Brendan J Connell
Biographic Data
| ID | 839102 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Brendan J Connell |
| GIVEN NAMES | Brendan J |
| FAMILY NAME | Connell |
| SIGNATURE | CONNELL B J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Lyon College |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-7466-5396 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 6 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 8 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Fairweather Cosmopolitans: Immigration Attitudes in Latin America During the Migrant Crisis
What explains voter attitudes toward immigration in Latin America? This article argues that increased refugee arrivals moderate the impact of social identities on immigration attitudes. We propose that informational cues associated with increased immigration make cosmopolitan identities less important-and exclusionary national identities more important-determinants of immigration preferences. Analyzing 12 Latin American countries from the 2017-20…
Western diplomacy and state access to capital
What determines government access to capital? Conventional explanations of state credit access rest on tenuous assumptions and fail to fully elucidate market behavior seen in recent years. This article argues that investors evaluate governments based on their diplomatic ties to the West. Specifically, diplomacy with major Western powers serves as a heuristic which signals to market actors that the debtor state is a trustworthy borrower with low d…
Democracy at the Limit: Does the U.S. Debt Ceiling Really Enhance Fiscal Accountability
Congressional control of the U.S. debt ceiling continues to prompt uncertainty among financial markets. Nevertheless, the standard defense of a statutory debt limit invokes the idea of accountability: oversight of the national debt by democratically elected policymakers precludes fiscal profligacy. For this argument to hold water, however, one should observe that lawmakers are indeed motivated and held accountable by voters on the debt ceiling. D…
Another Day, Another Currency: Self-interest, Experience, and Attitudes Toward Dollarization in Ecuador
How, if at all, does self-interest bear on individuals’ economic policy preferences? Though conventional theories of preference formation usually assume a role for self-interest, the informational demands associated with understanding economic policies can prevent individuals from forming attitudes on an egocentric basis. Building on work showing that policy-specific information facilitates egocentrism, we argue that personal experience with alte…
Fed Up: The Global Ascension of the Federal Reserve in the Era of Migration
In recent decades, the Federal Reserve has emerged as a global lender of last resort. In this article, we investigate whether the prospect of unwanted migration has driven lawmakers’ support for the Fed's increased international role. During an economic crisis, declines in investor confidence and capital flight to developed economies often cause economic hardship in the developing world, thus encouraging increased migration into advanced industri…
Migration and Economic Coercion
Sender costs of economic sanctions exacerbate the enforcement problem associated with multilateral coercive measures. When third-country sanctioners share strategic interests with the target state, they have commercial and diplomatic incentives to defect from multilateral sanctions arrangements. In addition to these well-documented sender costs, this article argues that migration pressure from the target state has become an important consideratio…
Inequality and the Partisan Political Economy
Inequality is shown to shape public policies with significant redistributive ramifications. As a measure of the poor median voter's dissatisfaction with the economic status quo, some scholars argue that it is an indicator of redistributive pressure. Yet for others, it is a proxy for the power asymmetry between the rich and the poor in policymaking. How does inequality affect redistributive tax policies? We offer an explanation based on policymake…
Electoral Rules, Interest Group Pressures, and the Price of Democratic Default
Conventional wisdom dictates that democracies are reliable in upholding their international commitments. However, this assertion is at odds with democratic behavior in sovereign borrowing where democracies have sometimes imposed considerable losses on foreign creditors. Why do some democracies choose to renege on extremely large portions of their sovereign debt during economic crisis? This article argues that costs incurred by creditors are depen…
Migration and Economic Coercion
Sender costs of economic sanctions exacerbate the enforcement problem associated with multilateral coercive measures. When third-country sanctioners share strategic interests with the target state, they have commercial and diplomatic incentives to defect from multilateral sanctions arrangements. In addition to these well-documented sender costs, this article argues that migration pressure from the target state has become an important consideratio…
Fairweather Cosmopolitans: Immigration Attitudes in Latin America During the Migrant Crisis
What explains voter attitudes toward immigration in Latin America? This article argues that increased refugee arrivals moderate the impact of social identities on immigration attitudes. We propose that informational cues associated with increased immigration make cosmopolitan identities less important-and exclusionary national identities more important-determinants of immigration preferences. Analyzing 12 Latin American countries from the 2017-20…
Fed Up: The Global Ascension of the Federal Reserve in the Era of Migration
In recent decades, the Federal Reserve has emerged as a global lender of last resort. In this article, we investigate whether the prospect of unwanted migration has driven lawmakers’ support for the Fed's increased international role. During an economic crisis, declines in investor confidence and capital flight to developed economies often cause economic hardship in the developing world, thus encouraging increased migration into advanced industri…
Inequality and the Partisan Political Economy
Inequality is shown to shape public policies with significant redistributive ramifications. As a measure of the poor median voter's dissatisfaction with the economic status quo, some scholars argue that it is an indicator of redistributive pressure. Yet for others, it is a proxy for the power asymmetry between the rich and the poor in policymaking. How does inequality affect redistributive tax policies? We offer an explanation based on policymake…
Electoral Rules, Interest Group Pressures, and the Price of Democratic Default
Conventional wisdom dictates that democracies are reliable in upholding their international commitments. However, this assertion is at odds with democratic behavior in sovereign borrowing where democracies have sometimes imposed considerable losses on foreign creditors. Why do some democracies choose to renege on extremely large portions of their sovereign debt during economic crisis? This article argues that costs incurred by creditors are depen…
Electoral Rules, Interest Group Pressures, and the Price of Democratic Default
Conventional wisdom dictates that democracies are reliable in upholding their international commitments. However, this assertion is at odds with democratic behavior in sovereign borrowing where democracies have sometimes imposed considerable losses on foreign creditors. Why do some democracies choose to renege on extremely large portions of their sovereign debt during economic crisis? This article argues that costs incurred by creditors are depen…
Migration and Economic Coercion
Sender costs of economic sanctions exacerbate the enforcement problem associated with multilateral coercive measures. When third-country sanctioners share strategic interests with the target state, they have commercial and diplomatic incentives to defect from multilateral sanctions arrangements. In addition to these well-documented sender costs, this article argues that migration pressure from the target state has become an important consideratio…
Inequality and the Partisan Political Economy
Inequality is shown to shape public policies with significant redistributive ramifications. As a measure of the poor median voter's dissatisfaction with the economic status quo, some scholars argue that it is an indicator of redistributive pressure. Yet for others, it is a proxy for the power asymmetry between the rich and the poor in policymaking. How does inequality affect redistributive tax policies? We offer an explanation based on policymake…
Fed Up: The Global Ascension of the Federal Reserve in the Era of Migration
In recent decades, the Federal Reserve has emerged as a global lender of last resort. In this article, we investigate whether the prospect of unwanted migration has driven lawmakers’ support for the Fed's increased international role. During an economic crisis, declines in investor confidence and capital flight to developed economies often cause economic hardship in the developing world, thus encouraging increased migration into advanced industri…
Western diplomacy and state access to capital
What determines government access to capital? Conventional explanations of state credit access rest on tenuous assumptions and fail to fully elucidate market behavior seen in recent years. This article argues that investors evaluate governments based on their diplomatic ties to the West. Specifically, diplomacy with major Western powers serves as a heuristic which signals to market actors that the debtor state is a trustworthy borrower with low d…
Democracy at the Limit: Does the U.S. Debt Ceiling Really Enhance Fiscal Accountability
Congressional control of the U.S. debt ceiling continues to prompt uncertainty among financial markets. Nevertheless, the standard defense of a statutory debt limit invokes the idea of accountability: oversight of the national debt by democratically elected policymakers precludes fiscal profligacy. For this argument to hold water, however, one should observe that lawmakers are indeed motivated and held accountable by voters on the debt ceiling. D…
Another Day, Another Currency: Self-interest, Experience, and Attitudes Toward Dollarization in Ecuador
How, if at all, does self-interest bear on individuals’ economic policy preferences? Though conventional theories of preference formation usually assume a role for self-interest, the informational demands associated with understanding economic policies can prevent individuals from forming attitudes on an egocentric basis. Building on work showing that policy-specific information facilitates egocentrism, we argue that personal experience with alte…
Fairweather Cosmopolitans: Immigration Attitudes in Latin America During the Migrant Crisis
What explains voter attitudes toward immigration in Latin America? This article argues that increased refugee arrivals moderate the impact of social identities on immigration attitudes. We propose that informational cues associated with increased immigration make cosmopolitan identities less important-and exclusionary national identities more important-determinants of immigration preferences. Analyzing 12 Latin American countries from the 2017-20…
Economics (8 works) · Political science (7 works) · Law (6 works) · Law (6 works) · Political economy (4 works) · Politics (4 works) · Development economics (3 works) · Finance (3 works) · Market economy (3 works) · Migration and Labor Dynamics (3 works)