Democracy at the Limit
Does the U.S. Debt Ceiling Really Enhance Fiscal Accountability
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 7367497 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Brendan J Connell (0000-0001-7466-5396, Lyon College, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Volume | 60 |
| Issue | 4 |
| Pages | 713-725 |
| Publication date | 2024-07-08 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | No |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Representation (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0034-4893 • E-ISSN: 1749-4001 |
| Publisher | Taylor & Francis (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1080/00344893.2024.2373154 |
| OpenAlex | W4400422467 |
| Language | EN |
| References cited | 21 |
Congressional control of the U.S. debt ceiling continues to prompt uncertainty among financial markets. Nevertheless, the standard defense of a statutory debt limit invokes the idea of accountability: oversight of the national debt by democratically elected policymakers precludes fiscal profligacy. For this argument to hold water, however, one should observe that lawmakers are indeed motivated and held accountable by voters on the debt ceiling. Do policymakers' positions toward the debt ceiling reflect the preferences of their constituents? And are policymakers punished or rewarded for their stances? Analyzing roll call votes on the debt ceiling in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1983 to 2014, I show that lawmakers' positions are driven predominantly by policymaker ideology and bank campaign contributions rather than the demographics or ideological makeup of their constituencies. Furthermore, I find no evidence that Republicans nor lawmakers from conservative-leaning districts are punished by their constituents when voting to raise the debt limit. Democratic lawmakers' reelection chances are affected by their voting behavior but in the form of rewards for approving debt ceiling increases. These findings suggest the U.S. debt ceiling – in addition to posing a high financial risk – contributes little to fiscal accountability
Accountability · Ceiling (cloud · Debt · Democracy · Economics · Inequality · Limit (mathematics · Physics · Political economy · Political science · Politics · Electoral Systems and Political Participation · Finance · Fiscal Policies and Political Economy · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth · Law · Mathematics · Public Administration
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Congress, The Electoral Connection
It's Even Worse Than It Looks
Measuring District-Level Partisanship with Implications for the Analysis of U.S. Elections
Public Opinion Toward Immigration Reform
Congress and the Politics of Statutory Debt Limitation
Policy representation of constituency interests
Understanding Interaction Models
Quiet Influence
Determining Trade Policy
Party Polarization in American Politics
Partisan Polarization and Congressional Accountability in House Elections
Constituency Influence in Congress
Out of Step, Out of Office
Have American's Social Attitudes Become More Polarized
| Citation velocity | historical |
|---|---|
| Highly cited | No |