Chengzhang Wang
Biographic Data
| ID | 7544980 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Chengzhang Wang |
| GIVEN NAMES | Chengzhang |
| FAMILY NAME | Wang |
| SIGNATURE | WANG C |
| AFFILIATIONS | Southwest Jiaotong University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-2967-5066 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 2 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2020 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Country output and financial black holes
This study develops the link between output and fiscal corruption risk in public–private partnership (PPP) schemes and the government bailout rate of non-performing loans (NPLs). The model assumes that corruption is widespread in such public investment programs. The objective functions of the government and PPP firms include fiscal corruption risk, given that the PPP firm and tax inspector can ‘effectively’ negotiate bribes. The model solves for …
Determining optimal meeting frequency
This study uniquely addresses declining business profitability because of a lack of coordinated meetings between the public and private sectors. We determine optimal meeting frequency (i.e., the highest number of regularly scheduled meetings of the Standing Committee of the inter-agency coordination per year at which profit can be maximised) for poorly functioning public–private partnership (PPP) industries (i.e., their average return on assets o…
No prominent works on this page.
Determining optimal meeting frequency
This study uniquely addresses declining business profitability because of a lack of coordinated meetings between the public and private sectors. We determine optimal meeting frequency (i.e., the highest number of regularly scheduled meetings of the Standing Committee of the inter-agency coordination per year at which profit can be maximised) for poorly functioning public–private partnership (PPP) industries (i.e., their average return on assets o…
Country output and financial black holes
This study develops the link between output and fiscal corruption risk in public–private partnership (PPP) schemes and the government bailout rate of non-performing loans (NPLs). The model assumes that corruption is widespread in such public investment programs. The objective functions of the government and PPP firms include fiscal corruption risk, given that the PPP firm and tax inspector can ‘effectively’ negotiate bribes. The model solves for …
Economics (2 works) · Finance (2 works) · Auction Theory and Applications (1 work) · Bailout (1 work) · Budget constraint (1 work) · Business (1 work) · Corporate Taxation and Avoidance (1 work) · Crowding out (1 work) · Economic growth (1 work) · Economy (1 work)