Capital in the Twenty-First Century—in the Rest of the World
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 6232932 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Michael Albertus (0000-0002-3341-8687, University of Chicago), Victor Menaldo (0000-0002-5663-0322, University of Washington) |
| Year | 2016 |
| Volume | 19 |
| Issue | 1 |
| Pages | 49-66 |
| Publication date | 2016-05-11 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Annual Review of Political Science (BOOK_SERIES) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 1094-2939 • E-ISSN: 1545-1577 |
| Publisher | Annual Reviews (PUBLISHER • US) |
| DOI | 10.1146/annurev-polisci-042114-015008 |
| OpenAlex | W2219928400 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 12 |
| References cited | 69 |
Recent work has documented an upward trend in inequality since the 1970s that harks back to the Gilded Age: the inegalitarian pre–World War I world. Most prominently, Thomas Piketty argues in Capital in the Twenty-First Century that this is partially due to the fact that capitalism is hardwired to exacerbate the gap between the rich and poor. By critically evaluating recent literature on this topic, this article offers three big contributions. First, we advance an alternative explanation for the long-term U-shaped nature of inequality that Piketty examines. Political regime types and the social groups they empower, rather than war and globalization, can account for the sharp fall and then sharp rise in inequality over the long 20th century. Second, we demonstrate that this U-shaped pattern only really holds for a handful of industrialized economies and a subset of developing countries. Finally, we provide a unified framework centered on two unorthodox assumptions that can explain inequality patterns beyond the U-shaped one. Capitalists and landholders actually prefer democracy if they can first strike a deal that protects them after transition. This is because dictators are not the loyal servants of the economic elite they are portrayed to be—in fact, they are often responsible for soaking, if not destroying, the rich under autocracy
Autocracy · Capital (architecture · Capitalism · Democracy · Development economics · Economic inequality · Economics · Elite · Globalization · Inequality · Market economy · Neoclassical economics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Rest (music · Sociology · World War II · History · Housing, Finance, and Neoliberalism · Income, Poverty, and Inequality · Law · Social Policy and Reform Studies
Threat of taxation and turnout of the rich
Interview with Thomas Piketty
Stray Thoughts on How It Might Go
Access to Modern Medical Technologies in Russia and Europe
Relational Exchange and the Degree of Embeddedness
Is Industrial Agriculture Sustainable During Climate Change and Ecological Threats
Factors of Satisfaction with Work-Life Balance
Legitimation of Commercial Surrogacy in Russia
Social Networks and Fertility
Is Inequality a Side Effect of Central Bank Independence
Globalization, Institutions, and Ethnic Inequality
The Political Effects of Wealth Inequality
Taxation and democracy
The Institutions Curse
Democracy in America
Growing Public
Autocracy and Redistribution
Capital in the Twenty-First Century
Mandates and Democracy
Why the poor do not expropriate the rich
Democracy comes to Europe
Why did the Elites Extend the Suffrage? Democracy and the Scope of Government, with an Application to Britain's "Age of Reform"
Coercion, capital, and European states, AD 990-1992
Do Democracies Have Different Public Policies than Nondemocracies?
Social Mobility and the Demand for Redistribution
Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe
Conservative Parties and the Birth of Modern Democracy in Europe
The Political Geography of Inequality
Consent, Dissent, and Patriotism
The Democratic Class Struggle
Economic Growth and Income Inequality
The Transition from Capitalism to Socialism
The Political Logic of Poverty Relief
Growth, income distribution, and democracy
Inequality
Democracy and Redistribution
Explaining Patterns of Redistribution under Autocracy The Case of Peru’s Revolution from Above
Standardizing the World Income Inequality Database
A Rational Theory of the Size of Government
The Effect of the Expansion of the Voting Franchise on the Size of Government
Did Women's Suffrage Change the Size and Scope of Government
The Industrial Revolution, Political Transition, and the Subsequent Decline in Inequality in 19th-Century Britain
The Rise of Social Spending, 1880-1930
Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy
Distribution and Redistribution
Democracy and Economic Crisis
Inequality and Democracy
Democracy, Elite Bias, and Financial Development in Latin America
Globalization, Domestic Politics, and Social Spending in Latin America
Testing Theories of American Politics
Economic Origins of Democratic Breakdown? The Redistributive Model and the Postcolonial State
Dealing with Dictators
The Conscription of Wealth
The political economy of financial internationalization in the developing world
Coercive Capacity and the Prospects for Democratization
The Role of Subnational Politicians in Distributive Politics
Inequality and Democratization
If You’re Against Them You’re With Us
The Non-Democratic Origins of Income Taxation
Is Democracy Good for the Poor
Gaming Democracy
Does Democracy Reduce Economic Inequality
Conquered or Granted? A History of Suffrage Extensions
The Economics of Transitions Democracy
Homer Gets a Tax Cut
Do Democracies Have Different Public Policies than Nondemocracies
Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions
Putting Inequality in Its Place
Inequality and Regime Change
The Economic Origins of Democracy Reconsidered
Democracy, War, and Wealth
Mobilizing Manpower for War
Determinants of the Growth of the State
| Unique citing works | 12 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,2 |
| Citation span | 2016 - 2026 (11) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 12 |