Victor Menaldo
Biographic Data
| ID | 779659 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Victor Menaldo |
| GIVEN NAMES | Victor |
| FAMILY NAME | Menaldo |
| SIGNATURE | MENALDO V |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Washington |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5663-0322 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 19 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 425 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 18 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2011 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 8 |
Why elites sometimes undo their own constitutional privileges
Does technology transfer from the US to China harm American firms, workers, and consumers? A historical and analytic investigation
Decades of spectacular economic growth have made China into an important geopolitical player. As Chinese companies improve their capabilities across several areas of advanced technology, including artificial intelligence, some US policymakers and pundits lament the country’s ‘unfair trade practices’ and serial ‘theft of American intellectual property’, particularly through so-called forced technology transfer. China hawks claim these practices hu…
Response to Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman’s review of Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins of Democracy
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins of Democracy
The Institutions Curse: Natural Resources, Politics, and Development
The ʽresource curseʼ is the view that countries with extensive natural resources tend to suffer from a host of undesirable outcomes, including the weakening of state capacity, authoritarianism, fewer public goods, war, and economic stagnation. This book debunks this view, arguing that there is an ʽinstitutions curseʼ rather than a resource curse. Legacies endemic to the developing world have impelled many countries to develop natural resources as…
Institutions Curse: Natural Resources, Politics, and Development
Capital in the Twenty-First Century—in the Rest of the World
Recent work has documented an upward trend in inequality since the 1970s that harks back to the Gilded Age: the inegalitarian pre–World War I world. Most prominently, Thomas Piketty argues in Capital in the Twenty-First Century that this is partially due to the fact that capitalism is hardwired to exacerbate the gap between the rich and poor. By critically evaluating recent literature on this topic, this article offers three big contributions. Fi…
The Fiscal Roots of Financial Underdevelopment
Why do some countries indulge in financial repression, harming economic development in the process, whereas others promote financial development? Three main explanations have been put forth. Market failures, due to information asymmetries, mean that credit is rationed even when lenders could potentially benefit from making loans readily available. Political failures, due to state capture, mean that credit will be rationed as a way of generating r…
Democracy, Elite Bias, and Redistribution in Latin America
Journal Article Democracy, Elite Bias, and Redistribution in Latin America Get access Victor Menaldo Victor Menaldo VICTOR MENALDO is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Washington. He has published on capitalism, natural resources, regime types, and redistribution across the leading journals in the field. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Political Science Quar…
Democracy, Elite Bias, and Financial Development in Latin America
Does democracy induce financial development? There are good theoretical reasons to believe this to be the case, but the evidence adduced to support this claim has been mixed. In this article, the authors posit that only democracies that appeal to the median voter should experience financial development because those democracies have adopted their own constitution after transition, rather than having inherited one from an authoritarian predecessor…
The New Political Economy of Natural Resources in Latin America
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Empirical Strategies in International Development Research: An Introduction
Foreign aid, economic globalization, and pollution
Dealing with Dictators: Negotiated Democratization and the Fate of Outgoing Autocrats
This paper examines how the circumstances of democratic transition affect the consequences of losing office for outgoing dictators. Using data on constitutional origins and democratization from 1875 to 2004, we find that outgoing dictators who are able to impose a holdover constitution during democratization and beyond are less likely to face severe punishment upon relinquishing their rule. These results hold after accounting for alternative expl…
Gaming Democracy: Elite Dominance during Transition and the Prospects for Redistribution
Inequality and democracy are far more compatible empirically than social conflict theory predicts. This article speaks to this puzzle, identifying the scope conditions under which democratization induces greater redistribution. Because autocrats sometimes have incentives to expropriate economic elites, who lack reliable institutions to protect their rights, elites may prefer democracy to autocratic rule if they can impose roadblocks to redistribu…
The Middle East and North Africa’s Resilient Monarchs
This article helps explain the variation in political turmoil observed in the MENA during the Arab Spring. The region's monarchies have been largely spared of violence while the "republics" have not. A theory about how a monarchy's political culture solves a ruler's credible commitment problem explains why this has been the case. Using a panel dataset of the MENA countries (1950–2006), I show that monarchs are less likely than nonmonarchs to expe…
Coercive Capacity and the Prospects for Democratization
How does the strength of a state’s coercive apparatus under autocracy affect the likelihood of democratic transition? While a broad range of literature posits a negative link between repression and democracy, empirical models of the determinants of democratization rarely include measures that capture this relationship. We generate a panel dataset with global scope from 1950-2002 to explicitly empirically assess whether coercive capacity is negati…
If You’re Against Them You’re With Us: The Effect of Expropriation on Autocratic Survival
This article advances a theory of why some dictators weaken the elite through expropriation whereas others do not. When the organization that launches a new dictator into power is uncertain about whether he will remain loyal to them, a dictator’s decision to expropriate the preexisting elite may contribute to political stability by signaling his exclusive reliance on this group. The authors corroborate this claim empirically. Using new data compi…
Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse
A large body of scholarship finds a negative relationship between natural resources and democracy. Extant cross-country regressions, however, assume random effects and are run on panel datasets with relatively short time dimensions. Because natural resource reliance is not an exogenous variable, this is not an effective strategy for uncovering causal relationships. Numerous sources of bias may be driving the results, the most serious of which is …
Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse
A large body of scholarship finds a negative relationship between natural resources and democracy. Extant cross-country regressions, however, assume random effects and are run on panel datasets with relatively short time dimensions. Because natural resource reliance is not an exogenous variable, this is not an effective strategy for uncovering causal relationships. Numerous sources of bias may be driving the results, the most serious of which is …
Gaming Democracy: Elite Dominance during Transition and the Prospects for Redistribution
Inequality and democracy are far more compatible empirically than social conflict theory predicts. This article speaks to this puzzle, identifying the scope conditions under which democratization induces greater redistribution. Because autocrats sometimes have incentives to expropriate economic elites, who lack reliable institutions to protect their rights, elites may prefer democracy to autocratic rule if they can impose roadblocks to redistribu…
The Middle East and North Africa’s Resilient Monarchs
This article helps explain the variation in political turmoil observed in the MENA during the Arab Spring. The region's monarchies have been largely spared of violence while the "republics" have not. A theory about how a monarchy's political culture solves a ruler's credible commitment problem explains why this has been the case. Using a panel dataset of the MENA countries (1950–2006), I show that monarchs are less likely than nonmonarchs to expe…
Coercive Capacity and the Prospects for Democratization
How does the strength of a state’s coercive apparatus under autocracy affect the likelihood of democratic transition? While a broad range of literature posits a negative link between repression and democracy, empirical models of the determinants of democratization rarely include measures that capture this relationship. We generate a panel dataset with global scope from 1950-2002 to explicitly empirically assess whether coercive capacity is negati…
If You’re Against Them You’re With Us: The Effect of Expropriation on Autocratic Survival
This article advances a theory of why some dictators weaken the elite through expropriation whereas others do not. When the organization that launches a new dictator into power is uncertain about whether he will remain loyal to them, a dictator’s decision to expropriate the preexisting elite may contribute to political stability by signaling his exclusive reliance on this group. The authors corroborate this claim empirically. Using new data compi…
Dealing with Dictators: Negotiated Democratization and the Fate of Outgoing Autocrats
This paper examines how the circumstances of democratic transition affect the consequences of losing office for outgoing dictators. Using data on constitutional origins and democratization from 1875 to 2004, we find that outgoing dictators who are able to impose a holdover constitution during democratization and beyond are less likely to face severe punishment upon relinquishing their rule. These results hold after accounting for alternative expl…
Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins of Democracy
Democracy, Elite Bias, and Financial Development in Latin America
Does democracy induce financial development? There are good theoretical reasons to believe this to be the case, but the evidence adduced to support this claim has been mixed. In this article, the authors posit that only democracies that appeal to the median voter should experience financial development because those democracies have adopted their own constitution after transition, rather than having inherited one from an authoritarian predecessor…
The Fiscal Roots of Financial Underdevelopment
Why do some countries indulge in financial repression, harming economic development in the process, whereas others promote financial development? Three main explanations have been put forth. Market failures, due to information asymmetries, mean that credit is rationed even when lenders could potentially benefit from making loans readily available. Political failures, due to state capture, mean that credit will be rationed as a way of generating r…
Capital in the Twenty-First Century—in the Rest of the World
Recent work has documented an upward trend in inequality since the 1970s that harks back to the Gilded Age: the inegalitarian pre–World War I world. Most prominently, Thomas Piketty argues in Capital in the Twenty-First Century that this is partially due to the fact that capitalism is hardwired to exacerbate the gap between the rich and poor. By critically evaluating recent literature on this topic, this article offers three big contributions. Fi…
Democracy, Elite Bias, and Redistribution in Latin America
Journal Article Democracy, Elite Bias, and Redistribution in Latin America Get access Victor Menaldo Victor Menaldo VICTOR MENALDO is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Washington. He has published on capitalism, natural resources, regime types, and redistribution across the leading journals in the field. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Political Science Quar…
Empirical Strategies in International Development Research: An Introduction
Foreign aid, economic globalization, and pollution
Do Natural Resources Fuel Authoritarianism? A Reappraisal of the Resource Curse
A large body of scholarship finds a negative relationship between natural resources and democracy. Extant cross-country regressions, however, assume random effects and are run on panel datasets with relatively short time dimensions. Because natural resource reliance is not an exogenous variable, this is not an effective strategy for uncovering causal relationships. Numerous sources of bias may be driving the results, the most serious of which is …
The Middle East and North Africa’s Resilient Monarchs
This article helps explain the variation in political turmoil observed in the MENA during the Arab Spring. The region's monarchies have been largely spared of violence while the "republics" have not. A theory about how a monarchy's political culture solves a ruler's credible commitment problem explains why this has been the case. Using a panel dataset of the MENA countries (1950–2006), I show that monarchs are less likely than nonmonarchs to expe…
Coercive Capacity and the Prospects for Democratization
How does the strength of a state’s coercive apparatus under autocracy affect the likelihood of democratic transition? While a broad range of literature posits a negative link between repression and democracy, empirical models of the determinants of democratization rarely include measures that capture this relationship. We generate a panel dataset with global scope from 1950-2002 to explicitly empirically assess whether coercive capacity is negati…
If You’re Against Them You’re With Us: The Effect of Expropriation on Autocratic Survival
This article advances a theory of why some dictators weaken the elite through expropriation whereas others do not. When the organization that launches a new dictator into power is uncertain about whether he will remain loyal to them, a dictator’s decision to expropriate the preexisting elite may contribute to political stability by signaling his exclusive reliance on this group. The authors corroborate this claim empirically. Using new data compi…
Empirical Strategies in International Development Research: An Introduction
Foreign aid, economic globalization, and pollution
Dealing with Dictators: Negotiated Democratization and the Fate of Outgoing Autocrats
This paper examines how the circumstances of democratic transition affect the consequences of losing office for outgoing dictators. Using data on constitutional origins and democratization from 1875 to 2004, we find that outgoing dictators who are able to impose a holdover constitution during democratization and beyond are less likely to face severe punishment upon relinquishing their rule. These results hold after accounting for alternative expl…
Gaming Democracy: Elite Dominance during Transition and the Prospects for Redistribution
Inequality and democracy are far more compatible empirically than social conflict theory predicts. This article speaks to this puzzle, identifying the scope conditions under which democratization induces greater redistribution. Because autocrats sometimes have incentives to expropriate economic elites, who lack reliable institutions to protect their rights, elites may prefer democracy to autocratic rule if they can impose roadblocks to redistribu…
Democracy, Elite Bias, and Financial Development in Latin America
Does democracy induce financial development? There are good theoretical reasons to believe this to be the case, but the evidence adduced to support this claim has been mixed. In this article, the authors posit that only democracies that appeal to the median voter should experience financial development because those democracies have adopted their own constitution after transition, rather than having inherited one from an authoritarian predecessor…
The New Political Economy of Natural Resources in Latin America
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
The Institutions Curse: Natural Resources, Politics, and Development
The ʽresource curseʼ is the view that countries with extensive natural resources tend to suffer from a host of undesirable outcomes, including the weakening of state capacity, authoritarianism, fewer public goods, war, and economic stagnation. This book debunks this view, arguing that there is an ʽinstitutions curseʼ rather than a resource curse. Legacies endemic to the developing world have impelled many countries to develop natural resources as…
Institutions Curse: Natural Resources, Politics, and Development
Capital in the Twenty-First Century—in the Rest of the World
Recent work has documented an upward trend in inequality since the 1970s that harks back to the Gilded Age: the inegalitarian pre–World War I world. Most prominently, Thomas Piketty argues in Capital in the Twenty-First Century that this is partially due to the fact that capitalism is hardwired to exacerbate the gap between the rich and poor. By critically evaluating recent literature on this topic, this article offers three big contributions. Fi…
The Fiscal Roots of Financial Underdevelopment
Why do some countries indulge in financial repression, harming economic development in the process, whereas others promote financial development? Three main explanations have been put forth. Market failures, due to information asymmetries, mean that credit is rationed even when lenders could potentially benefit from making loans readily available. Political failures, due to state capture, mean that credit will be rationed as a way of generating r…
Democracy, Elite Bias, and Redistribution in Latin America
Journal Article Democracy, Elite Bias, and Redistribution in Latin America Get access Victor Menaldo Victor Menaldo VICTOR MENALDO is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Washington. He has published on capitalism, natural resources, regime types, and redistribution across the leading journals in the field. Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Political Science Quar…
Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins of Democracy
Response to Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman’s review of Authoritarianism and the Elite Origins of Democracy
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Does technology transfer from the US to China harm American firms, workers, and consumers? A historical and analytic investigation
Decades of spectacular economic growth have made China into an important geopolitical player. As Chinese companies improve their capabilities across several areas of advanced technology, including artificial intelligence, some US policymakers and pundits lament the country’s ‘unfair trade practices’ and serial ‘theft of American intellectual property’, particularly through so-called forced technology transfer. China hawks claim these practices hu…
Why elites sometimes undo their own constitutional privileges
Political science (18 works) · Economics (15 works) · Law (15 works) · Politics (15 works) · Democracy (12 works) · Law (12 works) · Political economy (11 works) · Development economics (9 works) · Elite (8 works) · Market economy (7 works)