Martin L Jönsson
Biographic Data
| ID | 845000 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Martin L Jönsson |
| GIVEN NAMES | Martin L |
| FAMILY NAME | Jönsson |
| SIGNATURE | JÖNSSON M L |
| AFFILIATIONS | Lund University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5864-3223 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2008 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
On the Prerequisites for Improving Prejudiced Ranking(s) with Individual and Post Hoc Interventions
In recruitment, promotion, admission, and other forms of wealth and power apportion, an evaluator typically ranks a set of candidates in terms of their perceived competence. If the evaluator is prejudiced, the resulting ranking will misrepresent the candidates’ actual ranking. This constitutes not only a moral and a practical problem, but also an epistemological one, which begs the question of what we should do – epistemologically – to mitigate i…
What we mean as what we said or would have said
We usually mean what we say, but sometimes we do not. When I ironically utter ‘What lovely weather’ on a rainy day, or mistakenly utter ‘Jim is a barn door’ instead of ‘Jim is a darn bore’, I say one thing and mean another. However, although utterances like these are not uncommon, they are greatly overshadowed by the volume of humdrum utterances of ‘There is wine in the fridge’ or ‘I really like nachos’ where we mean what we say. And since we usu…
Improving misrepresentations amid unwavering misrepresenters
In recruitment, promotion, admission, and other forms of wealth and power apportion, an evaluator typically ranks a set of candidates in terms of their competence. If the evaluator is prejudiced, the resulting ranking will misrepresent the candidates’ actual rankings. This constitutes not only a moral and a practical problem, but also an epistemological one, which begs the question of what we should do—epistemologically—to mitigate it. In a recen…
A unified account of the conjunction fallacy by coherence
Shogenji’s measure of justification and the inverse conjunction fallacy
Kinds of Learning and the Likelihood of Future True Beliefs: Reply to Jäger on Reliabilism and the Value Problem
We reply to Christoph Jäger's criticism of the conditional probability solution (CPS) to the value problem for reliabilism due to Goldman and Olsson (2009). We argue that while Jäger raises some legitimate concerns about the compatibility of CPS with externalist epistemology, his objections do not in the end reduce the plausibility of that solution
Compositionality and Other Issues in the Philosophy of Mind and Language An interview with Jerry Fodor
No prominent works on this page.
Compositionality and Other Issues in the Philosophy of Mind and Language An interview with Jerry Fodor
Kinds of Learning and the Likelihood of Future True Beliefs: Reply to Jäger on Reliabilism and the Value Problem
We reply to Christoph Jäger's criticism of the conditional probability solution (CPS) to the value problem for reliabilism due to Goldman and Olsson (2009). We argue that while Jäger raises some legitimate concerns about the compatibility of CPS with externalist epistemology, his objections do not in the end reduce the plausibility of that solution
Shogenji’s measure of justification and the inverse conjunction fallacy
A unified account of the conjunction fallacy by coherence
Improving misrepresentations amid unwavering misrepresenters
In recruitment, promotion, admission, and other forms of wealth and power apportion, an evaluator typically ranks a set of candidates in terms of their competence. If the evaluator is prejudiced, the resulting ranking will misrepresent the candidates’ actual rankings. This constitutes not only a moral and a practical problem, but also an epistemological one, which begs the question of what we should do—epistemologically—to mitigate it. In a recen…
On the Prerequisites for Improving Prejudiced Ranking(s) with Individual and Post Hoc Interventions
In recruitment, promotion, admission, and other forms of wealth and power apportion, an evaluator typically ranks a set of candidates in terms of their perceived competence. If the evaluator is prejudiced, the resulting ranking will misrepresent the candidates’ actual ranking. This constitutes not only a moral and a practical problem, but also an epistemological one, which begs the question of what we should do – epistemologically – to mitigate i…
What we mean as what we said or would have said
We usually mean what we say, but sometimes we do not. When I ironically utter ‘What lovely weather’ on a rainy day, or mistakenly utter ‘Jim is a barn door’ instead of ‘Jim is a darn bore’, I say one thing and mean another. However, although utterances like these are not uncommon, they are greatly overshadowed by the volume of humdrum utterances of ‘There is wine in the fridge’ or ‘I really like nachos’ where we mean what we say. And since we usu…
Epistemology (7 works) · Philosophy (7 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Metaphysics (5 works) · Philosophy of language (5 works) · Philosophy of science (5 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Mathematics (3 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (3 works)