Susanne Lohmann
Biographic Data
| ID | 709816 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Susanne Lohmann |
| GIVEN NAMES | Susanne |
| FAMILY NAME | Lohmann |
| SIGNATURE | LOHMANN S |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of California, Los Angeles |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1478-4534 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 22 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1025 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 22 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1993 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 12 |
The Trauma and Mental Health Impacts of Coercive Control: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis
Coercive control is an under researched type of intimate partner violence (IPV). The aims of this review were to (a) synthesize all available evidence regarding associations with coercive control and mental health outcomes including post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), complex PTSD, and depression; and (b) compare these with associations involving broader categories of psychological IPV. Primary studies which measured associations of coercive c…
It's Like You're a Living Hostage, and It Never Ends”: A Qualitative Examination of the Trauma and Mental Health Impacts of Coercive Control
Coercive control is a complex and poorly understood dimension of intimate partner violence that is associated with trauma and mental health consequences. It is essential to understand the nuanced and varied experiences of coercive control and potential processes of traumatization. In this qualitative phenomenological study, we conducted semi-structured interviews with 16 women who had experienced coercive control and accessed domestic violence se…
The Non‐Politics of Monetary Policy
This article studies the non-politics of monetary policy. It argues that there is an urgent need for a macro political economy, which is stuck with an impoverished understanding of political institutions. It looks at the life cycle of social choice, public choice, and political economy and presents an assessment of the contribution of macro political economy. The last two sections are concerned with total special interest gridlock and the poverty…
Clumsy Solutions for a Complex World: The Case of Climate Change
Successful solutions to pressing social ills tend to consist of innovative combinations of a limited set of alternative ways of perceiving and resolving the issues. These contending policy perspectives justify, represent and stem from four different ways of organizing social relations: hierarchy, individualism, egalitarianism and fatalism. Each of these perspectives: (1) distils certain elements of experience and wisdom that are missed by the oth…
Banking on Reform: Political Parties and Central Bank Independence in the Industrial Democracies
Banking on Reform: Political Parties and Central Bank Independence in the Industrial Democracies
A Toy Model of Scientific Progress
Scientific research programs have a life cycle consisting of a sequence of overlapping subprograms. Each subprogram works within set boundaries, driven by the internal logic of its theoretical and empirical puzzles; outside of the boundaries lie the blind spots of the subprogram. Over time, boundaries shift as the blind spots become hot spots of inquiry. For a while, the status-quo subprogram overlaps with the subprogram challenging it, but event…
Representative Government and Special Interest Politics: We Have Met the Enemy and He is Us
In any society characterized by diversity and specialization, each citizen - the butcher, the baker, the candlestick-maker - is a special interest on some dimensions of public policy and a member of the general public on many other dimensions. Each citizen enjoys being at the receiving end of special interest handouts even at the expense of inefficiencies imposed on general public. But relative to the status quo involving inefficient redistributi…
Why Do Institutions Matter? An Audience–Cost Theory of Institutional Commitment
Institutions constrain political choices and thus commit the future path of policy. Well–designed institutions square the circle of generating commitment that is both credible and flexible. This article develops an audience–cost theory of flexible commitment that addresses some vexing questions. Where does institutional commitment come from? Why is institutional commitment feasible when policy commitment is not? How can an institution achieve cre…
Collective Action Cascades: An Informational Rationale for the Power in Numbers
Self‐interested individuals pursue their goals rationally taking into account the constraints imposed by their environment and best‐responding to the strategic behavior of other individuals: when applied to collective action, economic theory predicts undersupply. Meanwhile, the behavior of masses of people is described as excitable, emotional, irrational, suggestible, hypnotic, disorderly, and unpredictable: in practice, it seems, collective acti…
Setting the agenda: Electoral competition, commitment of policy, and issue salience
What Price Accountability? The Lucas Island Model and the Politics of Monetary Policy
This paper develops a model of an electoral cycle in inflation and output based on rational inflation expectations and rational retrospective voting. Voters are heterogeneous and partially informed about aggregate macroeconomic variables. They observe precisely how policy stimulates their local economies, but their observations of economic activity in other sectors are imprecise. Voters extract information about the incumbent policymaker's econom…
Positive political economy: Theory and evidence
This book investigates how observed differences in institutions affect political and economic outcomes in various social, economic, and political systems. It also examines how the institutions themselves change and develop in response to individual and collective beliefs, preferences, and strategies. This volume tackles both monetary and real topics in an integrated way, and represents the first coherent empirical investigation of positive models…
Federalism and Central bank Independence: The Politics of German Monetary Policy, 1957–92
Two channels of political control allow elected politicians to influence monetary policy. First, political threats to the status, structure, or very existence of the central bank may force central bankers to comply with politically motivated demands on monetary policy. Second, politicians may use their powers of appointment to ensure diat central bank appointees share their electoral and party-political goals. This paper derives the monetary poli…
An Information Rationale for the Power of Special Interests
Political decisions are often biased in favor of special interests at the expense of the general public, and they are frequently inefficient in the sense that the losses incurred by the majority exceed the gains enjoyed by the minority. This article explains the bias in terms of information asymmetries and the free-rider problem. First, incumbents increase their reelection prospects by biasing policy toward groups that are better able to monitor …
Linkage Politics
In this article, the author extends the basic repeated prisoners' dilemma to allow for the linkage of punishment strategies across issues (issue linkage) as well as decentralized third-party enforcement (player linkage). The concepts of issue and player linkage are then synthesized to develop the notion of domestic-international linkage, which connects trigger strategy punishments across games played over different issues by different sets of pla…
Party Identification, Retrospective Voting, and Moderating Elections in a Federal System: West Germany, 1961-1989
The hypotheses of retrospective voting and moderating elections rationalize some empirical regularities in U.S. presidential and congressional elections that posed a challenge for the party identification hypothesis. Here, these hypotheses are applied to the German federal system that is characterized by staggered national and Land (provincial) elections. They are tested using data on real GNP growth at the national and Land levels, party vote sh…
The Political Economy of Conflict and Appropriation
This collection of essays departs from the conventional economic paradigm wherein individuals or groups choose among various productive activities for mutually beneficial trade. Each essay recognizes that where property rights are not well defined or easily enforced, individuals may forgo productive opportunities and engage in appropriative activities to compete for property, income, rights or privileges. Though the essays differ in their focus, …
Information, access, and contributions: A signaling model of lobbying
The poverty of green and Shapiro
Donald Green and Ian Shapiro argue that rational choice scholarship in political science is excessively theory‐driven: too few of its theoretical insights have been subjected to serious empirical scrutiny and survived. But rational choice theorizing has the potential to identify and correct logical inconsistencies and slippages. It is thus valuable even if the resulting theories are not tested empirically. When Green and Shapiro's argument concer…
Divided government and U.S. trade policy: Theory and evidence
If different parties control the U.S. Congress and White House, the United States may maintain higher import protection than otherwise. This proposition follows from a distributive politics model in which Congress can choose to delegate trade policymaking to the President. When the congressional majority party faces a President of the other party, the former has an incentive to delegate to but to constrain the President by requiring congressional…
The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989–91
This article analyzes the dynamics of turnout and the political impact of five cycles of protest, consisting of forty-two mass demonstrations that occurred on Mondays in Leipzig over the period 1989–91. These demonstrations are interpreted as an informational cascade that publicly revealed some of the previously hidden information about the malign nature of the East German communist regime. Once this information became publicly available, the via…
A Signaling Model of Informative and Manipulative Political Action
I develop a signaling model of mass political action. I establish that rational, self-interested individuals may have incentives to engage in costly political action despite a free-rider problem. Their political actions are informative for a political leader who rationally takes a cue from the size of the protest movement. However, some information is trapped in extremist and rationally apathetic pockets of the society. Some extremists take polit…
The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989–91
This article analyzes the dynamics of turnout and the political impact of five cycles of protest, consisting of forty-two mass demonstrations that occurred on Mondays in Leipzig over the period 1989–91. These demonstrations are interpreted as an informational cascade that publicly revealed some of the previously hidden information about the malign nature of the East German communist regime. Once this information became publicly available, the via…
A Signaling Model of Informative and Manipulative Political Action
I develop a signaling model of mass political action. I establish that rational, self-interested individuals may have incentives to engage in costly political action despite a free-rider problem. Their political actions are informative for a political leader who rationally takes a cue from the size of the protest movement. However, some information is trapped in extremist and rationally apathetic pockets of the society. Some extremists take polit…
Clumsy Solutions for a Complex World: The Case of Climate Change
Successful solutions to pressing social ills tend to consist of innovative combinations of a limited set of alternative ways of perceiving and resolving the issues. These contending policy perspectives justify, represent and stem from four different ways of organizing social relations: hierarchy, individualism, egalitarianism and fatalism. Each of these perspectives: (1) distils certain elements of experience and wisdom that are missed by the oth…
Divided government and U.S. trade policy: Theory and evidence
If different parties control the U.S. Congress and White House, the United States may maintain higher import protection than otherwise. This proposition follows from a distributive politics model in which Congress can choose to delegate trade policymaking to the President. When the congressional majority party faces a President of the other party, the former has an incentive to delegate to but to constrain the President by requiring congressional…
An Information Rationale for the Power of Special Interests
Political decisions are often biased in favor of special interests at the expense of the general public, and they are frequently inefficient in the sense that the losses incurred by the majority exceed the gains enjoyed by the minority. This article explains the bias in terms of information asymmetries and the free-rider problem. First, incumbents increase their reelection prospects by biasing policy toward groups that are better able to monitor …
Federalism and Central bank Independence: The Politics of German Monetary Policy, 1957–92
Two channels of political control allow elected politicians to influence monetary policy. First, political threats to the status, structure, or very existence of the central bank may force central bankers to comply with politically motivated demands on monetary policy. Second, politicians may use their powers of appointment to ensure diat central bank appointees share their electoral and party-political goals. This paper derives the monetary poli…
Linkage Politics
In this article, the author extends the basic repeated prisoners' dilemma to allow for the linkage of punishment strategies across issues (issue linkage) as well as decentralized third-party enforcement (player linkage). The concepts of issue and player linkage are then synthesized to develop the notion of domestic-international linkage, which connects trigger strategy punishments across games played over different issues by different sets of pla…
Information, access, and contributions: A signaling model of lobbying
Party Identification, Retrospective Voting, and Moderating Elections in a Federal System: West Germany, 1961-1989
The hypotheses of retrospective voting and moderating elections rationalize some empirical regularities in U.S. presidential and congressional elections that posed a challenge for the party identification hypothesis. Here, these hypotheses are applied to the German federal system that is characterized by staggered national and Land (provincial) elections. They are tested using data on real GNP growth at the national and Land levels, party vote sh…
Why Do Institutions Matter? An Audience–Cost Theory of Institutional Commitment
Institutions constrain political choices and thus commit the future path of policy. Well–designed institutions square the circle of generating commitment that is both credible and flexible. This article develops an audience–cost theory of flexible commitment that addresses some vexing questions. Where does institutional commitment come from? Why is institutional commitment feasible when policy commitment is not? How can an institution achieve cre…
The poverty of green and Shapiro
Donald Green and Ian Shapiro argue that rational choice scholarship in political science is excessively theory‐driven: too few of its theoretical insights have been subjected to serious empirical scrutiny and survived. But rational choice theorizing has the potential to identify and correct logical inconsistencies and slippages. It is thus valuable even if the resulting theories are not tested empirically. When Green and Shapiro's argument concer…
What Price Accountability? The Lucas Island Model and the Politics of Monetary Policy
This paper develops a model of an electoral cycle in inflation and output based on rational inflation expectations and rational retrospective voting. Voters are heterogeneous and partially informed about aggregate macroeconomic variables. They observe precisely how policy stimulates their local economies, but their observations of economic activity in other sectors are imprecise. Voters extract information about the incumbent policymaker's econom…
Representative Government and Special Interest Politics: We Have Met the Enemy and He is Us
In any society characterized by diversity and specialization, each citizen - the butcher, the baker, the candlestick-maker - is a special interest on some dimensions of public policy and a member of the general public on many other dimensions. Each citizen enjoys being at the receiving end of special interest handouts even at the expense of inefficiencies imposed on general public. But relative to the status quo involving inefficient redistributi…
Setting the agenda: Electoral competition, commitment of policy, and issue salience
It's Like You're a Living Hostage, and It Never Ends”: A Qualitative Examination of the Trauma and Mental Health Impacts of Coercive Control
Coercive control is a complex and poorly understood dimension of intimate partner violence that is associated with trauma and mental health consequences. It is essential to understand the nuanced and varied experiences of coercive control and potential processes of traumatization. In this qualitative phenomenological study, we conducted semi-structured interviews with 16 women who had experienced coercive control and accessed domestic violence se…
A Signaling Model of Informative and Manipulative Political Action
I develop a signaling model of mass political action. I establish that rational, self-interested individuals may have incentives to engage in costly political action despite a free-rider problem. Their political actions are informative for a political leader who rationally takes a cue from the size of the protest movement. However, some information is trapped in extremist and rationally apathetic pockets of the society. Some extremists take polit…
Divided government and U.S. trade policy: Theory and evidence
If different parties control the U.S. Congress and White House, the United States may maintain higher import protection than otherwise. This proposition follows from a distributive politics model in which Congress can choose to delegate trade policymaking to the President. When the congressional majority party faces a President of the other party, the former has an incentive to delegate to but to constrain the President by requiring congressional…
The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989–91
This article analyzes the dynamics of turnout and the political impact of five cycles of protest, consisting of forty-two mass demonstrations that occurred on Mondays in Leipzig over the period 1989–91. These demonstrations are interpreted as an informational cascade that publicly revealed some of the previously hidden information about the malign nature of the East German communist regime. Once this information became publicly available, the via…
Information, access, and contributions: A signaling model of lobbying
The poverty of green and Shapiro
Donald Green and Ian Shapiro argue that rational choice scholarship in political science is excessively theory‐driven: too few of its theoretical insights have been subjected to serious empirical scrutiny and survived. But rational choice theorizing has the potential to identify and correct logical inconsistencies and slippages. It is thus valuable even if the resulting theories are not tested empirically. When Green and Shapiro's argument concer…
The Political Economy of Conflict and Appropriation
This collection of essays departs from the conventional economic paradigm wherein individuals or groups choose among various productive activities for mutually beneficial trade. Each essay recognizes that where property rights are not well defined or easily enforced, individuals may forgo productive opportunities and engage in appropriative activities to compete for property, income, rights or privileges. Though the essays differ in their focus, …
Linkage Politics
In this article, the author extends the basic repeated prisoners' dilemma to allow for the linkage of punishment strategies across issues (issue linkage) as well as decentralized third-party enforcement (player linkage). The concepts of issue and player linkage are then synthesized to develop the notion of domestic-international linkage, which connects trigger strategy punishments across games played over different issues by different sets of pla…
Party Identification, Retrospective Voting, and Moderating Elections in a Federal System: West Germany, 1961-1989
The hypotheses of retrospective voting and moderating elections rationalize some empirical regularities in U.S. presidential and congressional elections that posed a challenge for the party identification hypothesis. Here, these hypotheses are applied to the German federal system that is characterized by staggered national and Land (provincial) elections. They are tested using data on real GNP growth at the national and Land levels, party vote sh…
Positive political economy: Theory and evidence
This book investigates how observed differences in institutions affect political and economic outcomes in various social, economic, and political systems. It also examines how the institutions themselves change and develop in response to individual and collective beliefs, preferences, and strategies. This volume tackles both monetary and real topics in an integrated way, and represents the first coherent empirical investigation of positive models…
Federalism and Central bank Independence: The Politics of German Monetary Policy, 1957–92
Two channels of political control allow elected politicians to influence monetary policy. First, political threats to the status, structure, or very existence of the central bank may force central bankers to comply with politically motivated demands on monetary policy. Second, politicians may use their powers of appointment to ensure diat central bank appointees share their electoral and party-political goals. This paper derives the monetary poli…
An Information Rationale for the Power of Special Interests
Political decisions are often biased in favor of special interests at the expense of the general public, and they are frequently inefficient in the sense that the losses incurred by the majority exceed the gains enjoyed by the minority. This article explains the bias in terms of information asymmetries and the free-rider problem. First, incumbents increase their reelection prospects by biasing policy toward groups that are better able to monitor …
Setting the agenda: Electoral competition, commitment of policy, and issue salience
What Price Accountability? The Lucas Island Model and the Politics of Monetary Policy
This paper develops a model of an electoral cycle in inflation and output based on rational inflation expectations and rational retrospective voting. Voters are heterogeneous and partially informed about aggregate macroeconomic variables. They observe precisely how policy stimulates their local economies, but their observations of economic activity in other sectors are imprecise. Voters extract information about the incumbent policymaker's econom…
Collective Action Cascades: An Informational Rationale for the Power in Numbers
Self‐interested individuals pursue their goals rationally taking into account the constraints imposed by their environment and best‐responding to the strategic behavior of other individuals: when applied to collective action, economic theory predicts undersupply. Meanwhile, the behavior of masses of people is described as excitable, emotional, irrational, suggestible, hypnotic, disorderly, and unpredictable: in practice, it seems, collective acti…
Representative Government and Special Interest Politics: We Have Met the Enemy and He is Us
In any society characterized by diversity and specialization, each citizen - the butcher, the baker, the candlestick-maker - is a special interest on some dimensions of public policy and a member of the general public on many other dimensions. Each citizen enjoys being at the receiving end of special interest handouts even at the expense of inefficiencies imposed on general public. But relative to the status quo involving inefficient redistributi…
Why Do Institutions Matter? An Audience–Cost Theory of Institutional Commitment
Institutions constrain political choices and thus commit the future path of policy. Well–designed institutions square the circle of generating commitment that is both credible and flexible. This article develops an audience–cost theory of flexible commitment that addresses some vexing questions. Where does institutional commitment come from? Why is institutional commitment feasible when policy commitment is not? How can an institution achieve cre…
Banking on Reform: Political Parties and Central Bank Independence in the Industrial Democracies
Banking on Reform: Political Parties and Central Bank Independence in the Industrial Democracies
A Toy Model of Scientific Progress
Scientific research programs have a life cycle consisting of a sequence of overlapping subprograms. Each subprogram works within set boundaries, driven by the internal logic of its theoretical and empirical puzzles; outside of the boundaries lie the blind spots of the subprogram. Over time, boundaries shift as the blind spots become hot spots of inquiry. For a while, the status-quo subprogram overlaps with the subprogram challenging it, but event…
Clumsy Solutions for a Complex World: The Case of Climate Change
Successful solutions to pressing social ills tend to consist of innovative combinations of a limited set of alternative ways of perceiving and resolving the issues. These contending policy perspectives justify, represent and stem from four different ways of organizing social relations: hierarchy, individualism, egalitarianism and fatalism. Each of these perspectives: (1) distils certain elements of experience and wisdom that are missed by the oth…
The Non‐Politics of Monetary Policy
This article studies the non-politics of monetary policy. It argues that there is an urgent need for a macro political economy, which is stuck with an impoverished understanding of political institutions. It looks at the life cycle of social choice, public choice, and political economy and presents an assessment of the contribution of macro political economy. The last two sections are concerned with total special interest gridlock and the poverty…
The Trauma and Mental Health Impacts of Coercive Control: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis
Coercive control is an under researched type of intimate partner violence (IPV). The aims of this review were to (a) synthesize all available evidence regarding associations with coercive control and mental health outcomes including post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), complex PTSD, and depression; and (b) compare these with associations involving broader categories of psychological IPV. Primary studies which measured associations of coercive c…
It's Like You're a Living Hostage, and It Never Ends”: A Qualitative Examination of the Trauma and Mental Health Impacts of Coercive Control
Coercive control is a complex and poorly understood dimension of intimate partner violence that is associated with trauma and mental health consequences. It is essential to understand the nuanced and varied experiences of coercive control and potential processes of traumatization. In this qualitative phenomenological study, we conducted semi-structured interviews with 16 women who had experienced coercive control and accessed domestic violence se…
Political science (20 works) · Economics (18 works) · Law (17 works) · Politics (15 works) · Law (13 works) · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy (9 works) · Microeconomics (8 works) · Law and economics (7 works) · Political economy (7 works) · Computer Science (6 works)