John B Londregan
Biographic Data
| ID | 843440 |
|---|---|
| NAME | John B Londregan |
| GIVEN NAMES | John B |
| FAMILY NAME | Londregan |
| SIGNATURE | LONDREGAN J B |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 375 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1990 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2006 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Centralization of Bargaining and Wage Inequality: A Correction of Wallerstein
Legislative Institutions and Ideology in Chile
Legislative Institutions and Ideology in Chile
The 1980s and 1990s have seen several authoritarian governments voluntarily cede power to constitutionally elected democratic governments. John Londregan uses Chile as a case study of this phenomenon, exploring what sorts of guarantees are required for those who are ceding power and how those guarantees later work out in practice. He constructs an analytical model of a democratic transition and provides a new statistical technique for analysing l…
Does High Income Promote Democracy
The authors construct a statistical model with which to test whether the regularity that democracy is more commonly found among wealthy countries stems from a democratizing effect of high income or is due entirely to other factors, such as the historical context, various features of the institutional setting, and simultaneity with the process of leadership change. Even after correcting for these many other influences, the democratizing effect of …
Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power
The transfer of power through the use of military force is a commonplace event in world affairs. Although no two coups d'etat are alike, they all have a common denominator: poverty. We analyze political and economic data from 121 countries during the period 1950–1982 and find that the probability of a government's being overthrown by a coup is significantly influenced by the level of economic well-being. Thus, even authoritarian governments have …
Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power
The transfer of power through the use of military force is a commonplace event in world affairs. Although no two coups d'etat are alike, they all have a common denominator: poverty. We analyze political and economic data from 121 countries during the period 1950–1982 and find that the probability of a government's being overthrown by a coup is significantly influenced by the level of economic well-being. Thus, even authoritarian governments have …
Does High Income Promote Democracy
The authors construct a statistical model with which to test whether the regularity that democracy is more commonly found among wealthy countries stems from a democratizing effect of high income or is due entirely to other factors, such as the historical context, various features of the institutional setting, and simultaneity with the process of leadership change. Even after correcting for these many other influences, the democratizing effect of …
Centralization of Bargaining and Wage Inequality: A Correction of Wallerstein
Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power
The transfer of power through the use of military force is a commonplace event in world affairs. Although no two coups d'etat are alike, they all have a common denominator: poverty. We analyze political and economic data from 121 countries during the period 1950–1982 and find that the probability of a government's being overthrown by a coup is significantly influenced by the level of economic well-being. Thus, even authoritarian governments have …
Does High Income Promote Democracy
The authors construct a statistical model with which to test whether the regularity that democracy is more commonly found among wealthy countries stems from a democratizing effect of high income or is due entirely to other factors, such as the historical context, various features of the institutional setting, and simultaneity with the process of leadership change. Even after correcting for these many other influences, the democratizing effect of …
Legislative Institutions and Ideology in Chile
The 1980s and 1990s have seen several authoritarian governments voluntarily cede power to constitutionally elected democratic governments. John Londregan uses Chile as a case study of this phenomenon, exploring what sorts of guarantees are required for those who are ceding power and how those guarantees later work out in practice. He constructs an analytical model of a democratic transition and provides a new statistical technique for analysing l…
Legislative Institutions and Ideology in Chile
Centralization of Bargaining and Wage Inequality: A Correction of Wallerstein
Political science (5 works) · Politics (5 works) · Authoritarianism (3 works) · Democracy (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Political economy (3 works) · Development economics (2 works) · Economics (2 works) · Ideology (2 works) · Inequality (2 works)