Physicians’ multitasking and incentives
Empirical evidence from a natural experiment
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 19035882 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Étienne Dumont (0000-0003-4618-0572), Bernard Fortin (0000-0002-7820-1916, corresponding author), Nicolas Jacquemet (0000-0002-5056-9225), Bruce Shearer (0000-0002-0958-2137) |
| Year | 2008 |
| Volume | 27 |
| Issue | 6 |
| Pages | 1436-1450 |
| Publication date | 2008-07-31 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | Journal of Health Economics (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0167-6296 • E-ISSN: 1879-1646 |
| Publisher | Elsevier BV (PUBLISHER) |
| DOI | 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2008.07.010 |
| PMID | 18778862 |
| OpenAlex | W3012634558 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 24 |
| References cited | 21 |
Business · Economics · Fee-for-service · Health care · Human multitasking · Incentive · Management · Microeconomics · Natural experiment · Operations management · Public economics · Time allocation · Engineering · Global Health Care Issues · Healthcare Policy and Management · Medicine · Primary Care and Health Outcomes · Psychology · Social Psychology · Marketing
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| Unique citing works | 24 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1,41 |
| Citation span | 2009 - 2026 (18) |
| Citation velocity | current |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 24 |