Multi-Task Agents and Incentives
The Case of Teaching and Research for University Professors
Bibliographic Data
| ID | 9716567 |
|---|---|
| Authors | Marta De Philippis (Bank of Italy, corresponding author) |
| Year | 2021 |
| Volume | 131 |
| Issue | 636 |
| Pages | 1643-1681 |
| Publication date | 2021-05-04 |
| Peer Reviewed | Yes |
| Open Access | Yes |
| Type | ARTICLE |
| Venue | The Economic Journal (JOURNAL) |
| Journal identifiers | ISSN: 0013-0133 • E-ISSN: 1468-0297 |
| Publisher | Oxford University Press (PUBLISHER • GB) |
| DOI | 10.1093/ej/ueaa119 |
| OpenAlex | W3094927328 |
| Language | EN |
| Citations received | 3 |
| References cited | 50 |
This paper exploits a natural experiment to study the effects of providing stronger research incentives to faculty members on universities’ average teaching and research performance. The results indicate that professors are induced to reallocate effort from teaching towards research. Moreover, tighter research requirements affect the faculty composition, as they lead lower-research-ability professors to leave. Given the estimated positive correlation between teaching and research ability, those who leave are also characterized by lower teaching ability. The average effect on teaching for the university is therefore ambiguous, as positive composition effects countervail effort substitution
Affect (linguistics · Composition (language · Economics · Exploit · Incentive · Management · Mathematics education · Medical education · Microeconomics · Natural experiment · Statistics · Task (project management · University faculty · Computer Science · Economic Policies and Impacts · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies · Innovations in Educational Methods · Mathematics · Psychology
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| Unique citing works | 3 |
|---|---|
| Citations per year | 1 |
| Citation span | 2023 - 2024 (2) |
| Citation velocity | recent |
| Highly cited | No |
| Citation types | Neutral: 3 |