Bruce Shearer
Biographic Data
| ID | 8760345 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Bruce Shearer |
| GIVEN NAMES | Bruce |
| FAMILY NAME | Shearer |
| SIGNATURE | SHEARER B |
| AFFILIATIONS | Département d'économique Université Laval, CRREP, IZA and CIRANO Quebec City Canada |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-0958-2137 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 9 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 9 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2007 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
Labour supply, service intensity, and contracts: Theory and evidence on physicians
Based on linked administrative and survey panel data, we analyse the labour supply behaviour of physicians who could adopt either a standard fee‐for‐service contract or a mixed remuneration (MR) contract. Under MR, physicians received a per diem and a reduced fee for services provided. We present estimates of a structural discrete choice model that incorporates service intensity (services provided per hour) and contract choice into a labour suppl…
Structural Estimation and Experiments: Applications to Contracting Models
Structural estimation requires the specification of behavioral models that can be used to conduct ex ante policy evaluations and welfare analysis. Experiments generate data by exogenously varying key variables to measure outcomes under various treatment conditions. Gains from combining experiments and structural estimation can be considerable. We illustrate these gains through two recent papers (Bellemare and Shearer, 2011, 2013) in the area of c…
Labour Supply, Work Effort and Contract Choice: Theory and Evidence on Physicians
Labour Supply, Work Effort and Contract Choice: Theory and Evidence on Physicians
Physicians' Multitasking and Incentives: Empirical Evidence from a Natural Experiment
Physicians' Multitasking and Incentives: Empirical Evidence from a Natural Experiment
Policy Analysis in the Health-Services Market: Accounting for Quality and Quantity
We provide a theoretical and empirical framework for evaluating the effects of policy reforms on physician labor supply. We argue that any policy evaluation must account for both the quality and the quantity of services provided. The introduction of quality into the analysis has implications for both the theoretical and empirical analysis of labor supply, and consequently policy evaluation. In particular, endogenous quality choices introduce non-…
Physicians’ multitasking and incentives: Empirical evidence from a natural experiment
Physicians' Multitasking and Incentives: Empirical Evidence from a Natural Experiment
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Physicians' Multitasking and Incentives: Empirical Evidence from a Natural Experiment
Physicians' Multitasking and Incentives: Empirical Evidence from a Natural Experiment
Physicians' Multitasking and Incentives: Empirical Evidence from a Natural Experiment
Policy Analysis in the Health-Services Market: Accounting for Quality and Quantity
We provide a theoretical and empirical framework for evaluating the effects of policy reforms on physician labor supply. We argue that any policy evaluation must account for both the quality and the quantity of services provided. The introduction of quality into the analysis has implications for both the theoretical and empirical analysis of labor supply, and consequently policy evaluation. In particular, endogenous quality choices introduce non-…
Physicians’ multitasking and incentives: Empirical evidence from a natural experiment
Labour Supply, Work Effort and Contract Choice: Theory and Evidence on Physicians
Labour Supply, Work Effort and Contract Choice: Theory and Evidence on Physicians
Structural Estimation and Experiments: Applications to Contracting Models
Structural estimation requires the specification of behavioral models that can be used to conduct ex ante policy evaluations and welfare analysis. Experiments generate data by exogenously varying key variables to measure outcomes under various treatment conditions. Gains from combining experiments and structural estimation can be considerable. We illustrate these gains through two recent papers (Bellemare and Shearer, 2011, 2013) in the area of c…
Labour supply, service intensity, and contracts: Theory and evidence on physicians
Based on linked administrative and survey panel data, we analyse the labour supply behaviour of physicians who could adopt either a standard fee‐for‐service contract or a mixed remuneration (MR) contract. Under MR, physicians received a per diem and a reduced fee for services provided. We present estimates of a structural discrete choice model that incorporates service intensity (services provided per hour) and contract choice into a labour suppl…
Economics (9 works) · Microeconomics (8 works) · Healthcare Policy and Management (7 works) · Incentive (7 works) · Business (6 works) · Marketing (5 works) · Engineering (4 works) · Gender, Labor, and Family Dynamics (4 works) · Human multitasking (4 works) · Labour economics (4 works)