty diesel engines, silica and asbestos, and the tobacco industry's Master Settlement Agreement (…
National TV broadcasting and the rise of the regulatory state
Sewage Treatment as an Industry Subsidy
Federal water pollution control legislation in the 1970s set standards that affected the discharge of industrial effluent and expanded subsidies for the construction of municipal treatment
Rentless rent-seeking and abnormal returns
Economic agents and the level of pollution control
Mixed goods and bads
Henry George, Property Rights and Environmental Quality
Mixed goods and bads
Henry George, Property Rights and Environmental Quality
Conflicting commons
A Property Rights Paradox
Murray N. Rothbard is recognized as one of the most articulate modern critics of Henry George's land value tax. A leading libertarian thinker, Rothbard condemns George's recommendation that government act to affect private transactions in land, arguing that such interventions infringe on previously defined private property rights. However, Rothbard's social system has no explicit mechanism for accommodating the emergence of tradeable property rig…
Conflicting analysis of a ?Conflicting commons
Economic agents and the level of pollution control
Henry George, His Advocates and Adversaries
Groundwater and the Land Value Tax
Application of the land value tax has been described for many natural resources. However, the problems encountered with flowing underground resources have not been fully discussed. Groundwater is one such flowing resource that affects the value of surface land. The underground water is also subject to its own market forces. If a Georgist tax is to be applied to groundwater or to land affected by it, the administrator of the tax must consider the …
Regulating the function, not the industry
Rentless rent-seeking and abnormal returns
Antitrust actions and the budgeting process
Regulators, legislators and budget manipulation
Organic constitutions and common law
The Politics of Regulatory Change
Environmental feudalism
Constitutional choice for the control of water pollution
Regulation and the Reagan Era
Journal Article Regulation and the Reagan Era: Politics, Bureaucracy and the Public Interest. Ed. by Roger E. Meiners and Bruce Yandle. (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1989. xvi + 304 pp. Cloth, $49.50. Paper, $19.95.) Get access William H. Becker William H. Becker George Washington University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Journal of American History, Volume 79, Issue 2, September 1992, Pages 747–748, https:/…
Sewage Treatment as an Industry Subsidy
Federal water pollution control legislation in the 1970s set standards that affected the discharge of industrial effluent and expanded subsidies for the construction of municipal treatment
Environment and efficiency lovers
Sir Edward Coke and the struggle for a new constitutional order
Private and public choices in public education
Regulatory takings and constitutional repair the 1990s' property-rights rebellion
Exploring the Production of Social Order
Common law environmentalism
National TV broadcasting and the rise of the regulatory state
Economics (25 works) · Political science (24 works) · Law (21 works) · Law (16 works) · Public finance (16 works) · Law and economics (15 works) · Politics (14 works) · Macroeconomics (10 works) · Sociology (9 works) · Business (8 works)